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Cinema, Space and Nation: The Production of Doğu in Cinema in 
Turkey 
 
Ali Fuat Sengul, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisor: Shanti Kumar 
From social realism and socialist cinema, to the Turkish ‘new wave’ and the 
nascent Kurdish cinema, this dissertation traces the mutual implication of the production 
of Turkish national space and of Doğu (“The East”) as cinematic space. Doğu emerged as 
part of a discursive formation within the Turkish state’s address to eastern Turkey; it 
entered national cinema as a result of the journey of social realism to the region in the 
aftermath of the military coup in 1960, which allowed for the bourgeoning of the socialist 
public sphere and enabled filmmakers to cinematically reflect on the region. However, 
the state’s renewed security-oriented interests, triggered by the resurgent Kurdish 
movement within both Turkey and Iraq, permeated the region and enforced limits on the 
representation of Doğu as a new cinematic space. Although in its cinematic incarnation 
‘Doğu’ was hardly a perpetuation of state ideology, a cartographic anxiety—informed by 
the desire for spatial modernization—shaped the politico-aesthetic parameters of the 
region’s cinematic presence. In recent years, the representation of the region within the 
nascent Kurdish cinema can be understood as a deconstructive turn problematizing the 
foundation of Turkish national space and the cinematic Doğu.  
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CHAPTER I – CINEMA SPACE NATION 
 
Born in and with a space, the state may also perish with it. 
Henry Lefebvre, “Space and the State” 
INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation project, I study the representation of Doğu in cinema in 
Turkey. Doğu, ‘the East’ in Turkish, refers to the Kurdish-inhabited Eastern part of 
Turkey. This region initially became a cinematic subject within the context of a national 
problematic in the 1960s, although cinema’s journey to the region goes back to the start 
of the 1950s, when the region served as a background for films such as Mazarımı Taştan 
Oyun/ Dig My Grave on Stone (Atıf Yılmaz 1951), Dağları Bekleyen Kız / The Girl Who 
Waits the Mountains (Atıf Yılmaz, 1955), and Ezo Gelin / The Bride Ezo (Orhan Elmas, 
1955). While these films took place within the East, it was only in the 1960s, when the 
Socialist Left had appropriated the term as part of a developmentalist rhetoric, that the 
region itself became the subject of cinema. In both the state and the socialist account, 
however, the East was deemed a part of the national territory not fully integrated into 
national modernization. Doğu, in this way, emerged as a ‘problem’ obstructing spatial 
modernization, namely the production of national space. I study Doğu as a cinematic 
space by relating the production of national cinema to the production of national space in 
Turkey. As a cinematic space, Doğu emerged at the intersection of the processes of the 
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production of national cinema and of national space. Doğu is both the geographical 
location of the region (the East), and the name of the region as addressed within the 
framework of national modernization. In this project, I use Doğu to refer to this national 
problematic through which the region gained its visibility as a new cinematic space, 
while the East will be used as a geographical signifier.  
The journey of Turkish cinema to Doğu in the 1960s meant both the physical 
production process in the region and the problematization of the region through national 
modernization. In order to explain the terms of the encounter of national cinema with the 
region as Doğu, I specified certain starting points. The journey of national cinema to the 
region was made possible within the context of the 1960s. Throughout the decade, after a 
long period of the state’s monopoly over discursive production on the region since the 
1920s, cinema managed to gather interested progressive writers and artists around its 
production process. Social realism as a cinematic movement, which emerged as a more 
politicized cinematic language informed and defined the filmmakers’ engagement in the 
region. Although social realism took shape within the post-military coup reformation 
period in the early 1960s, its aesthetico-political parameters were formed in the early 
1950s, after what I will define as the ‘realist turn’ in cinema, which overlapped with the 
emergence of ‘national cinema.’  
Although informed by the literature on the concept of ‘national cinema,’ my 
analysis of national cinema in the Turkish context varies from these accounts. Since the 
1980s, within several debates, national cinemas have been defined and problematized in 
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relation to the conditions of postcoloniality and Third cinemas (Willemen 1989); and, 
more recently within the context of global, transnational, and world cinema frameworks 
(Hjort and Petrie 2007, Vitali and Willemen 2006, Ďurovičová and Newman 2009) My 
account diverges from these in several important ways. First, I define ‘nation’ through 
spatial terms rather than cultural terms, although ‘cultural’ is an important part of 
spatiality. I take national cinemas as productive of national space rather than enclosed 
within it. Second, I argue that the emergence of national cinema in Turkey was based not 
on ‘national specifity’ vis-à-vis other nations and national cinemas, which, as Paul 
Willemen attests, informed the early studies on ‘national cinema,’ (2006) but as a result 
of internal debates on the definition of ‘the nation’ in terms of its space and time.  
The international context and the industrial imperatives such as the effect of the 
municipal tax cut on film ticket revenues in 1948 and the concomitant rise in domestic 
film production unquestionably affected the emergence of a national cinema in the 1950s 
(Arslan 2011). Yet these factors were overdetermined by the need for defining a nation 
that would identify the ‘national cinema.’ Although ‘national cinema’ was celebrated as a 
sign of the end of both Western and Eastern influences on film production, the desire for 
‘the national’ was part of a larger discursive formation within which both the function of 
cinema and nation was redefined in the 1950s. Third, rather than tracing what makes a 
cinema national (what makes Turkish cinema Turkish), whether in terms of its content, 
style, specificity, or industrial scope, I trace the emergence of the discourse of national 
cinema: why did ‘national cinema’ become a concern only in the 1950s ? This will help 
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discussing where and when to start the national cinema in Turkey. Following these 
concerns, I propose the beginning of national cinema, while also taking into consideration 
the ‘first films’ and the arrival of the cinematic medium, and the emergence and 
consolidation of the film industry, should be traced back to the moment ‘national cinema’ 
emerged as a problematic. In this way, I suggest there is a discrepancy between the 
history of cinema and of film production in a national space and the historiography of 
‘national cinema’ informed by this problematic, the former being mainly the product of 
the latter. This national problematic defined what kind of history would be written at that 
particular moment. 
Informed by this spatial problematic, I discuss Turkish ‘national cinema’ through 
two related events that took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s: the spatial expansion 
of film production and the ‘realist turn,’ which informed this spatial expansion. In the 
early 1950s, on the one hand, filmmakers went to rural Anatolia to make films, on the 
other hand, they went out to the urban everyday as part of the narrative space, after 
decades of being constricted to a completely ‘staged’ mise-en-scéne. These excursions, 
both to rural Anatolia and to the urban everyday after long staying in the vicinity of 
Istanbul’s studios, was part of a search for a realist aesthetic that would define national 
cinema.  
However, the journey to rural Anatolia for the sake of ‘realism’ was not limited to 
cinema, but was part of a process through which ‘nation’ was defined through the term of 
‘realism,’ and rural Anatolia as the ‘space’ of ‘real nation.’ Cinematic realism 
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(documentary style, non-professional/amateur actors, recording life as is) was chosen as 
able to capture real nation within Anatolia. This spatial shift, the realist turn and its 
relationship to the nation, all through the problematic of national cinema, were definitive 
for the filmmakers’ journey to the to the East and it determined both the aesthetic-
political parameters of the films on Doğu and their reception by the critics. For this 
reason, the study of national cinema in terms of spatial shifts, namely the spatial analysis 
of national cinema is crucial to a discussion of Doğu as cinematic space. The spatial 
analysis will also bring together national space and national cinema as problematic 
informing cinematic representation. 
The introduction of Doğu in Turkish cinema was informed on the one hand by 
events in cinema, such as the foundation of Sinematek (Turkish Cinematheque) by the 
left-wing cineastes and the emergence of social realism and a more politicized culture of 
film production, etc., and on the other, by the events taking place within the East in the 
1960s, such as the socio-political mobilities (Gündoğan 2011) organized by the socialist 
left. However, it was the military coup of 1960 that defined both the possibility and the 
limits of the representation of Doğu as cinematic space. The coup defined the possibility 
because social realism through which Doğu gained its visibility was part of the 
reformation process that led to the emergence of a socialist public sphere, which, for the 
first time brought together Turkish and Kurdish socialists. Also during the 1960s, the 
East became an object of critical scholarly analysis. The coup defined the limits of 
representation because during the same period, the post-coup state intensified its security-
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oriented policies within the region due to the Kurdish movement both inside Turkey and 
in the neighboring Iraq. Although the emergence of a socialist public sphere affected film 
production in the 1960s, the ‘national cinema problematic’ – the production of national 
cinema and finding a national cinematic language and aesthetic—shaped social realism’s 
engagement in the East until the 1970s.  
In my study of cinematic representation’s ‘productive’ contribution to the spatial 
formation of Doğu vis-à-vis the national space, it is necessary to explain what I mean by 
nation and Doğu as spatial formations. I define the process of nation building through the 
production of national space by states’ spatial techniques. Although nation-states are 
founded on a demarcated territory on which they hold sovereign rights, the physical land 
becomes national space through states’ spatial techniques. Within the process of national 
spatial formation, parts of the national territory are redefined in relation to a new national 
center, and this relationality informs the identity of different/heterogeneous parts. In 
order to explain the mutually implicated relationship between nation and space, I define 
the concept ‘nation-space’ as a problematization of ‘national space.’ While national space 
defines a particular space’s identity as national without actually defining the nation or 
space it identifies, nation-space, decouples national space by problematizing the twin 
processes of spatializing nation and nationalizing space as state spatial practices in 
national modernization process. An important part of the spatial modernization is that 
these spatial techniques also work to ‘realize’ the nation in a phenomenological sense. 
Techniques such as cartography, geography, and census render the nation visible and 
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experiential. While becoming ‘real,’ the nation also emerge as a series of ‘images.’ I 
name this form of visibility resulting from state spatial practices, ‘state realism.’ The 
analysis of Doğu at the intersection of cinematic realism and state realism will show the 
limits and form of the (in)visibility as it relates to the region. In both terms, ‘realism’ is 
not a reflective but productive of its subject (through the problematic of national 
modernization.) Although cinematic realism is the second chapter’s analytical concern, 
‘realist’ ideology informs the production of all films I discuss throughout the dissertation. 
Both cinematic realism through the analysis of realist turn and national cinema 
and state realism through the analysis of national space are informed by a spatial analysis, 
which also informs my textual readings of the films. I study Doğu as cinematic space in 
three main iconographic sites by which it became visible: borderland, farmland, and 
empty-flooded village. Each site corresponds to a genre and a particular spatial 
problematic. Borderland was the main site in 1960s social realist films on Doğu. 
Borderland became the primary cinematic space through an attempt to find a 
secular/modern culture on the fringes of the national space as well as through the 
cartographic anxiety triggered by the Kurdish movement at both sides of the south-
eastern borders. In these films, the national border and its politico-cognitive acceptance 
by the characters constitute the criteria for being modern. Although the border appeared 
in different periods and within different genres, especially in the 1980s due to the 
beginning of the armed conflict on the borders, it was not the main site in the later films.  
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Farmland was the main cinematic site of the films on Doğu in the 1970s socialist 
cinema. The farmland was the main space of economic production in the eastern context, 
where the economy was based on agricultural labor. The farmland was both the space of 
production and of revolution. The site disappeared as the main cinematic space with the 
loss of faith in socialist revolution within the context of the East after the 1980 military 
coup, which targeted the socialist movement. Empty-flooded villages were the main 
cinematic sites in the new Turkish cinema of the 1990s. The site manifests how Turkish 
cinema dealt with the effects on the region of the war between Turkish army and the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers Party) since the mid 1980s: approximately three thousand villages 
were evacuated as a security precaution and as a result of dam construction as part of the 
massive South-East Anatolia Development project. As part of these sites, mountains have 
been an important iconographic element in the films of Doğu, signifying either resistance 
(against suppression) or unconquerability and unreacheability (by the security forces); 
their narrative function can be situated within the three sites I specified. 
I offer this spatial reading of the films on Doğu against two trends in film analysis 
that have defined film studies on Turkish cinema. One is the character-based analysis, 
which focuses on the identity of the main characters through the analytics of reality, and 
deploys the analysis of stereotypes. A recent study by Kurdish cultural critic and 
journalist Müslüm Yücel, Türk Sineması’nda Kürtler (Kurds in Turkish Cinema) covers 
the entire history of Turkish cinema featuring Kurds. Yücel argues that in popular 
Turkish cinema, Kurds categorically performed socially inferior roles and have been 
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represented almost without exception as Turks with a broken accent. The representation, 
Yücel suggests, has been based on the assimilation and humiliation of Kurdish identity. 
Although a valid analysis of the state’s practices against the Kurdish identity, the 
argument dismisses the entire field of cinematic production as the continuation of state 
ideology1. Methodologically, this approach takes a particular identity as an a priori that 
can be either truthfully or stereotypically represented. In contrast, I suggest that the 
filmmakers’ engagement in the region and its characters is always pre-determined by a 
national-spatial problematic through which they gain cinematic visibility. Thus, the 
change in the identity of the characters in different periods can be explained by the 
change in the formulation of the national-spatial problematic. I argue that it is the space 
that embodies the characters, and not vice versa, and we should take space, Doğu, as the 
main subject of analysis: The main characters in the 1960s social realist films, the bandit 
and the smuggler, inhabited the borderland; the revolutionary figure of 1970s socialist 
films, the maraba (peasant), inhabited the farmland; and the major character in the new 
                                               
1 As I will discuss later on, cinema’s engagement in the region was a break in the ideology of cultural 
productions on Doğu. Until the 1940s the literary works on Doğu was heavily informed by the Kemalist 
ideology, which was based on the superiority of the Republican cultural project. The two early foundational 
novels Dağları Bekleyen Kız/The Girl Who Waits the Mountains (1936) by Esat Mahmut Karakurt and 
Zeynonun Oğlu/Zeyno’s Son (1928) by Halide Edip Adıvar are examples of the early incarnations of Doğu 
as a literary space. The novels take place during the Kurdish rebellions after the foundation of Turkish 
Republic in 1923. Both novels are about the amorous relationship between a Turkish military officer as the 
embodiment of national modern and the representative of the new state and a young Kurdish woman 
expected to be encultured by the relationship (Alakom 2010.) The novels reflect the Kemalist ideology of 
the early Republican period by narrating the story of modernization through military presence. Although in 
the 1960s films on Doğu has military officers as main characters, these films avoid a celebratory brace of 
the Army beyond the necessity for passing film censorship. The filmmakers I will discuss throughout the 
dissertation was critical of this early high modernist Republican ideology. 
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Turkish cinema of the 1990s, the migrant, was unable to inhabit the empty, flooded 
village due to the spatial practices of the state. 
The second trend in Turkish film studies is related to the recent works on new 
Turkish cinema. The ‘new’ Turkish cinema as a new analytical term to define 1990s art 
and popular films has been used by the film scholars such as Asuman Suner (2011), 
Gönül Dönmez-Colin (2008), and Savaş Arslan (2011) to define a post-national 
cinematic aesthetic, which problematizes the idea of nation as homogenous and coherent 
identity-space. The analytical framework is to a great extent informed by transnational, 
excilic, diasporic cinema theory put forth, among others, by Hamid Naficy in his work 
Accented Cinema (2001) where he formulizes a new mode of cinematic presence through 
the aesthetic-political experiences/experiments of the several “deterritorialized” 
filmmakers whose productions evade the boundaries of nation and national cinema. 
According to Naficy, interstitiality, mobility, deterritorialization, and border-crossing are 
modalities that give rise to a particular language of cinema. Informed by this framework, 
the analysis of the recent films on Doğu takes the same parameters as their modus 
operandi. Suner’s discussion of Eşkiya/The Bandit (Yavuz Turgul 1996); Dönmez-
Colin’s (2008) and Kevin Robins and Asu Aksoy’s discussion of Güneşe 
Yolculuk/Journey to the Sun (Yeşim Ustaoğlu 1999) (Robins and Aksoy 2000) are 
representative examples. While in both films the main characters are ‘deterritorialized,’ 
and constantly in move --Baran in Eşkiya had to leave his village and go to Istanbul to 
find his beloved; Mehmet in Güneşe Yolculuk, after losing his job in Istanbul where he 
11 
 
lived as a migrant worker, took his friend’s coffin to his village for burial and there 
assuming the latter’s identity --as I will discuss in the fourth chapter in detail, I argue that 
a more productive analysis would focus, not on the deterritorialized characters, but on the 
films’ problematization of the state spatial practices that produce such migrant subjects. 
In what follows, I offer a brief historical background of the region followed by a 
discussion of my conceptual framework, research methodology and theoretical-
methodological influences behind my project. Afterwards, I provide an outline of my 
chapters overviewing each one’s theoretical stake within the overall concern of the 
dissertation.  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: NATION-STATE, THE EAST AND DOĞU 
Until the late 19
th
 century Turkish modernization process, the Eastern region had 
been ruled by Kurdish principals with varying degrees of administrative autonomy on the 
territory. Although after the World War I parts of the Kurdish nobility were enrolled in 
the war effort during the ‘war of independence’ as irregular forces on the Turkish side, 
The foundation of the Turkish Republic in the early 1920s brought the collaboration to an 
end. The rebellions, which broke out in the late nineteenth century, resumed after the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic. The Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925, the Ağrı 
Rebellion of 1930-31, and the Dersim Rebellion of 1937-382 (Yeğen 1999, 2011) were 
                                               
2 In recent scholarship on national historiography and Kurdish Question, the term ‘Dersim Massacre’ is 
used to define the event instead of ‘Dersim Rebellion.’ While the existence of the local resistance against 
the Turkish army has been accepted, the response of the Turkish army was well beyond only suppressing 
the resistance including mass killings and deportations from the province and changing the name of the 
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the major instances of armed encounters between the new state and the Kurdish 
opposition. This opposition was circumvented within the one and a half decades after the 
foundation and the region was kept under the State of Emergency until the 1950s. During 
this period, the territoriality of the state was established through military build-up as part 
of the martial law precautions that expanded until 1950. The inhabitants of the region 
were deported to the western parts of Turkey with the Forced Settlement Law of 1934 
and replaced with non-Kurdish population, while the place names and cultural titles were 
Turkicised throughout the region. During this period the term Doğu and Doğulu (the one 
from Doğu) began to be used in place of “Kurd.” Except for a few novels praising the 
military might and presence in the region and official reports written by the emergency 
governors on the general situation within the region, the East had been kept strictly 
outside both cultural and academic representation until the second half of the 1960s3. 
This absence had been informed by the nationalist discourse—formed in the 1930s—that 
Kurds do not ‘exist.’ The comparison of the geography books of 1920s and 1930s is a 
                                                                                                                                            
province to the name of the military operation ‘Tunceli’ (bronze-hand). In November 2011, the Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdoğan apologized ‘in the name of the state’ accepting the event as massacre perpetrated 
by the then ruling party Republican Peoples Party that currently serves as the main opposition in the 
Parliament. (http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/134241-basbakan-dersim-icin-ozur-diliyorum) (accessed on 
9/10/12) 
3 Doğu Sorunu (Eastern Question), signifying the situation of the Eastern regions in terms of the necessity 
of incorporating the region into the new nation-space, reincarnated within official reports after the 
foundation of the Turkish state with regard to the rebellions, their causes, and measures that should be 
taken by the state. In 1936, a year before the Dersim Massacre a “Top Secret” report was submitted to the 
President by the Minister of Economy Celal Bayar. Entitled ‘Şark Raporu’ (Eastern Report), it discusses 
the necessity of socio-economic reforms to assimilate the Eastern region into Turkish culture3. In the 
report, Bayar claims that in addition to the social reforms, in order to make sure of the intended results, the 
reforms should be accompanied by deporting Kurdish notables from the region to avoid likely reverse 
effects(Bayar 2006 )3.  
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good indication of the state practices and the disappearance of Kurds and the emergence 
of Doğu(lu) as a new discursive category. The expressions like “Kurdish women dresses 
with shalvar and colorful headcover” in 1920’s geography books changed to “Eastern 
(Doğulu) women ….” into the 1930s. By the end of the decade, the expression Kurd(ish) 
disappeared from the official discourse and was replaced by Doğu(lu) (Ozkan, 2002). The 
1934 Law on Family Names prohibited the use of last names that refer to other nations. 
The law required all last names to be in proper Turkish (Durgun, 2011). In 1941, the first 
Geography Congress met to discuss policies to make the national geography conform to 
“Turkish reality” (p. 213). As a result, the national territory was divided into seven 
geographical regions and named according to the adjacent bodies of water 
(Akdeniz/Mediterranian Region, Karadeniz/Black Sea Region, Marmara Sea Region, 
Ege/Aegean Region) or to the geographical location of the region (Inner-Anatolia 
Region, East Anatolia Region, South-East Anatolia Region). The congress also discussed 
Turkicising the name of the districts, cities and villages in the regions according to 
similar generic formulas. These techniques, while rendering the nation visible by 
registering it onto identification cards, maps, atlases, and road signs, erase the 
existence—both physical (material) and symbolic—of the non-Turks within the nation-
space. Doğu was invented as the limit of representation of the region and its inhabitants. 
In addition to the discursive reincarnation into the category of the geographic location, 
within the official documents Doğu was used pejoratively: It signified pre-modern 
allegiances against the modern nation-state, with illiterate, obstinate and primitive people.  
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DOĞU AS DISCURSIVE SPACE 
Discursive space is informed by Edward Said’s discussion of the Orient in 
Orientalism (Said 1979). More than a physical location, the term discursive space is 
informed by the ideological and political function of that particular geography within the 
organization of power on a particular scale. However, unlike Said’s Orientalism in which 
he studies the Orient as part of colonial knowledge production based on the dichotomous 
ordering of the physical space through the axis of self and the other (occident-orient) 
(ibid.), I discuss Doğu as part of the national knowledge production whose spatial 
ordering is based on the erasure of the self-other dichotomy within an intended space-
time of the nation. Hence I discuss the discursive space (of Doğu) in conjunction with the 
spatial (material) practices that contribute to the production of the former within the 
economy of state power.  
Using Doğu both in physical (as East) and discursive terms presents a number of 
difficulties. While it became the region that was produced geographically in the 1940s as 
part of the national territory as a result of the decade’s geographic and cartographic 
surveys dividing the national territory into administrative-economic units, Doğu also 
refers to a particular problematization of the region within the state discourse concerning 
the production of nation-space that I define as ‘spatial modernization.’ As I discuss in the 
second chapter, the semantic inflation in the term from a geographic signifier, as a 
‘location,’ to a discursive ‘space’ produces— and reproduces—this locality within the 
nexus of national significations. To avoid the confusion, I use ‘the East’ and occasionally 
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‘the region’ to refer to a geographical unit, while ‘Doğu’ is used to refer to the discursive 
aspect. In this way, I define my subject as being not merely the films taking place in this 
particular region, namely, in the East, but in Doğu as discursive space. I use this 
distinction as a heuristic device, and the reader should be informed that I am not taking 
‘the East’ as a value-free and neutral definition, as it always implies a (national) center 
and in this way I suggest the images cannot be just the reflection of a physical location: 
both geographical representation (cartographic projection) and cinematic representation 
are already mediated by discursive regimes. They intersect as much as diverge. My main 
interest here is in the way cinema engages in the problematization of the region as Doğu.  
I differentiate between the films on Doğu and the ones that are taking place within 
the East. I have specified around a hundred films taking place in the Turkish East since 
1950s (see the complete list in Appendix A). Within this list, I selected a list of around 
twenty films made between 1965 till 2005 for analysis which engaged in the production 
of Doğu as cinematic space. These films thematically inspired many other popular films 
on the region without a similar political/ideological commitment on the part of the 
filmmakers. One example in terms of the criteria for film selection is Mezarımı Taştan 
Oyun/Dig My Grave on Stone (1951.) The film takes place in the city of Diyarbakir, the 
producer’s hometown, and was one of the earliest films taking place in the region; 
however, it is based on a romantic folktale and made under the influence of the highly 
popular Egyptian melodramas of the period. The actor and producer of the film, Hüseyin 
Peyda, known as the Rudolph Valentino of Turkish cinema, wanted the film, to be shot in 
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his hometown, among other things, to cut the cost of production (Yılmaz 1995, Yücel 
2009).4 Similarly, there are films making use of the high popularity of the films on Doğu. 
The ‘Arabesque’ films on the ‘Eastern’ singers exploit the same tropes made popular by 
the films I discuss in here. What motivated the directors of these films, however, was the 
commercial viability of the genre rather than their cultural-political engagement in the 
region. Although not included in the analysis, I briefly mention these films in the third 
chapter under the rubric of ‘fatalistic’ films of the East.  
When I first started my project my working assumption was as follows: although 
the directors went to the region as part of the critique of the state practices therein, their 
cinematic production in Doğu worked to reproduce the state ideology (formed till the 
1960s). However, as I delved into the production stories of the films, the biographies of 
the filmmakers, and how they negotiated being able to have access to a ‘state of 
emergency’ region in a mode that was critical of state practices, I shifted my framework 
from the idea of cinema as direct ideological re-production of state’s conception of Doğu 
to the field of cinematic production as semi-autonomous yet overdetermined by state 
practices. As I discuss in the following chapters, both cinematic space and national space 
have been subjected to several contestations and they are far from being homogenous 
formations. Cinema and political power in Turkey had a mostly antagonistic relationship 
                                               
4 However, the story on which the film is based is about Abdo Agha who is known to be Kurdish (Yücel 
2009). Yet, during the filming process any reference to the ethnic identity of the character is erased. 
Although I recognize the importance of the film within a discussion on cinema and national identity, and a 
textual analysis of which would show the erasures the film embodies to achieve popular status, I am not 
including it in my discussion as neither the film nor the producer (and director) comments on the region 
beyond appropriating as the background.  
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except for a few moments in the history of Turkish cinema: the period after the 1960 
military coup when the political power turned a green light on the emergence of a 
socialist public sphere and allowed cinema’s modernist critique of the dethroned 
Democrat Party’s conservative ideology is a primary example. While appropriating the 
term as the only (possible) form of engagement available, these films redefined Doğu as a 
contested space of class antagonism in accordance with the critical discourse of the 
decade, which informed the ideology of cultural production on the region. Even still, film 
production has been perpetually overdetermined by state practices—censorship being the 
prime instance: almost all films in the following pages were initially banned and/or 
censored by the censorship committee, which was comprised of state officials without 
any representative from the film industry. Moreover, the majority of the directors and 
screenwriters were blacklisted by the committee, yet they continued producing their craft 
under pseudonyms.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
As a popular medium, Turkish cinema since 1950s made the East, a state of 
emergency region, visible and available for mass consumption. Although censorship to 
an important extent limited the scope of visual and narrative engagement of the 
filmmakers, the uniqueness of the cinematic medium resides in its capacity as a 
cartographic field where these limits can be traced and seen. Considering the ideology of 
cinematic production, it is also a field where the political power encounters its 
opposition. Since the 1960s, when knowledge production on the region was still under 
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the strict control of the state, filmmakers insisted on engaging in the East as one of its 
main subjects.  
Methodologically, I analyze these films as part of the production and contestation 
of national space. Cinema is palimpsestic field, which requires a method of analysis that 
runs at several grounds. I introduce a spatial reading as the overall methodology that 
brings together different analytical concerns. Spatial reading refers to the analysis of 
space within the films, the space of cinematic production, and cinema’s connection to the 
production of national space. It comprises textual and contextual analyses: the textual 
analysis of the films reads space in films by asking how films form their narrative space. 
How do characters engage in the space they inhabit or move across? How does the 
iconography of Doğu change over time? Contextual analysis aims to take films as 
contexts themselves. Although contextual analysis, in a conventional sense, is the study 
of the context within which cultural production takes place, thereby assuming a one-way 
structural causation between the context and the text, in my own use of contextual 
analysis, films map their own contexts. This has two meanings: on a textual level, the 
contexts become visible—readable—through films, and the textual analysis may reveal 
contextual ‘determinants.’ In the second sense, to which this projects leans, films create 
their own contexts, namely, there is no concrete context prior to the production of a film. 
Both films and their analysis bring together otherwise separate events to make sense of 
the films, or these otherwise disparate events assume a relation within the analyses of the 
films. This ‘bringing together’ gives an analytical definition of a ‘context.’ In this sense, 
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‘the’ context is the co-product of the films and their readings. Both textual and contextual 
analyses are important methodological components of spatial reading whose primary 
concern is to show how these films, together with state spatial techniques, become 
productive of the space of Doğu.  
LITERATURE REVIEW: SPATIAL TURN, CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND THE NATION 
Since the early 1990s, cinema studies has revealed interests in the disciplines of 
geography and political science, disciplines that traditionally had a scientific commitment 
to the world but were undergoing an epistemic shift that is now referred to as the “spatial 
turn” and offered fresh insights for scholars formerly working through traditionally realist 
sciences. Encapsulated by the works of Henry Lefebvre ([1974] 1991), Michel de Certeau 
(1984), Michel Foucault (1967, 1980, 1984), David Harvey (1989), Edward Soja (1980, 
1989), and Doreen Massey (1994), the spatial turn opened the door for a critical 
interdisciplinary dialogue between geography and other fields, including cinema studies. 
My own spatial readings are informed by Henry Lefebvre whose The Production 
of Space ([1974] 1991) redefined space as both a social product and productive of the 
social against the idea of space as abstract, empty and homogenous. Edward Soja 
continues the perspective in his formulation of ‘socio-spatial dialectics’ (1980) and later 
in Postmodern Geographies (1989) through socio-spatio-temporal ‘trialectics.’ Soja 
criticizes the prime status given to historicism in social analysis, which proposes 
historical progress as taking (no)place by reducing space to a neutral component. The 
reflection of this historicism and taking (no)place in cinema – and film—studies can be 
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seen as the dominance, until recently, of anthropocentric readings of cinematic 
representations where the mobile body, both the filmmakers and the characters (e.g. 
Naficy, 2001) take the central stage. These analyses that take the body at the center 
reproduce the body and space as dichotomous. Taken as the art of motion (it comes as no 
surprise that one of the foundational stories in the history of cinema is the photographer 
Eadweard Muybridge’s desire to capture motion), cinema has been, until recently, 
analyzed through historicist methodology that prioritizes progress and agency. Although 
spatial reading problematizes historicism and the primacy of agent/body over the space it 
inhabits, as informed by Lefebvre (1991, 2009), Foucault (1980, 1982, 1986) and Soja 
(1980, 1989), it does not reduce the body to the effect of a structural causality, what 
would be ‘spatial determinism’ (Soja 2009, p. 33). Instead, in spatial reading, space 
allows, and is allowed by, subjects.  
In their introduction to the edited volume Taking Place: Location and the Moving 
Image, Elena Gorfinkel and John David Rhodes, emphasizing the importance of space 
and place in cinematic production and analysis propose shifting the order of background 
and foreground in film analysis by bringing forward the background and pushing the 
foreground behind (2011). Even though this is a necessary move towards a ‘spatial 
reading,’ this insight can be furthered by also analyzing the ways in which the two 
grounds implicate each other.  
While geographical knowledge and methodology became available for other 
disciplines, the discipline itself started appropriating the methodologies of other social 
21 
 
science and humanities disciplines. Edward Said’s Orientalism defined the ‘orient’ as 
‘imaginative geography,’ Franco Moretti’s Atlas of European Novel (1992) discussed the 
geography of 19th century European novel as charting (and inventing) the “new 
geography of nation-state.” Tom Conley’s Cartographic Cinema (2007) (following his 
Film Hieroglyphs: Ruptures in Classical Cinema (1991)) suggested films as maps: he 
states: “[I]n its first shots, a film establishes a geography.” Conley also proposes 
‘cartography as a way of viewing cinema’ (p. 2)  
Within the discipline of Geography this turn encouraged geographers to question 
the scientific claims of their discipline and the relations of power underlying the 
production of geographical knowledge. One result of this epistemological shift was to 
interrogate what kind of geographical knowledge had been produced within the cinematic 
medium and how it affected the way real geography is perceived. In Place, Power, 
Situation, and Spectacle: a Geography of Film (1994), Stuart Aitken and Leo Zonn 
offered “geographical investigation of cinematic spaces and places.” They state that “the 
way spaces are used and places are portrayed in film reflects prevailing cultural norms, 
ethical mores, societal structures, and ideologies,” which should lead the geographers to 
pay attention to the “production and consumption of space and place in cinema” (1994, p. 
5). In the same edited volume, Jeff Hopkins analyzes how cinematic landscape and the 
society are connected: “cinematic landscape is [...] an ideologically charged cultural 
creation whereby meanings of place and society are made, legitimized, contested, and 
obscured” (Hopkins 1994, p.47). He further claims that the ideological effect of the film 
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lies in its capacity to fabricate “an imaginary space and time, a cinematic space” which is 
the result of the combination of “iconic forms and the iconic illusion of motion” (p. 52). 
Sharing a similar concern with Hopkins, Marcus Power and Andrew Crampton in their 
introduction to the edited book Cinema and Popular Geo-Politics critically reflect on the 
relation between “reel geopolitics” and “real geopolitics.” In their article “Reel 
Geopolitics: Cinemato-graphing Political Space” they argue that film “represents a 
constitutive element in the production of political geographies” and “political spaces, 
places and landscapes are implicit tools in the production of film” (2007, p. 5). For that 
reason, they argue, there is a need to investigate “the filmic authorship of geopolitics or 
the production of geopolitical meaning in cinematic texts and their intertextuality with 
other geopolitical landscapes and discourses” (p. 3). 
Against the backdrop of historicist analyses, the literature on nation and 
nationalism witnessed the emergence of works focusing on the importance of 
geographical and cartographic knowledge in the production of nations and nationhood. 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism complemented his major argument of nation as ‘imagined community’ with 
the ‘material’ conditions of imagination (2006), Thongchai Winachakul’s Siam Mapped: 
A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (1993) on the production of Thai nationality 
through national cartography, traces how during the process of nation-building, different 
ethnicities and their territories are reduced to geographical locations within the new 
spatiality of Thailand. Raymond Craib’s Cartographic Mexico: A History of State 
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Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes (2004) discusses the formation of the state and the 
production of nation through maps and mapmaking as a process of ‘realizing the nation;’ 
and James Scott’s seminal work Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve 
the Human Condition Have Failed (1998), reflects on the productive function of 
geographical and cartographic knowledge production within the nation-building process.  
Spatial reading aims to put these literatures into productive dialogue by tracing 
similar concerns as they arise across different conjunctures. The two effects of the spatial 
turn: on the one hand, the attention to the material bases of nations and the importance of 
space (spatial production) within nation-building process, and, on the other, the mutually 
productive relationship between cinema and space in the cinematic space and the space of 
representation, drive this dissertation. Doğu brings together these two spatial technologies 
of state and cinema. First, I discuss Turkish nation building through the production of 
nation-space by modifying and re-defining the national territory with cartographic and 
geographical techniques (bounded by national borders) in accordance with a national 
(Turkish) identity. Second, I discuss cinema and its relation to nations and nationhood 
through its spatial character that combines politics of representation with the politics of 
space. 
CINEMA OF CONTESTED SPACE(S) 
I specifically engage in a dialogue with the literature on the cinematic 
representation of ‘contested space(s).’ The analysis of the cinematic representation of 
social identities and their representation in general, who inhabit a contested space—one 
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that is subject to multiple sovereignty claims—should prioritize that space. ‘Spatial 
reading’ permits a discussion of space as the main stake of cinematic representation of 
these sites. The checkpoints, borders, and landscapes in Palestinian, Basque, Irish and 
Armenian cinemas, and in the cinema of the Indian North-east, feature as main issues in 
these films. These contested spaces abound in national cinemas where cinematic 
representation is directly connected to political representation, and cinematic space to 
political space.  
Scholarly works on the American Western genre attests to the primacy of political 
geography as underlying the production of the genre. Even though the works I have 
considered include the issue of the representation/misrepresentation of the characters, 
they focus on how such representation is informed by the spatial perception of the 
American “West.” For example, in his seminal Gunfighter Nation, Richard Slotkin argues 
that Westerns mythologized the westward-moving frontier of violence to legitimate Euro-
America's act of violent (dis)possession of the Indian land (Slotkin, 1992). Besides being 
methodologically similar to my study’s shift of the focus from the representation of the 
body to the space it occupies, these scholarly works on the Western genre contextualize 
the films within a very specific time in American history: the moment of integrating the 
“west” into the white-European political cartography, and the rise of the genre and its 
revivals parallel the renewed political attempts to incorporate the region.  
Michael J. Shapiro (2004, 2007) looks at Post WWII John Ford movies to show 
the ways in which the West is integrated into the American way. Shapiro introduces 
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space as a character in the narrative, not just a background on which characters move, 
and connects the cinematic space to the actual space to which it refers. He further states 
that what is at stake in these films is not the characters that are (mis)represented but the 
space within which the characters live. This (mis)representation, in turn, works to 
delegitimize the Indians’ right to the space and to politically and socially disqualify them 
in inferior roles. He introduces the concept of “cinematic nationhood” where “film has 
been involved in the cultural articulation of the nation building and sustaining the project 
of the states” (2007, 32). Shapiro looks at how “myth of the west” is invented in the 
western genre. In the article “The Demise of International Relations” he analyzes 
Stagecoach (John Ford 1939) and claims that the “ethnoscape” of the film is depicted as a 
“haunted land” (p. 36) in which “whites are represented as destined to displace 
unreliable, dangerous savages” who are shown as characterologically unfit to negotiate a 
shared political order (p. 38). Shapiro claims that the identity between characters and the 
landscape is explored in all of Ford’s westerns. In My Darling Clementine (1949), there 
are “two inseparable impediments to the expansion of a stable and peaceful domesticity 
to the west: the untamed landscape, which encompasses and dominates the lives of the 
west’s people and hitherto untamed, violent characters, who imposed the rule of the gun” 
(2004, 153).  
Steve Neale, in his work on the post-war pro-Indian westerns, “Vanishing 
Americans” (1998), claims that what made these films possible and popular was, on the 
one hand, the change in the government, especially in the office of war information, in 
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terms of the geo-political concerns, which resulted in adapting liberal policy “that favors 
negotiation, co-existence and mutual respect towards the Native American population, on 
the one hand, and tolerance and integration on the other (1998 11).” This liberal stance, 
according to Neale, that lasted until 1960s and supported by both Liberals and 
conservatives, was a way of integrating Indians. As a result, the revival of the genre in 
post-war context as pro-Indian took place within the nexus of various discourses and the 
political power’s changing geopolitics of the region. While the territory was appropriated 
as commodity for capitalist expansion, Indians were to be citizens of the nation, losing 
their “special status” in “Euro-American law as ‘domestic dependent nations’“(19). 
Analyzing another revival of the genre in 1990s, in “The New Western American 
Historiography and the Emergence of New American Westerns,” Rick Rowland and 
Edward Countryman claim that this reemergence of Western can be attributed to the 
popularization of a particular historiography looking at westward expansion of the Euro-
American settlers claiming that the “frontier” does not exist (1998 185). This new cluster 
of movies, for the authors, re-defines the Indian through white lexicon:   
[W]hat is so appealing about this vision of Indian culture is that it seems to reflect 
foremost a just society where individual accomplishments are rewarded and 
private property rights respected, as well as a co-operative communitarian circle 
where no one is left to fend for him/herself psychologically or materially (p. 189).   
In a different context and different genre, yet with similar concerns, in “The 
Space in Film and the Film in Space: Madrid’s Retiro Park and Carlos Saura’s Taxi,” 
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Benjamin Fraser (2007) analyzes Carlos Saura’s Taxi (1996) through what he calls 
“urban approach” which combines in the film analysis both ‘on-screen’ and ‘off-screen 
space’ of the film. He claims that “the meaning of on-screen spaces must be tied to the 
production of off-screen spaces” (2007, 16). According to Fraser, from an urban 
approach, the film does not have spatial sensitivity. He points that the park in the film 
functions as an aesthetic background that is fixed and uncontested. However, through 
reading the park’s spatial history, he claims the film cannot give a sufficient critique of 
how the park itself has been commodified to turn it into a “tourist space” and how the 
government’s security apparatuses and the discourse on crime in the park work to 
legitimize this kind of global spatial reordering of city-spaces. Fraser claims that by 
failing to critique this spatial violence, the film reproduces the aesthetic ideology backing 
this spatial reconstruction of the park. Implying that the film is also a part of the tourist 
aesthetic he offers a film analysis: the analysis would “require the twin investigation of 
how urban space is used in film as well as how the film is used in urban space” (2007, 
30). Fraser states that beyond paying attention to the violence to which the space is 
exposed, spatial analysis should include the construction of space itself as a form of 
violence and how the violence against minorities is an integral part of the construction 
and reorganization of this space. 
CINEMA STUDIES IN TURKEY AND THE FILMS OF DOĞU 
In recent works on the representation of the other in Turkish cinema, specifically 
the representation of ‘Kurds,’ the films on/about them are criticized in terms of the 
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character portrayals without any attention given to the politics of space regarding the very 
space they inhabit. For example, Müslüm Yücel in his Kurds in Turkish Cinema (2009) 
dismisses almost the entire Turkish cinema as assimilationist by (mis)representating the 
Kurds in inferior roles. This analysis insufficiently takes Kurdishness as a homogenous 
entity that can be represented in a unified truthful way; moreover, the focus on 
misrepresentation misses the differences between the modalities through which the 
characters in the films perform their identities and how these modalities are mediated by 
differential positions the characters embody. The generalizing attitude of Yücel against 
the representation of Kurds in Turkish cinema is repeated by another recent work, this 
time, on the emergent Kurdish cinema. In her introduction Müjde Arslan, the editor of the 
book Kurdish Cinema: Deterritoriality, Border and Death, , proposes the concept of 
‘Kurdish cinema’ as correcting the misrepresentations of Kurds in Turkish cinema. 
Despite the validity of these critical analyses by the Kurdish scholars and writers against 
the homogenizing effects of ‘national cinema’ they use an ideological analysis 
inadequately: while tracing the ideological effects within the texts, their analysis does not 
pay attention to the larger politico-cultural field within which both the filmmakers and 
the texts assume their functions. Both works overlook the material determinations of 
political and social history of cinematic production such as the state of emergency rules 
and the censorship with which the filmmakers constantly struggled. 
The methodology of spatial reading is also necessitated by the nature of the 
‘Kurdish question’. As I will discuss in the following chapters, what embodies the 
29 
 
Kurdish question is Kurds’ “right to space” (Lefebvre 2009):  the Kurdish question is a 
spatial question, more specifically a question of sovereignty. As mentioned earlier, the 
films of Doğu are part of a particular problematization of that space to which Doğu 
refers. The directors were not primarily concerned with the representation of a particular 
(ethnic/national) Kurdish identity although they were—and still are—aware of the 
Kurdish struggle and its human costs. The representation, however, was informed by the 
way the space inhabited by Kurds was perceived by the filmmakers. Two main subject 
positions within which Kurds are represented in cinema, the smuggler and maraba, which 
I discuss in the second and third chapters, should be taken as reflections of the 1960s 
(national) border anxiety and the ideal of socialist revolution in the East of 1970s, 
respectively. I argue that the filmmakers were mainly interested in Doğu and its 
rehabilitation through national (spatial) modernization.  
Throughout the dissertation, I track how the directors perceived that ‘space’ 
before and during the time of production. My argument is based on the assumption that 
the ‘politics of representation’ is implicated in the ‘politics of space’. In order to study the 
nexus of ‘representation’ and ‘space,’ I trace how the signifier Doğu has changed across 
different films and periods. While ‘Doğu’ has been used within these films to define that 
particular space, its meaning and narrative function transformed according to spatial 
regimes to which that space was subjected. Following this assumption, my main criticism 
of the recent works on Kurdish representation is that they miss that the Kurdish question 
is about contestation over space and that the state’s response to that question has been 
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spatial. In an analysis of cinematic representation as part of the spatial claims and 
strategies, the main question should be: what are the spatial stakes informing the 
filmmakers in their representations of Kurds, and what are the spatial effects of such 
representations? The main problem is not whether Kurds are misrepresented but how 
their representation is related to the spatial politics of the Turkish nation-state. The issue 
of representation, cinematic and at large, should be discussed in connection with the 
question whether the representation grants the right to space. Finally, the importance of 
space in the analysis—and the importance of space in Kurdish question—is that the 
emphasis on the cinematic representation of the body of the Kurd cannot understand the 
problematization of Doğu—either as an obstacle to the production of national space (state 
discourse) or as its excess (Socialist discourse) – and moreover, it abstracts the body from 
its spatiality and reduce the Kurdish question to the question of ‘individualized’ cultural 
rights, which could be remedied through multicultural policies that incorporate capitalist 
modernization into a new governmentality of the nation-state. 
CHAPTER OUTLINES 
The representation of Doğu in Turkish Cinema took place at the conjunction of 
various events; the form and the function of this cinematic space changed in different 
moments and contexts. I specify four periods when a particular event, or series of events, 
affected the representation of Doğu. Taken together, they provide a historical account of 
the emergence of Doğu as cinematic space. The first period is the 1960s during which 
social realism prepared the contours of Doğu as cinematic space. I discuss Doğu’s 
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representation in relation to what I call ‘realist turn’ in Turkish cinema and the ‘national 
cinema debate’ that shaped the 1960s cinematic production. The second period covers the 
1970s socialist / revolutionary cinema and its connection with Doğu. Doğu as cinematic 
space within socialist/revolutionary cinema bears the main debates and tensions of the 
socialist movement and the place the Kurdish movement occupied within. The third 
period covers the armed conflict between the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and the 
Turkish Army that started in 1984. The war and the concomitant state of emergency 
effective in the provinces of Doğu throughout the 1990s on the one hand and the 
emergence of what film scholars called ‘new Turkish cinema,’ a revival of film 
production after a decade of politico-aesthetic crisis in Turkish cinema as a result of 1980 
military coup, on the other informed Doğu as cinematic space. I end the chapter with the 
lifting of state of emergency rule in 2004. During this period of armed conflict the East 
witnessed massive ‘forced migration’ to the mostly western cities, especially Istanbul. 
While Doğu turns into an empty space, Istanbul becomes the new cinematic space of 
Doğu. In the last chapter, I shift my focus from Turkish cinema to the emergent Kurdish 
cinema. The shift implies remapping the geography to which Doğu corresponds. In a 
similar way that Doğu functions as a discursive space as part of the production of Turkish 
nation-space, the same geography is a part of another territoriality, Kurdistan. As such, 
the East of Turkey corresponds to the North of Kurdistan. The last chapter discusses 
Kurdistan as cinematic space and reads it in parallel with Doğu.  
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Chapter II: Social Realism, Borderland and Nation-Space 
Following the main methodological argument that the cinematic representation 
should be analyzed through spatial shifts and claims, in this chapter I study the two 
spatial shifts that brought the cinema to the East, to the space inhabited by Kurds in the 
context of state realism, informing the various spatial techniques of the state in an effort 
of produce “national territory” (Lefebvre 2009). The argument of the chapter is that 
realism, both in cinematic and state form, defined the form and content of the nation. 
Although I start the representation of Doğu in 1960s, within the framework of social 
realism constituting the aesthetic and political form of representation, the chapter goes 
back to the 1950s to trace the formation of the aesthetic of cinematic realism in Turkish 
cinema. The first spatial shift to Anatolia, considered by the directors as the authentic 
space of national culture, was to find a secular interpretation of national culture. The 
second shift to the South, through the film adaptations of Yasar Kemal’s stories helped 
formulating the narrative tension of realist cinema around the antagonism between the 
feudal elite and the landless peasant brought together within the economy of an 
impossible love story. These shifts were triggered by a desire to find a modern/secular 
national identity in Anatolia. Thus, the filmmakers’ commitment to portray their subjects 
‘realistically’ can be seen as an attempt to merge the ‘real’ of the camera and the ‘real’ 
nation; a belief in the camera’s technological capacity to show what is in front of it is 
matched with the belief in the existence of a real ‘nation’ that can be captured optically. 
The 1960 military coup was the necessary –yet unfortunate—turning point for the 
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emergence of social realism as the new political language of cinematic production. Yet 
by capitalizing on the anxiety over the national borders, the post-coup military power 
renewed its spatial strategies in the East: modifying national census queries to exclude 
any reference to different ethnicities, Turkicising toponyms to ‘reflect’ homogenous 
(national) spatiality were some of these strategies. Films I discuss bring together the 
narrative tension of the realist cinema between the feudal elite and the landless peasant 
and the ‘border anxiety.’ The national border and borderlands are central components in 
the social realist films of Doğu. By reading ‘social realism’ and ‘state realism’ together, 
the chapter discusses the spatial stakes of cinematic Doğu in the 1960s.  
Chapter III: Socialism and Farmland: Doğu as Space of Revolution 
The aesthetic and political consensus behind social realism dissolved during the 
second half of 1960s. The result was the emergence of two camps: socialist/revolutionary 
cinema followed the socialist movement and its cultural politics, and ‘national cinema’ 
makers defined their aesthetico-political engagement through nativist and traditionalist 
terms. Within socialist/revolutionary cinema, Doğu as cinematic space was informed by 
the following factors: The emergence of a socialist public sphere, the anti-colonial 
internationalism of Socialist movement, and the revival of a Kurdish movement and its 
alignment, until the mid-seventies, with Turkish socialism. The chapter discusses Doğu 
as ‘space of revolution’ aiming to eradicate feudalism.  
In the chapter, I argue against the claim that the films of the period were 
Orientalist and misrepresented the Kurds in inferior roles. Firstly, framed around the 
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socialist politics of the period, ‘class antagonism,’ not ethnicity, was the main modality 
through which Doğu became visible in cinema: the feudal elite became the target of 
criticism, not Kurds as an ethnic category. Secondly, due to the political claims over the 
space of Doğu and the political engagements of the filmmakers, the cinematic 
representation was shaped by socialist realist aesthetics. I argue that rather than being 
orientalist (eroticizing and exoticizing an ahistorical space) these films engage in the 
possibility of historical progress through the revolutionary agency of the character of 
‘maraba.’ Although the figure appears as the prime focus, the maraba is a reflection of 
socialist spatial politics. The politics of space emerged at the intersection of the anti-
imperialist and anti-colonial theory and struggles, and prioritized national spatial 
modernization.  
Chapter IV: The Long 1990s and the Empty, Flooded village: War and the Spatial 
Politics of New Turkish Cinema 
In the 1980s, Doğu became an unknown, undecipherable space. This was an 
important shift from the 1970s when progressive filmmakers had a clear vision (Socialist 
gaze) of Doğu and were adamant supporters of socio-economic development as a panacea 
to the ‘problem’ of the region. The result was: maraba disappeared as the main 
protagonist in the 1980s. Instead of agricultural fields, snow-capped mountains became 
the main site of the few films of the decade on Doğu. This perspective loss, aggravated 
by the armed conflict and state of emergency, lasted until the mid-1990s when critical 
engagement in Doğu became possible as a result of a series of political events. The brief 
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positive political atmosphere at the beginning of the decade due partly to the post-cold 
war political order evolved into intense conflict towards the mid-1990s. Turkish cinema 
engaged in Doğu through the effects of the war on the region, forced migration being the 
most important. About three million Kurds had to move to the western cities. Cinematic 
Doğu is shown through ‘empty, flooded village’. While the migrant became the main 
protagonist of the films and attracted the scholarly attention, the immobile (sedentary) 
body that stayed behind within the empty region expanded the diegetic space back to the 
East. Through the obstinate/sedentary body, the films trace the effect of war on the 
region. Yet for those who left the East behind, the act of leaving does not bring relief, and 
the migrant bodies are marked by Doğu in the form of skin color and accents. The spatial 
order they are subject to in the East continues to determine their life in the western city.  
Chapter V: Kurdish Cinema, Remapping National Space 
Recently there has been a debate as to whether or not there is a Kurdish cinema, 
asking, do Kurdish films exist without a national cinema framework? While including 
Kurdish cinema within a national cinema framework poses a methodological problem  as 
it lacks institutional structure, nation-state and national territory, recent critical works on 
the nation and globalization’s effect on cultural production allows us to reevaluate the 
scope of cinematic production and its relation with space.  
While Kurdish cinema is understood as part of a national struggle, close analysis 
of frameworks of Kurdish film production demonstrates the films cut across both national 
and transnational perspectives. In this chapter, I discuss Kurdish cinema in terms of its 
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spatial imaginary: how it negotiates the political struggle for (territorial) sovereignty and 
the decentralized existence of the filmmakers. The mapping of cinematic space within 
Kurdish films and its relation to other maps help to show its difference from Turkish 
cinema. While this spatial imaginary deconstructs Doğu as part of Turkish nation-space, 
Kurdish cinema does not imagine another nation-space. Rather, it proposes a non-violent 
cartography replacing the violence embodying the (re)production of nation-space.  
CONCLUSION 
While the literature referred to above exemplifies reading cinema spatially, its 
direct transmission to my project has several complications. I use spatial reading not to 
demonstrate how the cinematic representation disqualifies Kurds’ “right to space,” but to 
partly discuss why a proper analysis should not take the representation of Kurdish 
‘identity’ as the center of analysis. Therefore, I propose studying the filmmakers’ 
perception of the space of Doğu at particular moments. Since the main argument is that 
what drove the cinematic production on Doğu was (national) spatial modernization, the 
main conflict is determined by spatial anxiety caused not by the Kurds as an ethnic 
category, but by the space they inhabit as impediment to national modernization. The 
issue with the cinematic representation has not been the containment of spatial 
contestation, but redefining it through the terms of national modernization. However, as I 
discuss in the fourth chapter, the 1990s was a turning point in contesting the state’s 
project of (national) spatial modernization in new Turkish cinema. Yet by that time, 
37 
 
Turkish cinema, unlike in 1970s, granted no revolutionary agency to its characters against 
the state. 
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CHAPTER II: REALIST CINEMA, DOĞU, AND NATION-SPACE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the representation of Doğu as part of the social realist 
movement in Turkish cinema. Social realism refers to the progressive left-wing 
filmmakers’ attempts to reflect on the contemporary socio-economic problems (Refiğ 
1971). The movement, although lacking a manifesto or an institutional structure, rather 
referring to a mode of cinematic engagement that brought together several filmmakers 
and film critics, emerged within the context of the social reformation process in the post-
coup 1960s (Daldal 2003). While the cinematic representation of the East was an 
achievement in and of itself, for the region had been outside the space of representation 
both politically and aesthetically since the foundation of the Republic due to the 
successive state of emergency rules under which it had been ruled by the military 
governors with extraordinary powers, its cinematic representation within social realism 
aimed at incorporating this contested space into the space –time of the national, which, 
successive governmental policies long failed to achieve. Although the filmmakers had to 
work under the strict censorship regulations imposing the official discourse of the 
‘nonexistence’ of Kurds as separate ethnicity, it’s also the ideology of realism that 
structured a particular way of (modernist) representation. I take the cinematic 
representation of the East through realism as part of the production of nation-space. In 
order to make this ‘productive’ connection, I will argue that ‘realism,’ besides and more 
than a cinematic style, worked as the main logic structuring the production of the modern 
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nation and of the region since the foundation of the Turkish state in the 1920s. Social 
realism was both the product of this logic and serves as a ground where it is the most 
‘visible.’ The realist cinema was part of creating national cinematic language through the 
representation of the ‘real’ nation, whereas the discourse of nation as reality was part of 
the ‘realist turn’. The relationship between ‘realism’ and ‘nation,’ stretches beyond 
cinematic production.  
The main concern of this chapter is how the conventions of realism as it emerged 
within context of Turkish cinema was related to the production of Doğu as cinematic 
space. A historical account of the emergence of realist cinema through the textual 
analysis of the first realist films of the 1950s, (Karanlık Dünya/Dark World (Metin 
Erksan 1953), Toprak/The Earth (Nedim Otyam 1952) within the wider context of 
ideological shifts in the 1950s will be followed by the discussion of realist cinema’s 
travel to the East in the 1960s. This initial discussion will inform the analysis of how 
Doğu became space of reality in realist films in the 1960s. After the 1960 military coup, 
the decade witnessed the emergence of social realism as a more politicized cinematic 
language. I will discuss how the military coup affected the politics of cinematic 
production in general and of cinematic realism in particular, and how it affected the 
representation of Doğu – or its introduction into the cinematic space. The textual analysis 
of three social realist films on Doğu will accompany the discussion of the nexus of 
realism and nation to understand the logic of realist representation and its relation with 
national space. The chapter ends with the discussion of another ‘realist’ film of the 
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decade Seyyit Han (1968) by Yılmaz Güney. The discussion of the films will provide 
insight into the logic and limits of ‘social realism’ within the context of the Turkish 
cinema of the 1960s. 
As part of an attempt to understand the cinematic representation of Kurds within 
the context of the ongoing ‘Kurdish question’, my starting point in this chapter is the 
continuity between the ‘realist’ films of the 1950s and the films about Kurds in the 1960s 
when they became the subject of cinematic representation. My attempt, however, was 
already challenged by the stickiness of the issue of representation and realism when I 
started the project. The films were ‘about’ Kurds who were not represented as Kurds but 
through certain categories conforming the basic contours of cinematic production of the 
era. The troubling part was to reconcile realism and realist cinema with the disappearance 
of Kurds in it. Although both the ontological (absence /presence) as well as 
epistemological (how to know if they are Kurds when they are not represented as Kurds) 
premises of my initial concern over representation was promising to pursue a rich 
analysis, the translation of the theoretical concern over cinematic representation of Kurds 
in the Turkish context, namely discussing the representation of Kurds in terms of their 
material presences but cinematic absences gravitated towards the argument taking 
cultural production as part of the ideological state apparatuses (Althusser 1994). Yet the 
close study of the politics of cinematic production in 1950s and 1960s shows that, 
cinema, especially the realist cinema, and the political power had more of an antagonistic 
relationship with each other than the former being the apparatus of the latter. However, 
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1960s were one of the few moments, especially the first half, when the political power 
supported the emergence of a critical cinema, i.e. social realism. It was within social 
realist political aesthetics that we see the representation of Kurds Turkish cinema -- 
although not as Kurds. At that stage of the research, I changed my main question from 
why Kurds were ‘not’ represented in Turkish cinema (namely, why any reference to 
Kurdishness, such as the language, disappeared from the representation), to why the 
Turkish cinema went to the East, the space inhabited by Kurds and interrogate an answer 
to the first question within this larger ‘spatial’ problematic. Shifting the focus from the 
Kurds to the space they inhabit helps understanding the ideology of both cinematic 
production and of space; the two have an intrinsic connection. I located cinema’s spatial 
journey to the East within the context of my current argument that the cinematic 
representation aims to incorporate this contested space into the space –time of the nation. 
What made the representation of the region in the 1960s possible was the effect of what I 
call the realist turn both in the definition of nation and in Turkish cinema, both of which 
converged in the 1950s. To support my argument, I trace two genealogies that converged 
in 1960s as the conjuncture of cinematic production on Doğu. First is the geneaology of 
social realist cinema within which the East entered the cinematic space. I will discuss 
realist turn in cinema through two spatial shifts in cinematic production and in connection 
with the emergence of ‘national cinema.’ Within the general realist turn, nation and the 
‘real’ converged in the 1950s. The other genealogical attempt is the analysis of what I 
call state realism, which refers to the state’s attempt to produce nation as reality through 
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several spatial technologies of production in an effort of produce national territory 
(Lefebvre 2009). The East was subjected to the techniques of state realism to the most 
extreme measures due to its contested history. In the East, the cinematic realism and state 
realism intersected, the latter informing and limiting the former. I argue that when social 
realism arrived the East what it saw as ‘real’ was already the product of these 
nationalizing spatial techniques: I call Doğu as new national(ized) spatiality. The 
appropriation of Doğu to define the narrative space of the films on the East, both by the 
filmmakers and the film critics, is one indication to trace this intersection. As discussed in 
the first chapter, Doğu emerged within the state’s discourse to address the region. The 
discourse of Doğu worked to decouple the space it refers to and its inhabitants by way of 
reducing it to a geographical extension of an assumed (national) center.  
In the following first section is the discussion of the emergence of realism within 
the context of Turkish cinema. Through the discussion of the first ‘realist’ films, I will 
locate the realist turn within the context of a general political, ideological and aesthetic 
transformation in the 1950s’ Turkey. The section is followed by the discussion of the 
emergence of social realist cinema in the 1960s and its relation to the 1960 military coup 
and within the context of the ‘national cinema debate’ of the decade. The debate 
informed both the production of social realist films and the hermeneutic space within 
which they are received by the film critics. The next section discusses state realism and 
the arrival of social realism to ‘Doğu’ through the discussion of four seminal films of the 
period at the intersection of two realisms. Toprağın Kanı/The Blood of the Earth (Atıf 
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Yılmaz 1965) is about an idealist petroleum engineer, the head of the oil refinery in the 
eastern town of Raman. The film revolves around the engineer’s fight against the 
“imperialist” America and the feudal system both preventing the drilling with the fear of, 
as the engineer suspects, losing both the town and the nation to the rapid modernization 
that the oil revenue would bring about and ending their dependency on both sides. 
Hudutlarin Kanunu / Law of the Borders (Lütfi Ömer Akad 1966) is about Hıdır, an ex-
smuggler (on the border of Syria) whose attempt to quit smuggling, backed by the army 
officer and a primary school teacher, fails due to the still strong feudal system in the 
region. Muradın Türküsü/The Song for Murat (Atıf Yılmaz 1965) deals with the villager 
Murat’s love affair with the daughter of the mighty landlord who refuses Murat’s request 
to marry the daughter. Yet the Landlord is outmaneuvered by the power of the people of 
the town. All three films use actual places, incorporate regional details and deal with the 
contemporary problems of the time of their production: border, nationalization of 
petroleum, feudalism, land reform, etc. and all three are well-known examples of social 
realist cinema. My argument regarding these films and how they deal with the East is that 
being part of the social realist cinema, their primary concern was national (spatial) 
modernization. I will end the chapter with the analysis of Seyyit Han (Yılmaz Guney 
1968). A director of Kurdish descent, Güney had already been a part of Turkish cinema 
both as actor and screen writer. Hudutların Kanunu was based on one of his short stories 
and he was also the main character in the film. Seyyit Han was his attempt to make a 
realist film (Soner 2005) in defiance of the dominance of commercial cinema. He worked 
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with the well-known cinematographer Gani Turanlı whose work with the director Akad 
made him an important name in social realist cinema. However, although film was loyal 
to conventions of realist cinema (location shooting, documentary style, focusing of 
ordinary people) to the extent of looking like a documentary film in some parts, it was 
banned by the censorship committee by distorting reality. While the film shows the 
subjective nature of reality, it is also a wonderful example to discuss the ideology of 
social realism and its connection with state realism.  
REALIST TURN, CINEMA AND NATION 
In 1948, in response to a long-term anxiety on the part of the Domestic Film 
Producers Association over the dominance in the domestic market of the American and 
Egyptian cinemas, the government introduced a substantial revenue tax cut for domestic 
films to invigorate the film production. Not only enjoying numeric dominance, American 
and Egyptian cinemas also shaped the production culture in Turkey throughout the 1940s. 
The majority of domestic films were remakes of popular American adventure films or 
Egyptian melodramas (Arslan 2011). During the following decade, the number of 
domestic films exponentially increased5 (Makal 1991). The same year, in 1948, the 
Association organized a competition to select the ‘best Turkish film’ (Başgüney 2010). In 
the early 1950s, a group of new film directors such as Metin Erksan and Lütfi Ömer 
Akad entered the still-nascent film industry withholding a desire to put an end to the 
                                               
5 According to Makal, between the years of 1916 to 1944, the average number of annual film production is 
1.46. Between 1945 and 1959 the number rises to 41.46. (Makal 1991, 9) 
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dependency on foreign films, offering instead the creation of a national cinematic 
language. In 1952, Association of the Friends of Turkish Cinema is established and the 
following year, organized the first Turkish film festival. Also in 1953, a survey was put 
by the Sinema6 journal to investigate the first “Turkish” film as a possible starting point 
for this national cinema (Özön 1995). 1950s witnessed these attempts at nationalizing the 
nascent industry that had been under the ‘foreign influence’ and finding a national 
cinematic language that would be different from the other cinemas.  
One response to the need to creating a national cinematic language in the 1950s 
was what I call realist turn in ‘national’ cinema. The main premise of the turn was 
representing ---or more properly, reflecting--- the ‘real’ problems of the ‘real’ people, 
that is in turn taken as ‘the nation’. Unlike the historical films of the era journeying into 
the past for search of an authentic national identity, or the films of the previous decade 
under the influence of stage arts that had a pro-western take on the national identity 7,  the 
                                               
6 The journal was started by Nijat Özön and Halit Refiğ in 1950s as a reaction to the popular cinema 
magazines such as Yıldız (Star) and Yeni Yıldız (New Star) focusing on the lives of film stars. Sinema 
journal would focus on film critique and debates. (Başgüney 2010) 
7 Within the dominant historiography of Turkish cinema, the early history is divided into two periods: Up 
till the 1940s, during the single party era, the industry was” under the influence of “the single man” Muhsin 
Ertuğrul”  who, coming from a Theatre background assimilated the cinematic medium into the conventions 
of stage arts, using artificial sets and imitating “western” representational style. The second period is started 
in the 1950s; “multi-party era -- multi-director film industry”. While the periodization of the history of 
cinema according to political historiography is arbitrary, as I argue in this chapter, the 1950s were a turning 
point in terms of the desire for ‘national’cinema’. I discuss this turning point in terms of the shift from the 
use of artificial sets to location shooting which, as I will analyze as part of a larger politico-ideological shift 
in the 1950s. The historiography written by Nijat Özön in his 1962 book “History of Turkish Cinema” 
remained unchallenged until recently (for a critique of dominant historiography of Turkish Cinema , see 
Dilek Kaya Mutlu’s “The Russian monument at Ayastefanos (San Stefano): Between defeat and revenge, 
remembering and forgetting”). In his “Turkish Cinema” entry to “The Oxford History of World Cinema,” 
Yusuf Kaplan uses the same arbitrary periodization. (Kaplan 1997) 
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realist cinema focused on the here-now, as the time of the nation. The turn, however, not 
only referred to a particular cinematic style and methodology, it also referred to a spatial 
shift in cinematic production. The great majority of the films made until 1950s took place 
in (the vicinity of) Istanbul (Özön 2010).8 The realist cinema shifted the narrative space 
from Istanbul to Anatolia. Like its contemporary Italian neorealism, realist turn in 
Turkish cinema involved going out into the everyday life of the common people, 
documentary style shooting, and ethical attachment to the social world. However, unlike 
the latter which took urban as space of reality, realism in the Turkish context defined the 
rural Anatolia as its space of reality. Despite the difference, both Italian neorealism and 
realism in Turkish cinema had strict commitment to space (Rhodes and Gorfinkel 2011). 
Both movements’ criteria for realism is shaped by the reality of that particular spatiality 
they aimed to comment on. Also both movements diverged from the naturalistic tendency 
in the convention of cinematic realism that emphasized the verisimilitude between the 
image and ‘reality.’ While both have ethical commitment to factual world9, it is not 
simply the visual reproduction of it. As Andre Bazin discusses in “Ontological Bases..” 
                                               
8 The cinema historian Engin Ayça’s periodization of Turkish Cinema defines the pre-1950 period as 
‘urban cinema.’ According to Ayça with 1950s ‘rural cinema’ period starts. Although Ayça’s 
historiography of national cinema differs from that of Nijat Özön and Giovanni Scognamillio (Atam 
Görücü 1994), he also uses the same periodization of ‘from a cinema under the infuence of Theather to the 
proper cinema of the 1950s’ (p. 44). According to Ayça’s historiography, during the first ‘urban cinema’ 
period, cinematic production, with the annual production average of 4-5 films, was under the influence of 
Republican ideology of national modernization and imposed modern –read urban—lifestyle through films 
adapted from theather plays. It’s only in the1950s, the decade called by Özön as the period of sinema-
makers, that instead of constructing the (idealized) rural (villages) on the stage, location shootings of the 
rural began. (Özön 2010, Scognamillio 1987, Atam and Görücü 1994) 
9 David Overbey, in his Introduction to “Springtime in Italy: A Reader on Neo-Realism,” starts with a long 
quote from Roberto Rossellini where referring to the definition of neo-realism he says “For me, it is above 
all, a moral position from which to look at the world. It then became aesthetic position. But at the 
beginning it was moral” (quoted in Overbey 1978)  
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realism is taken not merely as reflecting whatever is in front of the camera but as the 
camera’s ability to assign to the image the status of (ontological) reality: the cinematic 
image itself constitutes the criteria of reality. What is ‘captured,’ the image, is not the 
reality of that particular place; the image of the place works as the content of realism. The 
image and reality are connected only through the mediation of an epistemological order. 
In addition to the capacity of the camera, the relationship between the camera and reality, 
whether the former reflects the latter or not, is based on how the reality is defined within 
that epistemological order in the first place. In the Turkish context, whether the realist 
cinema was representing the real ‘nation’ or not is not the main concern of the chapter. 
What will be proposed as the methodology, rather, goes to the opposite direction: taking 
the nation as the product of realism. The expedition of the realist directors to the rural 
Anatolia to ‘discover’ the nation, considering the productive function of realism, can be 
seen as containing a desire to ‘invent’ that very nation. If realism works through not 
reflecting but creating its reality, nation’s, an abstract category, becoming the object of 
realist cinema, should be read as its process of ‘real’ization, namely its production as 
reality10.  
Two films by the directors Metin Erksan and Nedim Otyam who made their 
directorial debuts in the early 1950s were the first ‘realist’ attempts in Turkish cinema. 
Erksan’s Karanlik Dünya/Dark World (1953) was on Aşık Veysel, the prominent blind 
                                               
10 The coupling of real and the nation is based on two premises: one is that nations do ‘exist’ and that they 
can be ‘seen.’ This secular - phenomenological interpretation of nation became popular among the 
Kemalist left in 1940s and 1950s. I will discuss the effect of secular interpretation in the next section. 
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folk poet. The film aimed to give a socio-economic background to his art and life. To 
make the film, Erksan went to the Sivralan village in the city of Sivas, Veysel’s 
hometown, located in the middle Anatolia. Otyam’s Toprak/The Earth (1952) was the 
first film dealing with the issue of land ownership and the still existing feudal system in 
rural Anatolia, a topical issue of the period. Both directors set out to explore the ‘real’ 
Anatolia. However, the directors had to alter their films drastically to pass through the 
censorship committee. (Hakan and Barış 2008, Ozgüc 2005, Ozön 1962, Scognamillio 
1987). At the first encounter with the committee, the films were completely banned for 
their ‘unrealistic portrayal’ of the rural Anatolia. Before the films were released, their 
depictions of the lack of health clinics, and the still pervasive smallpox (which had 
claimed Aşık Veysel’s sight); the undergrown crops, the barefoot children and villagers 
in patched clothes were cut and replaced by either retakes or documentary footages from 
foreign films. In Dark World, joyous villagers celebrating the end of smallpox in front of 
the hospital in the village [that added in the post-censorship editing process], voluminous 
crops, and well-dressed characters replaced the ‘unrealistic’ rural life depicted on the 
screen: not uncommonly, the political power decided what is real and what is not. The 
tragic-comic character of this encounter between the directors and the government-
appointed censorship committee, which would recur in the following four decades, 
should not divert the attention from a more subtle aspect of the encounter. While it is 
partly about the directors wanting to reflect the social realities of the national society and 
the political power through which it is repressed, it is also about the nature of this 
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particular social ‘reality’. At this point, the key question is ‘why did the directors choose 
the underdeveloped rural Anatolia as their object and space for their realist films?:’ 
Anatolia as ‘space of reality…?’ A clue lies within the period when the realist turn was 
unfolding, the time when, as Raymond Williams defines it, realism became a main 
“intent” behind cinematic production (Williams 1977). 
REALISM SPACE AND NATION 
As one side of cross-referentiality of the real and the nation is to assume 
equivalency between visible and the real, and the productive function of the discourse of 
reality, other side is redefinition of the nation through the axis of reality. From the 
perspective of nation, the coupling of real and the nation is based on two premises: one is 
that nations do ‘exist’ and the other is that they can be ‘seen.’ This secular - 
phenomenological interpretation of nation became popular among the Kemalist left in the 
1940s and 1950s. Cinematic realism was a response to the dominance of the foreign films 
and genres in the domestic film market and it was part of creating a national cinematic 
language. However, the realist ‘intent’ and the itinerary of realist cinema had been 
formed not in cinema per se but within the larger socio-political transformation beginning 
the second half of the 1940s. Realist cinema in the Turkish context offered a secular 
interpretation of national identity. Both the secular definition of nation and its 
representation in realist cinema was a response to ‘crisis of modernity’ experienced by 
the secular intelligentsia witnessing the rising popularity of religious conservative 
ideology since the mid-1940s. Mahmut Makal’s autobiographic realist novel “Bizim 
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Köy/Our Village” (1950) captures the transformation and the concomitant secular anxiety 
quite aptly. Makal was trained as teacher in Village Institute, the educational centers built 
by the founding Republican People’s Party upon the proposal by the Ministry of 
Education in the 1930s to spread Kemalist modernist reforms of the new republic 
throughout the country through selected representative native populations.11 Bizim Köy 
reflects Makal’s difficult experiences as teacher in his village. For Makal, the lack of a 
school building in the village came as no surprise considering the level of poverty: the 
village was completely outside the purview of the government. To prove his point Makal 
provides stark details on everyday life in the village throughout the novel. However, what 
was disconcerting to him was not so much the fact that the government left the villagers 
to their own destiny or how resistant the villagers had become to the idea of having a 
school in the village (while barely having bread to eat); it was the appearance and the 
mushrooming of religious orders in his and neighboring villages and the network of 
financial support from the villagers these orders were enjoying while he, as a teacher, was 
still struggling to build a school. The number of his students drastically decreases after 
the orders turned the mosques into religious schools for teaching Quran. The novel, 
through Makal’s observations, witnesses the increasing power of religious authorities in 
rural Anatolia. The novel in this way, predicts the conservative Democrat Party’s 
                                               
11 The Village Institute project was to an important extend inspired by the Soviet socialist experience. A 
group of select primary school students were enrolled in these institutes to become educators to teach in 
their own villages. The students not only learned reading and writing but also learned agriculture, 
engineering, art, medical expertise. The novels and the stories written by the writer-teachers highly 
informed the realist literature and cinema in the following decades. The Village Institutes are closed down 
by the Democrat Party government as being “communist nests” defaming religion. 
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ascension to power in the 1950 general elections, and the party’s support by the same 
religious orders.  
The peak moment of the crisis was probably the 1950 general elections when the 
modernist Republican People’s Party (RPP) lost to the Democrat Party (DP). The party 
was formed by the members of the RPP parliament, mostly big landowners from the 
Western regions, DP was supporting a more liberal economic model and its members had 
left the RPP in the mid-1940s due to its statist economic policy and formed the DP. In a 
very short period of time, with the support of its populist discourse, the DP managed to 
attract the votes of the rural population who had been marginalized by the high-modernist 
agenda and elitist ideology of the RPP, namely Kemalism. As a response to the victory of 
the conservative ideology, the secular intelligentsia formulated a more egalitarian, 
socialist interpretation of Kemalism. The new interpretation contained a critique of 
Kemalist elitism and its rigid modernization program, and came up with a solution to 
Kemalism’s tradition-modern dichotomy. The interpretation was based on a secular(ized) 
Anatolian tradition as the basis of Turkish national identity (Karacasu 2002). 
As part of the secular intelligentsia, the realist directors’ journey to rural Anatolia, 
should be seen as part of the re-appropriation of that space to the account of 
modernization. The realist cinema took up a modern tradition crafted by the socialist 
interpretation of Kemalism. The selection of Asik Veysel’s life story for the realist 
Karanlık Dünya film is meaningful in this respect. Veysel was an important figure in the 
heterodox Alevi tradition, outside the influence of mainstream Sunni Islam. His poems 
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carry a materialist worldview and he was at the time teaching music at the village 
institutes. The Earth by Nedim Otyam, on the other hand, was a critique of the feudal 
class represented by the DP. In the 1950s, cinema became a space of hegemonic struggle 
between the DP government, who controlled the machinery of censorship, and the realist 
directors, who were critical of the DP ideology. The censor committee’s harsh response 
to the first realist attempts epitomized the decade-long war of maneuver between 
censorship and the directors.  
Later in the decade, the realist films gave up their direct attachment to the present 
as it had made passing through the censorship an impossibility. Instead, the films of the 
later 1950s retained only a thematic connection to the present focusing more on the 
representation of Anatolian (national) culture. The works of the socialist writer Yasar 
Kemal became a main source for the films of the later 1950s. With these adaptations 
realist cinema made its second spatial shift, towards the South. Kemal’s stories blend a 
meticulously detailed portrayal of the landscape and the people of Southern Anatolia with 
the oral traditions of the region. His Kurdish family migrated to the Southern Cilicia 
region during the Crimean War, where the population was composed of the Turkomans 
and the Kurdish people (Hébert and Tharaud 1999). His stories were influenced by 
both the Kurdish oral Dengbejȋ tradition, and the Turkoman epics. Both Turkoman and 
Kurdish peoples had had violent encounters with the Ottoman administration during the 
Ottoman centralization process and their oral traditions on which Kemal’s stories are 
based chronicle these encounters. These stories were outside the influence of the State’s 
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Sunni Islam, too and having been written from a Socialist perspective (Gürsel 2008), they 
avoid metaphysic and fatalistic worldview. Possessing such qualities, these stories were 
the perfect source for realist cinema such as Lütfi Akad’s Beyaz Mendil/White 
Handkerchief (1955), Karacaoglanin Karasevdasi/Karacaoglan’s Melancholia (1959) 
and Atıf Yılmaz’s Alageyik/Red Deer (1957). 
Even though these films are based on love stories, the way the narrative flows 
reflects the stakes of the realist cinema of the decade. In each of these films the love 
affair between the male and female characters gets interrupted by a representative of the 
feudal ruling class – the landlord, the beg, the agha, etc. – either in the form of the rival 
or the parent of the young woman. The young men fight the landlord to marry the young 
women, but the action of the beg is portrayed against the ‘tradition’ approving the 
marriage of the loving partners. The tradition in the narrative---embodied in the form of 
the assembly of the elders--- facilitates the action (i.e. progress) of the male’s resistance 
against feudal injustice. The narrative economy of the films expels the feudal class---
comprised of the landlord, the beg, and the agha--- out of the tradition favoring the anti-
feudal agency of the male character. 
In Karacaoğlan’in Karasevdası, the orphan hero, Karacaoğlan, and the daughter 
of the landlord fall in love. Karacaoğlan asks the assembly of the elders to talk to the 
landlord on his behalf and ask him for the daughter’s hand in marriage. The landlord 
refuses and does not even negotiate with the assembly. However, as a tradition, the 
landlord can only refuse a proposal of marriage if the candidate cannot fulfill his one 
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wish. The wish must be extremely difficult to fulfill so that if the candidate realizes it he 
will prove his suitability as groom. However, after Karacaoğlan fulfills his wish, the 
landlord goes back on his promise and gets condemned by the assembly. Similarly, in 
Alagevik, the elder woman’s speech in front of the crowd is crucial. The speech comes 
after the fellow villager Halil’s fiancé is kidnapped and forced to marry to the landlord of 
the neighboring village. After the speech, the villagers raid the landlord’s house and 
deride the landlord: 
Our tradition does not allow marrying an engaged woman to another man. The 
landlord broke the tradition; we must bring him into line! 
In none of these late 1950s realist films does the action have a metaphysical 
source --- unlike the melodramatic films of the early decade where destiny, fate, and God 
were the sources of human (inter)action. While tradition has a central place in these films, 
it is defined in secular –practical—terms: it facilitates human action especially when 
encircled by the feudal order. Even though the narrative time is left ambiguous, the films 
are successful at reproducing everyday life on the screen on the material level; all the 
films take place in actually existing villages and the camera incorporates the details of the 
village life with the supervision of Yaşar Kemal: dresses, tools, ornaments, the buildings, 
etc. are used as central parts of the narrative. What informed the production and the 
reception of these films was the consensus between the directors and the film critics on 
the necessity of creating a national cinema. National cinema was, indeed, the primary 
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hermeneutic criteria among the film critics writing on these films. The reception of 
Alageyik by the film critic and historian Nijat Özön is a good example: 
In terms of its heroes, geography, and the relationship between heroes, Alageyik, 
among all […] films was the one that carried the most ‘from ourselves’ […] It 
successfully integrated the village inhabitants into the film” (emphasis in original, 
Özön, [1959] reprinted in 1995). 
As Özön’s reflection shows, the criterion for the national identity of the films is 
whether they are carrying anything ‘from ourselves.’ While this phenomenological 
account of the nation may sound arbitrary as to what really makes something ‘ours’ or 
who this ‘our’ is, both the films and the hermeneutic field within which they are received 
successfully collapse the real with the national and vice versa. The success of realist 
representation in this way does not lie in the attempted verisimilitude between 
representation and what it represents through ethnographic details incorporated into the 
cinematic representation; rather, it is the ability to assimilate these ethnographic details 
into an abstract national identity. 
THE COUP, SOCIAL REALISM AND THE NATIONAL CINEMA DEBATE 
In 1960, DP was ousted by military coup. The premise of the coup was the 
allegation that the DP government was destroying the secular pillars of the Republic. The 
coup was perceived as a revolution, giving way to a more open and progressive cultural 
and political atmosphere, by the intellectuals on the left who were intimidated throughout 
56 
 
the 1950s by the government run ‘communist hunts.’ For the film directors whose films 
had been sternly censored by the government appointed censorship committee, the new 
era appeared quite promising as the new constitution of 1961 promised the long waited 
liberal social reforms including allowing union rights for the cinema workers (Makal 
1991). Although in 1963, the new socialist Workers’ Party of Turkey’s (WPT) 
application to the newly appointed Constitutional Court for the abolishment of the 
censorship committee on the premise of its unconstitutionality failed, the State Council 
got appointed as the court of appeal to the decisions of the committee, which until that 
time had been final (Istanbul 1980). The State Council indeed reversed many committee 
decisions banning or censoring mostly social realist films on account of threat to national 
security and ideological propaganda (Özgüç 2000).  
Social realism emerged within this cultural-political conjunction as a progressive 
response to the socio-economic problems caused by the DP regime in the 1950s (Daldal 
2003). One of the earliest films in the movement, Gecelerin Ötesi/Beyond the Nights 
(Metin Erksan 1960) dealt with the social corruption that the DP’s policy of “creating a 
millionaire in every neighborhood” brought about (Altıner 2005). The anti-DP core of the 
social realist films made the social realist films legitimate critiques for the post-coup 
political power. The film Yılanların Öcü/Revenge of the Snakes (Metin Erksan 1964) is a 
good example demonstrating the political power’s change of attitude towards realist 
cinema. Based on 1958 novel by another prominent Village Institute writer, Fakir 
Baykurt, the film was about the villager Dark Bayram’s struggle against his fellow 
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villager Haceli, who with the support of the mukhtar, buys a piece of land directly in 
front of Bayram’s house. Even though the land is the common property of the village –
and, therefore could not be owned or sold—the mukhtar grants permission in exchange 
for a cash donation to the village coffers. Bayram’s opposition to Haceli backed by 
mukhtar results in him being blindfolded and beaten in the latter’s house. When the 
district governor comes to the village for inspection, Bayram’s mother informs the 
governor of the incident. The governor forces the mukhtar to undo the deal and stop the 
construction.  
The film subtly juxtaposes the state appointed idealist district governor and the 
pragmatist mukhtar, as the government representative in the village. The progressive state 
representatives such as teachers, military officers, engineers, and doctors would occupy a 
central position within the social realist films of the 1960s. The inclusion of such 
characters reflects both the optimism the progressive directors felt towards the period’s 
new political order and worked pragmatically to secure the release of the films without 
being squashed by the censorship. Not surprisingly, however, the censorship committee 
banned Yılanların Öcü. However, this time the director Metin Erksan, together with the 
crew, would visit the President General Cemal Gürsel for a special screening in the 
presidential office to convince him that the committee’s decision was baseless. After the 
screening, and nervous waiting for the film crew, Gürsel’s comment on the film was 
reassuring: “These are realist pictures from Anatolia. The situation is more pathetic than 
how it is portrayed; you even embellished it” (Özgüç 1995). The President’s sympathetic 
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attitude towards the realism of the film reveals the post-coup political power’s policy 
towards rural Anatolia. Whereas the DP perceived the periphery as its locus of power, 
supported by the local power holders withholding the feudal structures, for the 
modernizing secularist power, the periphery was perceived as an underdeveloped space 
that needs to be incorporated into the national modernity.  
STATE REALISM: DOĞU AS SPACE OF NATIONAL REALITY 
With its ethical claim to ‘reflect’ social and material reality, social realist 
cinema’s encounter with the East and the Kurds in the region who had been excluded 
from ‘national reality’ is a curious instance of depicting a heretofore ‘non-existent’ 
entities through the conventions of realism. Within the earlier discussion on realism, I 
followed a constructionist argument and claimed that realism works through producing 
its own content rather than reflecting a preexisting phenomena. In the Turkish context, 
realist turn in cinema was shaped by the left Kemalist filmmakers and was part of the 
creation of national cinematic language. From the earliest realist films onward, ‘nation’ 
was the content of realist representation. Keeping in mind this real-national confluence, 
the driving question of the following section is what was it that social realist cinema 
portrayed as reality in the East? A reality of what? Yet, I am not after an authentic reality 
that was ‘missed’ by cinematic representation. I am interested in where that cinematic 
reality came from. And how was that reality sutured into the national in the Kurdish 
context? While social realism’s, above mentioned homogenizing attitude towards the 
phenomenology of social existence within national borders is an important part, in the 
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context of the East, this is not the whole account of the encounter. To claim that social 
realism was able to show nation only by misrepresenting the outside reality misses 
another important process of ‘realizing’ the nation, which is what I call state realism. 
Both cinematic realism and state realism aim to produce nation as phenomenological, i.e. 
visible and experiential. When social realism arrived the East, the region had already 
been subjected to the conventions of this other realism. I use state realism to refer to both 
ontological and epistemological practices through which nation-states, during the process 
of nation-building, determine the limits and forms of existence within the national 
territory. The states determine what and who is entitled to exist, and how a particular 
existence can be known through techniques of reality such as census, cartography, 
geography, etc. In the process, the nations become more than what Benedict Anderson 
called ‘imagined community’ (1993). Through these techniques, nations become 
phenomenological; they become visible and experiential. The flipside of the process is 
the stories of disappearances that the new national reality sanctions. The cinematic 
representation of the East is formed at the intersention of these two realisms: social 
realism brought the desire for modern/secular nationhood, and a cartographic anxiety12 
(Krishna 1994) determined the form and limits of engagement.  
                                               
12 In his Cartographic Anxiety: Mapping the Body Politic in India, Sankaran Krishna defines cartographic 
anxiety as foundational coping mechanism in postcolonial nations with the problems caused by the process 
of founding a modern nation based on the principles of rationality and scientificity. While not a postcolony, 
in the Turkish context, as an ex-Imperial space, the anxiety over borders such as mapping the nation, fixing 
the borders, disciplining the border population has also been foundational due to the complex post-World 
War I reordering of the map of the middle east. 
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Although the coup and the new constitution brought about a more liberal political 
atmosphere for the emergence of a socialist public sphere, and allowed the survival of 
social realism as cinematic praxis, with a new momentum, the state resumed its Eastern 
policy in 1960s that had eased down during the previous decade. The prime reason for the 
new ‘nationalizing’ momentum in the 1960s was the remobilization of the Kurdish 
movement, which had been dormant since the late 1930s in Turkey. The remobilization 
came after the Kurdish movement in Iraq launched a revolution against the Iraqi state in 
1960s after they had been denied equal rights under the new post-coup Iraqi 
constitution13. The 1960s Kurdish movement in Turkey was to a certain extend 
influenced by the Iraqi Kurdish resistance. This new rapprochement between the two 
Kurdish movements was a cause for alarm, especially for the prospect that the aim of the 
Kurdish movement in Turkey would be a part of the reunification of a Kurdistan that had 
been divided into four parts after World War I. In June of 1960, the post-coup military 
government arrested 485 Kurdish notables and exiled 55 influential Kurdish figures 
(Gunter 1997) to the Western cities. While this move was designated to facilitate the 
assimilation of the Kurdish population into the Turkish national identity, the government 
took further actions to make the population invisible. Within the Eastern region, the 
toponyms that still were not in Turkish, were subjected to Turkicising. After the 1965 
                                               
13 The Kurdish leader Molla Moustapha Barzani had migrated to the Soviet Union after the demise of the 
Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabat in 1947. When the general Qasim took over power in Iraq, he invited 
Barzani to discuss their accommodation in Iraq and the new constitution. However, negotiation broke out 
and Barzani started a resistance, which would last until the failure in1975.  (Barzani 2003) 
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census, the statistical information based on the ‘mother tongue’ within the national 
population kept classified.  
SPATIAL MODERNIZATION ON THE BORDER OF THE NATION: THE BLOOD OF THE EARTH 
AND THE LAW OF THE BORDERS  
Towards the middle of Toprağın Kanı/Blood of the Earth (Atıf Yılmaz 1965) the 
petroleum engineer, in a voice tinged with anger, opens up to his psychotic son: “You 
always wonder why I am stuck in this goddamn place. I am here for these people. Our 
petrol will save them, too.” His statement comes in the form of a slip of tongue in a 
psychoanalytic moment, triggered by the son’s deteriorating psychological health, and the 
father’s futile attempt to explain his choices. While the father’s alcoholism too is 
apparently caused by that “goddamn” place, we don’t learn what constitutes the “our” to 
whom the petrol belongs or the “them,” who are apparently in need of saving. However, 
the son’s immediate delirious response to his father’s humanism does offer some clue: 
“We will leave and they will stay here, huh? These mountain men, these savages?” The 
son’s choice of words to define the people who would stay “here” is far from random: 
‘mountain men’ and ‘savages’ had been the prime names for the Kurdish population of 
the East in the official nomenclature of the state. What is fascinating in this scene is that, 
within the overall narrative economy of the film, we witness son’s all abnormalities, 
suicide attempts, and conspiracy theories. While the content of his conversation with the 
father can be taken as another ‘crazy’ talk coming from his mouth, its uncanny familiarity 
throws the words outside the diegesis right into the historical moment at which it was 
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produced. Blood of the Earth was one of the first films to be shot and set in the East and 
it was the first film to speak about ‘we’ and ‘them’ in the context of Doğu. By putting the 
overly familiarized discursive pieces into the mouth of the psychotic son character, the 
film, breaking the state sponsored scholarly silence on the region, offers a fleeting 
critique of the State practices in the region. However, the on-the-edge dialogue, 
especially the ‘unconscious’ critique it contains, ultimately disappears within the overall 
narrative economy of the film. A classical example of the social realist cinema of 1960s, 
the film situates the dialogue within one of the most pressing ‘national causes’ of the 
period: nationalization of petroleum. The film takes place in the Raman village located on 
the Turkish side of the Iraqi border. The idealist engineer, who believes that the oil 
revenue will benefit the socio-economic development of this Eastern village, fights 
against the American oil company running the oil fields, which, according to him, 
obstruct the drilling. However, the American company is not the only enemy the engineer 
fights. The local notables are also addressed as the enemy of a different kind.  
While the tension between the engineer father and the son represents the opposing 
ends of the official spectrum vis-à-vis the East and the inhabitants, the prime tension of 
the film is the one between Hasan and Hüseyin the two siblings who have diametrically 
opposed moral universe and ethical attachment to the space they inhabit. Hüseyin is a 
technician who had studied in a craftsmanship school in the city of Diyarbakir, whereas, 
Hasan, called as the ‘Sheikh,’ is a local tradesman running the smuggling economy in the 
town. At the beginning of the film we learn that while Hüseyin was at school in the 
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Diyarbakir, Hasan ‘bought’ Hüseyin’s fiancé from her parents. When Huseyin comes 
back to the town, he asks his brother not to come in between him and her as they are 
already engaged. Yet he fails to change Hasan’s deed. From the beginning, Hasan and 
Hüseyin are presented through their position to modernity and civility: schooled Hüseyin 
who engages with his lover versus trader Hasan buying a woman from her family against 
her will. The former is schooled and the latter is illiterate. 
More importantly though, the main juxtaposition between Hasan and Hüseyin is 
drawn through spatial terms: through their positions vis-à-vis the national border. After 
beaten up by Hasan and his friend, Hüseyin is picked up by the engineer and brought to 
his house for medical treatment. Soon he earns the trust of the engineer and starts 
working on the refinery as a technician. Together with the engineer, Hüseyin works 
towards building a modern city on the shoulders of the refinery and creating jobs for the 
local population. To achieve the modern dream, Hüseyin also joins the engineer’s fight 
against ‘imperialist’ America which ‘does not want the oil to be found.’  
The patriotic and nationalist intent of the engineer and Hüseyin is opposed by the 
feudal authorities, whose wealth come from border smuggling. The landlord and the 
tradesmen also resist the drilling, fearing that it would attract the labor power they were 
controlling for smuggling and destroy their socio-economic power. Situated within this 
national problematic, respect for borders, namely, taking the borders as not only 
territorial/physical but also as ethico-political presences separate Hasan from Hüseyin on 
the one hand, and the feudal class and the engineer on the other. Working for the refinery 
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becomes a patriotic duty to protect the nation-space from the imperialists as well as the 
feudal elite breaching the spatial integrity of the nation through smuggling. However, the 
difference – between Hasan(s) and Hüseyin(s), enunciated through two different axes, is 
proposed as contingent that would be overcome by socio-economic development, should 
the extra-ideological patriotism of the engineer’s techno-utopianism materialize: “Our 
petrol will save them, too!” By locating the main conflict between the siblings, the Blood 
of the Soil tames the enunciated difference. At the end of the film while Hassan is shot 
dead after his failed attempt to rob the refinery, Hüseyin marries the engineer’s niece: a 
perfect metaphor for the national unison within a restored nation-space. 
National border is an important component also in Hudutlarin Kanunu/Law of the 
Borders (Lütfi Ömer Akad 1966). Hudutlarin Kanunu takes place in the Deliviran village 
located on the Turco-Syrian border and revolves around the peasant Hıdır. He is the 
brother of one of the smugglers who got shot at the beginning of the film while 
smuggling goods across the border. After his brother’s death, Hıdır decides to quit 
smuggling. Instead, he wants to build a school in the village so that the children of the 
village would not “share the same fate as his.” However, as the landlord owns the entire 
land, and wants to use the local labor for smuggling, working on the land is not an option 
for the villagers. The landlord also opposes the construction of the school because 
children are an important part of the smuggling economy. The arrival of a new lieutenant 
to the village, who is in charge of border protection, automatically puts him against the 
local power holders. The lieutenant not only increases security at the border but also 
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forces the landlord to share the land with the peasant for farming. Already willing to quit 
smuggling, Hıdır sides with the lieutenant and agrees to ‘settle’ on the farm.  
However, the landlord tricks Hıdır into smuggling by threatening to expel him 
from the farm if he does not transport his herd across the border. Hıdır accepts to do it to 
stay as farmer on the land. However, when he rides the herd across the border, landmines 
get detonated and Hıdır barely gets out alive. After he later learns that it was a set-up by 
the landlord, he kills him and his men in return. At the end of the film, Hıdır is seen 
escaping from the lieutenant who will arrest him after the killings. To escape capture, 
Hıdır crosses the border into the landmined area between Turkey and Syria. While he 
negotiates with the lieutenant, Hıdır’s son also joins him. At the end of the film, Hıdır 
steps on a landmine outside the border and dies. The symbolic function of Hıdır’s border 
crossing at the end of the film is crucial. At first, he restores the territorial integrity of the 
nation by killing the landlord and chooses death by stepping outside of the national 
border. We see one more function of the national border in addition to the one of 
separating the nation-states, here the border separates life and death. Prior to its release, 
Hudutlarin Kanunu was banned by the censorship committee twice and finally passed on 
the third with the condition that at the film’s end, Hıdır would give his son a moral lesson 
by condemning smuggling and making him promise never to become a smuggler and go 
to school.  
In addition to film’s nationalizing attitude towards the reality it portrays, its 
interpretation betrays the national hermenuetic space that informs both the production 
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and reception. The interpretation of the film by the film critic Ali Gevgilili in the leftist 
cinema journal Yeni Sinema, (New cinema) is revealing how the film was perceived by 
the critics of its time:  
[Hudutlarin Kanunu ] is an impressive film about the major contradictions of 
Turkish society.” […] The state representatives are helpless … vis-á-vis the semi-
feudal capitalist economic structure. […]On the one hand, conflict is between 
labor, as represented by Hıdır, and capital, as represented by the landlord; on the 
other hand it is an internal conflict of capitalism as seen between the landlord and 
the tradesman. […] The film is neither totally epic, naturalist nor realist. The 
narrative technique turns the film into a lively, independent and unfailing work 
consistent with [the director’s] national qualities (1967, p. 7, emphasis added)  
Both Toprağın Kanı and Hudutlarin Kanunu clearly bear the concerns of the post-
coup political culture: an anxiety with the growing power of the landlords vis-à-vis the 
villagers and the state, and the entry of the modernist state representative as a savior. The 
feudal elite in the films assume a double menace: towards the townspeople and the 
villagers whom they exploit and expose to death through smuggling, and towards the 
nation-state by violating its territorial integrity by breaching the borders. Yet, during an 
interview after the release of Hudutların Kanunu, the director Akad’s response to the 
criticisms as to how realist the film was in terms of state-society relationship in the region 
adds a critical layer to the film: Accepting that the state-society relations in the film does 
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not represent the situation in the region, Akad admits “if we wanted to represent the 
reality, our film could not have passed the censorship.” (Özgüç 1995) 
Muradın Türküsü/The Song for Murat (Atıf Yılmaz 1965) takes place in a small 
town in the vicinity of the city of Diyarbakır. The romance between the young villager 
Murat and Meliha, the daughter of the landlord, gets interrupted by Meliha’s father, who 
is determined not to marry his daughter to an ordinary villager. After the assembly of the 
elders in the town fails to convince him to change his mind, the mufti of the town is 
called upon by the villagers assuming that the landlord would not dare refusing his 
judgment. However, himself failing to convince the landlord, the mufti releases a fatwa 
allowing Murat to abscond with Meliha as he believes the landlord to be an infidel, not 
allowing the lovers to marry. After much pressure from the villagers and the mufti, the 
landlord agrees to the marriage, offering one condition: if Murat kills his archenemy, the 
notorious bandit, Ҫoban Ali, he will allow the marriage. In reality, the landlord’s plan is 
to get rid of both Murat and the Ҫoban at the same time: if Murat kills Ҫoban, he reasons, 
he would inform the gendarmerie that Murat is a murderer, if Murat fails, it means Ҫoban 
will have killed Murat, the case will be closed. However, Murat discovers the scheme and 
forges an alliance with the Ҫoban against the landlord. Towards the end of the film, the 
villagers are seen camping in front of the landlord’s house protesting him for not letting 
Murat and Meliha to get married. Intimidated by the crowd, the landlord calls the 
gendarmerie to inform them a rebellion broke out in the village and the rebels are coming 
to loot his house. But when the gendarmerie arrives, the officers learn the real story and 
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arrest the landlord for misleading them. By opposing the tradition, which is respected not 
only by the villagers, the mufti and the gendarmerie, the landlord is excluded both from 
the town – and from the narrative.  
Among the three films I discussed so far, Muradın Türküsü, with its emphasis on 
modern tradition, the gendarmerie as the savior of the villagers, its centering the narrative 
tension on the conflict between the feudal landlord and the common villager as well as its 
location shooting, recognizable place names that properly ‘situate’ the story within the 
national map, is the one that used the conventions of realism the most. However, even 
though the film takes place in the East, the characters speak in a “clean” Turkish without 
a trace of regional (i.e. ethnic) accent. Moreover, the soundtrack of the film is a generic 
folk music that does not bear any regional specificity, the town could be any town in any 
part of Turkey. By erasing any regional marks from the narrative, soundtrack and mis-en-
scene, the film subtly incorporates the region into the homogenous national. Although the 
cartographic anxiety does not factor into the narrative through border crossing, the 
narrative clearly betrays its national desire through the antagonism between the landlord 
and Murat. If the latter’s romance with Meliha is understood as a threat for the 
hierarchical feudal order, then the landlord’s reaction makes sense as the protection of 
that order. The help of the villagers, the elders, mufti and the gendarmerie all boils down 
to the acting out of the desire for ‘horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson 1993) devoid of 
hierarchies embodying the old order. Murat, and together with him the entire village, 
contracts into citizenship after their protest against the landlord is sanctioned by the 
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gendarmerie. At the end of the film, what we have is the prototype of a ‘nation-space’ 
composed of smoothly functioning, undifferentiated people speaking in an accentless 
language. The role of the mufti, above all, still ties this modern nation-space to the 
‘tradition.’ Yet, in the director’s future films after the socialist turn, the mufti figure and 
his alikes will disappear on the people’s side as the ‘class’ not ‘ national culture’ will 
become unifying structure after the socialist turn. Later in these films, mufti reincarnates 
in the character of the Sheikh as the head of feudal system. 
SEYYIT HAN AND THE LIMITS OF CINEMATIC REALISM 
Hudutların Kanunu was not the only film that attracted the wrath of the 
censorship. The film Seyyit Han (1968) by Yılmaz Güney was also banned by the 
censorship committee. Also like HK, Seyyit Han was planned as a social realist film. In 
both cases, the directors had based their films on extensive research and observation; 
local costumes and accents were meticulously incorporated into the films. Made by the 
socialist actor-director of Kurdish origin Yılmaz Güney, who also wrote the story of HK, 
Seyyit Han was a realist film of a different kind. Unlike the other ‘social realist’ films of 
the period, where the narrative space is structured according to a national problematic14, 
Güney based the film on a Kurdish epic, giving her lead character a Kurdish name.  
After seven years during which he had to finish off his blood enemies as the only 
condition to marry his beloved, Keje, Seyyit Han, the male protagonist of the film comes 
                                               
14 Hudutlarin Kanunu was made as the first installation of the director Akad’s “Anatolian Triology” for 
which later he made the second installation in the northern Black Sea region, and the third in the western 
Aegean region. 
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back to his village triumphed on the day of Keje’s wedding. As he learns later, during his 
time outside, the landlord, the groom in the wedding, who also had been in love with 
Keje, tricked the villagers into believing that Seyyit Han was killed by his enemies, and 
he would be willing to marry her. Trapped between the feudal hierarchy and his promise, 
Keje’s brother is forced to accept the landlord’s proposal for his sister. However, Seyyit 
Han’s surprise return unsettles the ceremony. Keje wants to go back to Seyyit Han, yet 
has to prioritize his brother’s ‘honor’ which would be stained if she cancels the wedding 
in the middle. The landlord gets uncomfortable knowing that Seyyit Han, his strongest 
enemy in the village, would avenge his trick. Yet also aware of Keje’s love for Seyyit 
Han, the landlord sets up a deadly plan to save his honor. After the ceremony, he orders 
his men to tell Seyyit Han that he gives up on Keje and Seyyit Han should come and get 
her. His men catches Seyyit Han leaving the village. When Seyyit Han meets the landlord 
in the village, landlord puts one condition for Seyyit Han to get Keje back. Knowing that 
Seyyit Han is the sharpest shooter in the village, the landlord asks him to shoot at the 
center of a chamomile flower attached to an upside down basket. When he does, the 
landlord affirms that he now deserves Keje. As it turns out the basket with the chamomile 
covers Keje’s head and Seyyit Han killed Keje from her forehead. To avenge Seyyit Han 
kills the landlord and his men and slowly disappears in the vast empty landscape at dawn. 
While the narrative structure of the film resembles other social realist films, like 
the overbearing presence of the landlord, the oppressive feudal code, honor and exploited 
villager, the film avoids the modernist gaze that embodies social realism. We don’t see 
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the landlord as the representative an economic class. The wedding ceremony is shot in 
documentary style and it encompasses the entire second half of the film. Yet the realism 
that is aimed at the film alarmed the censorship board. When it was submitted to the 
board for permission, the committee raised two objections to the film: Firstly, Keje was 
not recognized as a proper Turkish name and, secondly, the banners carried by the crowd 
during the ceremony are not part of Turkish wedding ceremonies. Emblematic of the 
limits of realism within the context of national cinema, the censor committee asked the 
director to change the name and remove the banners as unrealistic additions to pass the 
censorship. What is revealing in this encounter, however is that both the name and the 
banners are open marks of Kurdishness yet they function as unrealistic –negation of 
realism-- within this particular cinematic context. While the customs, traditions, costumes 
are deemed appropriate as part of national reality, the ethnographic detail through the 
wedding ceremony and the name of the bride, designated by the director as the realist 
content of the film, worked as a foreign mark ---or stain--- in excess of the ‘reality’ that 
would embody the nation. 
CONCLUSION 
What brought together social realist cinema and state realism is their ability – and 
intention,not to reflect a reality, but to produce the content of the reality they refer to. 
They both have ability to define what is reality through their system of representation. 
What interests me in this chapter is the convergence of these two realisms in the 
representation of Doğu. What I suggest emerged as reality (of Doğu) was the product of 
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the modernist gaze of cinematic realism and the state’s techniques that create and 
legitimize a particular kind of realism. Yet, the filmmakers were aware of the limits of 
cinematic realism and the devised coping mechanisms to pass censorship. Akad’s 
response to the criticisms against Hudutlarin Kanunu is testament. The interest in realism 
in Turkish cinema coincided with the anxiety over the future of the modern nation. 
Within social realist films, nation has always been a part of the chain of signification. The 
social realist directors’ expedition to Doğu as part of rural Anatolia is an important 
component of social realism. While the realist turn brought about a new cinematic style 
and aesthetics among the film directors, it was the desire to redefine the nation on realist 
terms that structured social realism. In these films nation worked as the content of realist 
representation. In the 1960s, the arrival of social realism to Doğu corresponded to the 
cartographic anxiety over the national borders due to the revival of Kurdish movement 
during the decade in and outside Turkey. In the 1960s social realist films Doğu, as space 
of (national) reality is represented through national borders. Yet the narrative function of 
national borders was more than a cartographic presence, working to combine ingeniously 
two anxieties within the narrative of spatial modernization. By juxtaposing the characters 
based on their ethical attachment to the borders, social realist cinema equated being 
modern with the respect for the nation-space. 
.  
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CHAPTER III: CINEMA, SOCIALISM, AND DOĞU 
 
An over-sized politician, looking contently towards the West, where the nation is 
‘destined’ to reach, happens to turn his back on the East whereby a ‘tiny’ peasant is 
shouting at him to grab his attention to the human silhouettes squeezed into the little 
cells, waiting under the threat of death … The drawing is a typical example of the 
critique of the government policies on the East by the Left intelligentsia and the 
progressive media in Turkey during the late 1960s and 1970s: the dire situation of the 
region is the product of the State’s neglect and its maltreatment by the Government. The 
Leftist critique was a turning point in the history of modern Turkey in terms of 
problematizing the State practices in the region, however, the emblematic drawing leads 
one uncomfortably to question: Who is entitled in the drawing to represent Doğu? And 
what/who is giving the entitlement? Is the drawing entitling the peasant by recognizing 
his ‘voice’ or is it the framed gaze that is entitled (hence the drawer, hence the 
newspaper) through the familiar words put into the mouth of the peasant --- they are 
hanging up in the air, anyways!--- which interpellates the peasant within a particular 
problematization of the region: Doğu as the space of underdevelopment. The tension 
between critical visibility of the East and its terms of inclusion as Doğu draw the premise 
of the chapter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The chapter examines how Socialist political and aesthetic movements affected 
the representation of the Doğu in the Turkish cinema of the 1970s. The ‘socialist turn’ in 
the representation of the region in the cinema was the result of certain interrelated 
incidents that took place towards the end of the previous decade: the long dormant 
Kurdish political movement gained a new momentum within the Socialist politics in 
Turkey and the arrival of Yılmaz Güney in the Turkish cinema radically changed –and 
challenged-- the culture of filmmaking in Turkish cinema. Coming from a Kurdish 
family, who migrated to the Southern Turkey in the 1930s, Güney had close ties with the 
Turkish socialist movement in 1960s and 1970s. Starting from his films Umut/The Hope 
(1970) and Ağıt/Elegy (1971), Güney invented the contours of socialist cinema in Turkey.  
The State practices within the region and the international anti-colonial and anti-
imperialist struggles were the main parameters of Socialism’s engagement in the region 
(Belge 1993), yet the two ‘anti’ struggles worked in opposite directions in terms of the 
way Kurdish issue was perceived within the Socialist left. While the international anti-
colonial struggles helped the Socialist movement to perceive the problem of the Kurds 
within the region as one of oppression by the State as the dominant political power, the 
anti-imperialist direction of Socialism, that Turkey is an underdeveloped country due to 
its tie with the United States and that the Socialist movement should work towards the 
full independence of Turkey, led Socialism to frame the solution to the problem of 
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oppression within the borders of Turkish nation state.15 Within these parameters, 
Socialism redefined the problem relating the region as ‘Doğu Sorunu,’ the ‘Eastern 
Problem’. While, ‘Doğu’ had been used by the State to refer to the region as a 
geographical part of the nation, stripped of its ethnic and historical specificity and the 
“Eastern problem” as an issue to be solved through national modernization; Socialists, 
including the Kurdish socialists – until late 1970s—appropriated the “Eastern problem” 
as a revolutionary problem. Yet, its parameters were determined by the commitment, on 
the part of the Turkish Socialists, to the integrity of the nation-space. The ‘problem’ 
came to refer to the necessity of socio-economic development and land reform; and 
revolution to achieve them. However, while in its official incarnation, the discourse of 
socio-economic development aimed at concealing –and disqualifying-- the ethno-political 
content of the ‘underdevelopment,’ the Kurdish socialists and part of the Socialist Left 
represented by the Turkish Labour Party (TIP), insisted on the ethno-political dimension 
of socio-economic underdevelopment.16 
                                               
15 In his discussion on Turkish Cinematheque Association, Hakkı Başgüney refers to the culturalist 
tendency in the anti-imperialist discourse of Socialist movement that, according to him, more than 
occasionally degenerated into a nationalist rhetoric that threatened to cripple the intended internationalism 
of the movement (2010). This is clearly seen within the field of cinematic production in the forms of the 
heated debates – and clashes-- between National Cinema and Cinematheque circles throughout the late 
1960s. 
16 The declaration of the Fourth General Congress of TIP, which led to its closure, reads as follows: “That 
on the East part of Turkey, Kurdish people live. That from the beginning, the fascist policies of the 
dominant classes have been used, at times in the form of bloody cruelties, and through terror and 
assimilation, within the region. That one of the main reasons for the underdevelopment of the region 
inhabited by Kurdish people, besides Capitalism’s law of unequal development, is the social and economic 
policies of the dominant classes informed by the reality of the existence of Kurdish people living in the 
region. That for that reason, framing the “Doğu Sorunu” in terms of the problem of Interregional 
development disparity is the extension of chauvinistic and nationalist views of the dominant classes.  ”  
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The chapter examines how Doğu is (re)defined within Socialist theory and praxis 
and how this redefinition affected the cinematic representation of Doğu in the 1970s. The 
main tenors and character(s) of the socialist cinema will be analyzed in relation to the 
Socialist spatial imaginary. I discuss the cinematic representation of the East within the 
socialist films as part of its (re)production as ‘Doğu,’ as ‘space of revolution’ for socio-
economic development.17 Although almost all films on the region made in the 1970s were 
heirs, in one way or another, of the ‘socialist turn,’ in this chapter, I will use ‘socialist 
film’ only to define politically engaged films, which will be the primary objects of my 
analysis. The ‘socialist film’ defines a certain political ‘tendency’ in cinematic production 
throughout the decade, rather than as a genre in itself. Indeed, the films I will analyze 
here have been categorized in the literature on Turkish cinema under different genres 
such as ‘comedy,’ ‘melodrama,’ ‘feudal western,’ ‘land and labor films’ and ‘village 
films’. (Özgüç, 2005; Dorsay, 1979, 1989). Socialism, with its emphasis on class-
antagonism, feudal oppression, backwardness and illiteracy, was the main parameter of 
the films in question, however, not all films on Doğu during 1970s used socialist 
messages within a political program. Throughout the 1970s these tropes were shared by 
                                               
17 Development was the main solution prescribed in the social realist films of the 1960s, as well. However, 
both the agency and the affective attachment to development changes in the 1970s films. In both Hudutlatin 
Kanunu and Toprağın Kanı the state representative was the agent of development and occupied the center 
of the narrative. The Lieutenant in HK and the engineer in TK function as development agents, whereas in 
the 1970s films, the state representatives either disappear or given small roles. The state representative in 
one of the films is relocated outside the region by the government due to his amicable relationship with the 
native population which is deemed, by the ruling elite, subversive. While in the films I will discuss 
development is portrayed as necessity, its experienced impossibility within the narrative economy of the 
films forces the characters to revolt against the feudal authority that is seen as the beneficiary of the 
government support. We will come back to the issue of revolution later in the chapter. 
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almost all films on Doğu, yet only some of them used these as part of the Socialist 
politics. While selecting the films for analysis, the main criterion was whether the 
filmmakers, especially directors and the screen writers, were part of the Socialist 
movement. The political identity of the filmmakers was generally reflected within the 
political content of the film. I specifically focus on the political films on Doğu to trace 
the spatial imaginary of the Socialist politics through cinematic representations.  
Both the Socialist movement and its effect on cinematic production virtually came 
to a halt with the 1980 military coup. In the 1980s, while the cinematic interest in the 
region persisted, both due to the culture of fear created by the military rule and the 
dismantling of the developmentalist ideology, which defined the Socialist engagement in 
the region in the 1970s, ‘Doğu’ as defined and visualized within in the 1970s films 
disappeared --- or went through a semantic shift-- leading to an ambivalent politics of 
representation. The comparative analysis of the socialist films of the 1970s and the films 
of the 1980s will help better seeing ‘Doğu’ as ‘the’ particular space imagined within 
Socialism. 
ARCHEOLOGY OF DOĞU AS SOCIALIST CINEMATIC SPACE 
What defined Doğu as cinematic space during the 1970s was the politics of 
representation formed at the intersection of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movements 
that informed Socialist movement. This interstitial ideological positioning was productive 
of an ambivalent attitude towards the state: internationally recognized as the victim of 
dependent underdevelopment and internally oppressive political structure. The socialist 
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spatiality was predicated upon on the one hand the critique of the ‘oppressive’ state and 
on the other was called to duty on developing the region. This critique of the official 
neglect towards the region allowed the production of an iconography of 
underdevelopment by the directors: undernourished and sickly children, mud-brick 
houses, primitive plough, barren landscape. At the same time, this iconography was 
superimposed by the realistic reproduction of regional ethnographic details: dress code, 
body language, internal decoration, etc. At this point, it should be pointed out that there 
was a fundamental difference between ‘socialist’ films and the mainstream films that 
only copied the visual and plot structure of these films. Due to the cited influences, 
Orientalism has not been a major influence on socialist representation during the 1970s. 
While some of the characters are ‘orientalized’ within the visual economy of the films, 
the ‘class,’ but not ethnicity, was the main register of difference. During the 1970s, Doğu 
was hardly an exotic place for the filmmakers, it was a place of stark conflict and poverty. 
Orientalism goes against the tropes of national modernization to which all directors 
except for Yılmaz Güney subscribed during 1970s. The homogenizing logic of national 
modernization – the erasure of the dichotomy of the self and the other, rather than fixing 
them as binary oppositions-- prevented the Orientalist representation in the socialist 
cinema of the 1970s.  
A historical analysis of the emergence of socialist cinema within the context of 
Socialist politics in the late 1960s and the main debates within cinema will be followed 
by the textual analyses of several films selected according to the above cited criteria. I 
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will start the film analysis with two films Salako/The Fool One (1974) by Atıf Yılmaz 
and Endişe/The Angst (1974) by Şerif Gören. These films were made in the year of the 
general elections and after the General Amnesty is declared by the new government18 
Salako and Endise determined the decade’s two major –sometimes intersecting – 
narrative strands within the films of Doğu: ‘maraba films’ (through Endise) and 
‘comedies’ (through Salako). Maraba means landless peasant who works at the land 
lord’s land in exchange for a share from the harvest and maraba films take ‘him’ at the 
center of their narrative. While a maraba lives on the share he receives from the landlord, 
he is not simply a share-cropper. I claim that more than a share-cropper, he is a new 
subject position emerged within the Socialist discourse to refer to the Kurdish peasantry. 
In the absence of an industrial working class, it’s not surprising that part of peasantry 
becomes the revolutionary force in the socialist theory and practice. He resembles the 
‘agricultural proletariat’. Unlike a typical peasant or the villager, who had been 
considered illiterate and reactionary, maraba represents revolutionary mobility and 
consciousness; he is aware of his class position and organize with other maraba against 
the feudal oppression. Ismail Cem writing on the region at the end of the 1960s signals 
the emergence of this particular character: towards the end of 1960s, he observes, the 
peasants appropriated “the language of rights, justice, equality, and revolution” within 
                                               
18 Both films are made after the Amnesty. Yılmaz Güney started the film during the Summer of the same 
year after he was released with the General Amnesty in May. However, during the shootings of the film he 
is imprisoned again on account of him shooting the district judge of the town where he was shooting the 
film. However, it’s still not certain whether he was the one shooting  the districts judge (Güney 2005). In 
Salako there is a reference to the new government. 
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and outside the (national) border (Cem 1970). During that period in a number of 
occasions, Kurdish peasants occupied and appropriated the lands they worked at “with 
their rifles19.” The character of maraba captures that ‘revolutionary consciousness.’ Both 
Kara Carsaflı Gelin/Bride in Black Chador, (1975) by Süreyya Duru and Fıratın 
Cinleri/Jinns of Euphrates (1977) by Korhan Yurtsever use that moment of armed 
encounter between the peasants and the landlords. The 1978 film Kibar Feyzo/Feyzo, the 
Civilized One by Atıf Yılmaz also ends with Feyzo shooting the landlord dead. While the 
feudal oppression is of prime importance, the maraba films prioritize the resistance and 
mobility rather than fetishize the oppression even though in most films the system is 
restored at the end. In comedy films such as Davaro and Kibar Feyzo, the feudal 
oppression is ridiculed rather than fetishized. The comedy form within socialist films is 
used as a strategy to curve the direction of the address of the political content. Instead of 
devising a form of satire where comedy and critique would overlap, the comedy films in 
question use two parallel narratives. The comedic factor usually provide a(n) – apolitical-
- narrative closure to the political content. The films have two interlinked stories with 
different beginnings and endings. While the political content is enclosed through the 
comedy, the success of the films ---in terms of eluding the censorship—depends on 
locating the ‘apolitical’ comedic factor at the center of the film.  
                                               
19 In response to the peasant ‘uprisings’ the State initiated a “general scan” by commandos to collect the 
guns from the villages in the major cities in doğu. The scan lasted several months and the commandos used 
systematic torture and humiliation by stripping the male and females naked in the public to force them to 
hand in their guns. (Cem 1970).  
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I will end the decade with two films, Sürü/The Herd (1977) by Zeki Ökten and 
Hazal (1979) by Ali Özgentürk. These films signify the end of feudalism in Doğu due to 
the arrival of ‘capitalism’ (in the form of modern agriculture and train in Sürü and the 
road construction excavators in Hazal) into the region. However, the way they interpret 
the possible effects of capitalism on the region and on the characters is quite different. 
While Sürü is a critique of feudalism, Ökten does not juxtapose it with the ‘modern’ 
technology and he traces catastrophic effects of capitalism on the nomadic life of a 
Kurdish tribe. At the end of Hazal, on the other hand, the excavators come to the village 
to construct a road that would connect it to the heartland. Despite the wills of the feudal 
ruling elite, the engineers triumph and at the end of the film; the drivers of the excavators 
salute the villagers with smiling faces as they drive into the village. The paper ends with 
the 1980s political cinema. This last part focuses of the effects of 1980 military coup on 
the cinematic representation of Doğu in socialist cinema. In 1980s, cinema’s engagement 
in the East continued without an overt socialist framework that defined the 1970s 
cinematic production and with a more cautious attachment to the region. 
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: END OF SOCIAL REALISM AND REDEFINING REALITY 
Social realism and the relative freedom of expression enjoyed within and outside 
cinema was, somewhat ironically, the result of the military coup in 1960. The coup was 
the product of the secular bureaucratic alignment against the conservative DP. It was no 
surprise that the military government supported by the secular intelligentsia promoted the 
emergence of a socialist public sphere to counter the still strong religious-conservative 
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ideology. However, the alliance lasted until the general elections in 1965 when the DP’s 
successor Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, AP) won majority in the parliament. Even though 
the socialist Türkiye Işçi Partisi (Turkish Labor Party, TIP) gained 15 seats  it could not 
provide sufficient leverage to counter the change of the direction in the government.  
The elections also directly as well as indirectly contributed to the dismantling of 
the already shaking consensus between the filmmakers and the film critics that were 
holding the social realist movement together by intensifying the ideological conflicts 
within the movement that resurfaced at the first Cinema Convention in 196420 and came 
to a point of no return after the foundation of the Turkish Cinematheque Association by 
the film critics situated on the Left of social realism’s political spectrum. However, the 
breakup was only the reflection of a broader ideological clash within Socialism. The 
filmmakers who were the “auteurs” of the social realist cinema of the first half of the 
decade situated themselves on the ‘nativist’ end  represented by the YÖN (Direction) and 
MDD (National Democratic Revolution) traditions arguing for the inadequacy of the 
Marxist class analysis in explaining a ‘classless’ society like Turkey (Atilgan, 2002). 
These filmmakers, such as Halit Refiğ and Metin Erksan criticized the Cinematheque 
circle as missionaries of western values and admirers of European cinema (Refiğ, 1971), 
                                               
20 What is called “blood feud” to define the relationship between the critics and the filmmakers continued 
throughout the 1960s. On the other hand, during the decade, both filmmakers and film critics pushed for 
legal reforms to counter-balance the censorship statute of 1939 which was based on the Law of Police 
Duties and Powers of 1934 (Law 2559) that had been in effect. The Convention was organized by the 
Ministry of Tourism and Information to bring together the state and the filmmakers, unionists, film critics, 
and producers to discuss the issues of censorship and funding. Several filmmakers, among them were the 
social realist film makers,  unwilling to discuss matters of cinema with people (referring to film critics) 
who do not understand it, left the convention and protested the decisions. (Makal 1991)  
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while the film critics around the Cinematheque, who were staying closer to the TIP were 
vocal about their dissatisfaction with the national film production including the social 
realist experience (Başgüney, 2010). The film critic Onat Kutlar, also the co-founder of 
Cinematheque Association, wrote several articles in the Socialist magazine ANT (The 
Oath) criticizing the main contours of national film industry. The subject of the critiques 
was the capitalist mode of film production in the mainstream film industry that the 
filmmakers, even those social realists, take for granted. According to Kutlar, the financial 
organization of the industry, based on a bond system and managed by regional producers, 
was structured in a way that it was impossible to produce any social films outside the 
mainstream cinema (Kutlar 1967). While the content of the films were also the subject of 
many criticisms, it was taken only a symptom of the capitalist mode and relations of 
production21.  
During the latter half of the 1960s, while the majority of social realist directors 
redefined their production as “national cinema,” the film critics and the film directors 
who were close to the Cinematheque circle and situating themselves within TIP, oriented 
themselves toward European and Third Cinema under the influence of anti-colonial and 
anti-imperial political movements. (Başgüney 2010) Unlike the filmmakers, the film 
critics like Onat Kutlar, Nijat Özön and Ali Gevgilili emphasized “class antagonism” as 
an important component of cinematic representation. Both Hudutlarin Kanunu/Law of the 
                                               
21 Yet, in their response to the critiques, the filmmakers took up the fight along the line of a civilizational 
conflict between them, the nativists and the film critiques as euro-admirers. 
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Borders (1967) by Lütfi Ömer Akad and Seyyit Han (1968) by Yılmaz Güney were 
welcome by the Association with excitement. Akad had an ambiguous relationship with 
the Cinematheque Association and TIP, whereas Güney had been a self-identified 
Marxist-Socialist even before he became a filmmaker22.  
The film that finally satisfied the film critics within the Cinematheque circle – as 
a matter of fact the films is considered to be one of the masterpieces of Turkish Cinema-- 
came in 1970 by Yılmaz Güney. Written and directed by him, Umut/The Hope is the 
story of Cabbar, a phaeton rider, who migrated to the southern city of Adana to make 
living, probably as a result of the mechanization of agriculture which led to the high level 
of unemployment in the rural areas in the East (Beşikçi 1992). Cabbar loses his job as 
phaeton rider after a Mercedes car hits and kills one of his horses. After his attempt to 
borrow money from his bosses, old patrons and friends fails, and after a failed attempt at 
armed robbery on the street, he agrees to his friend Hasan’s solution to their economic 
destitute by treasure hunting with the help of the local Imam. Cabbar sells his pistol to get 
the money to pay the Imam to lead the hunt. At the end of the film unable to find any 
treasure, Cabbar falls into delirium. The film is premiered at the Cinematheque 
Association. With its references to the Italian neo-realist film Bicycle Thieves (Vittorio 
De Sica 1948), Umut was defined by the critics and other filmmakers as the ‘first realist 
film’ in Turkish cinema (Refig, 1971). However, instead of its conformity to national 
                                               
22 He was incarcerated for a published story which was claimed to be as “communist propaganda” (Soner 
2005, Dorsay 2005) 
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culture (as the criteria of realism in social realist aesthetic), the critics assigned the status 
of realty to the ability of the film to depict class-antagonism between Cabbar as phaeton 
driver and the owner of the Mercedes who hit and killed the horse. The scene in the 
police station was a testament to its politics of representation. After the accident, the 
driver and Cabbar end up in a police station. The police officer treats Cabbar like a 
criminal while the owner of the car was given a seat and offered a drink. Even though 
Cabbar wanted to file complainment against the driver, the police officer does not take 
him seriously and even threatens him to put into jail if he insists on misbehaving. Finally, 
Cabbar is ‘pardoned’ by the officer thanks to the ‘generosity’ of the driver, even though 
Cabbar thought he should be compensated for his loss.  
Not a social realist film in the way discussed in the previous chapter, as a film 
critic in Yeni Sinema journal, the journal of the Cinematheque Association, pointed out, 
the film was not realist in the socialist way, either: Cabbar’s solitude, that he is not able 
to be a part of the class solidarity that is formed by the phaeton riders against the 
municipality’s decision to ban phaetons from the city traffic, according to him, cripples 
the overall socialist message of the film. The critic asks why Cabbar is different from the 
other phaeton drivers and why while other phaeton drivers were going on strike Cabbar 
chooses to become a treasure hunter. The director’s decision to portray him as solitary 
and that this is found odd by the critic is important as it reveals the difference between 
the director, Yılmaz Güney and the critic as to what constitutes ‘reality’ in the 
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representation. The difference is not strictly an ideological one. Both the director and the 
critic were members of the Leftist circle of the Cinematheque.  
Cabbar’s burden in the film is not strictly class-oriented, although he shares the 
economic destitute with his fellow phaeton drivers. While the director models Cabbar on 
his Kurdish father, who had migrated to the city of Adana, who also did treasure hunting, 
the critic expects the character to act like a member of the proletariat yet, the critic 
reasons, Cabbar acts more like a lumpen than a proletarian. However, I suggest, what is 
emphasized by the director as Cabbar’s difference, that he chose the treasure hunting, 
interestingly an autobiographic addition, can be explained to be the ethnic “excess” of his 
character, modeled on Güney’s own father, which is seen by the critic as a stain on the 
socialist narrative of the film compromising the pure class-interest of the otherwise 
proper proletarian Cabbar. Through the character, the director also hints at the difficulty 
of the migrant worker’s mingling into the national labor23. The critic’s desire to clean the 
narrative off of all marks that compromises the dialectics based on ‘class’ is, as will be 
seen, reworked in most of the political films of the decade. 
What was called a ‘socialist cinema’ dates back to the release of Umut; however, 
the 1971 military ultimatum that targeted the Left delayed the production of socialist 
films on Doğu, and the production of political films in general, until after the 1974 
                                               
23 As will be seen in the chapter, the tension between the ‘ethnic identity’ of the characters in the films and 
their ‘class positions’ is not resolved and in majority of the films the latter supplants the former. The space 
of reality, whether it refers to nation or to class, is produced as the space of “we” from which the atypical 
character --here,the migrant Cabbar-- is excluded, and understood only in the form of an irregularity. 
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General Amnesty was declared by the Center-Left Ecevit government. The films on the 
East after the 1971 ultimatum, but before 1974, took up the issues such as socio-
economic underdevelopment, feudal oppression and backwardness in the region, while 
avoiding any political engagement. Based on Kemal Bilbasar’s novel “Cemo”, Atıf 
Yılmaz’s film with the same title, Cemo (1972) took up a story of love interrupted by an 
evil bandit.2425 Feyzi Tuna’s Kızgın Toprak/Heated Earth (1973) is about the struggle 
of a married couple in a village against the oppressive landlord who occupies the land of 
the couple. Orhan Elmas’ Ezo Gelin/The Bride Ezo, (1973), the second remake of the 
1958 film, is also a ‘feudal’ love story interrupted by a pervert land lord who uses his 
proves to force Ezo to marry him. Kartal Tibet’s Davaro: Son Eşkiya/Davaro: The Last 
Bandit (1974) is a story of a peasant who, in order to get married, had to kill his blood 
enemy as part of the feudal tradition.  
While these early films use tropes of Socialism and offers a –rather fleeting--
critique of feudalism, I do not consider them as part of the socialist films. One of the 
main criteria for a political film is the existence of agency against the feudal oppression. 
The Socialist discourse on Doğu is predicated on the necessity of the eradication of 
feudal order. In Socialist representation the feudal order is portrayed together with its 
                                               
24 Bandits appear in two different forms. In one form, the bandits are used by the ruling elite as a security 
and control mechanism against the peasant and in another form, (social) bandits emerge to counter the 
oppression of the ruling elite, landlords. In the chapter, bandit refers to both forms and the context will be 
determining to which form the concept refers. 
25 In the novel, the story takes place during the Kurdish Sheikh Said Rebellion and the evil bandit, 
Sorikoğlu, was one of the leaders of the rebellion. However, in the film version all historical references to 
the rebellion and the identity of Sorikoğlu is cut out from the narrative. 
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internal contradictions and its counter-dynamics. The aforementioned films and some 
others on Doğu during the 1970s fall into fatalism by fetishizing the feudal oppression 
without leaving any room for emancipatory social agency that would break free the 
oppression. The mainstream films usually excluded the socio-political address of the 
political films and simplified the stories within Orientalist tropes based on the 
‘pornography of (feudal) violence.’ 26  
SOCIALISM, EASTERN PROBLEM AND CINEMA 
The region became a major concern of the Socialist Left towards the end of the 
1960s. Several writers and journalists went to the region for interviews and research. 
Muzaffer Erdost’s “Şemdinli Interviews” that he wrote during his military service in 
Semdinli district of the city of Hakkari is published  in the socialist YÖN Magazin 
                                               
26 Bedrana (Süreyya Duru,1975) is a case in point. I excluded the film for the same reason of its excessive 
use of feudal violence. The film is based on two stories by Socialist writer Bekir Yildiz and it’s a collective 
project by him, Vedat Turkali (screen writer)and Süreyya Duru (director), two socialist filmmakers. While 
the film is based on ethnographic research by Turkali and claim to represent the region realistically 
(Turkali, Eski Filmler, [198?] ); it destroys its political agenda with the fatalistic melodramatic structure. 
Davud, the main protagonist, kidnaps Bedrana, the daughter of the landlord and take refuge in the house of 
the owner of the village. The village owner agrees to pay a dowry for Bedrana on behalf of Davut; in 
exchange, he asks Davud to smuggle his herd across the border. While Davut takes the herd to the other 
side of the border, the landlord’s butler kidnaps Bedrana and tries to rape her but she manages to run away 
even though the butler wounds her with knife. Her father sees Bedrana wounded and wants to kill her to 
clean his honor but the village chief stops him. The gendarmerie takes her to hospital. In the hospital Davud 
begs the doctor not to save Bedrana’s life because then he would have to kill her to clean his honor. 
Bedrana survives and goes back to her house. However, Davud has to kill her even though she told him the 
butler could not touch her. Davud wants to kill her but he is also afraid to go to prison. He finally finds a 
solution: he convinces Bedrana to fake hanging herself so that the villagers would think Bedrana is brave 
enough to kill herself but the god did not want to take her. When Bedrana puts the knot around her neck she 
realizes that Davud really wants her to hang herself, so she does… The films portrays the feudal violence 
but juxtapose the might of the landlord with the despair of Davud. The only positive representation is the 
gendarmerie who tries to mitigate the might of the landlord and restore order in the village. Not only the 
[feudal] violence but also illiteracy and backwardness is shown as the endemic character of the region. As 
was the case in social realist representation, only an outsider, the gendarmerie, would stop the vicious-
circle.  
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between 15 July-15 November 1966; Mehmet Emin Bozarslan’s book “Doğu’nun 
Sorunları” (The Problems of Doğu) analyzing the socio-economic situation of the region 
is published in the same year. Mahmut Makal’s observations on “Doğu” during his exile 
in the region is published with the title “An Anatolia Under the Ground,” in the Socialist 
magazine ANT in 1967. Ismail Beşikci’s two-volume “Doğu Anadolu’nun Düzeni” (The 
Order of East Anatolia) was published in 1968 and 1969 was the first academic research 
on the East dealing with the structural problems of the region from a Marxian 
perspective. Bekir Yıldız, Osman Sahin, Orhan Kemal and Yaşar Kemal wrote stories 
based on their personal experiences in the region27. Doğu Mitingleri (Eastern Meetings) 
organized within the region by the Kurdish activist groups self-identified as “Doğulular” 
(Easterners) was the first large scale attempt to discuss the socio-economic problems of 
the region after the long period of state of emergency period since the Kurdish rebellions 
following the foundation of the Republic (Beşikci 1992, Gündoğan 2011). Although the 
meetings were organized with the support of TIP, their reach well surpassed the members 
and organizers and attracted a wide spectrum of people from notables and land lords to 
merchants and to students across the region. Interregional development disparity, 
underdevelopment, and backwardness were comprising the conceptual arsenal of the 
meetings. The main solution proposed to overcome these issues was land reform (Beşikçi 
                                               
27 A majority of the films of the period were adapted from the stories of these writers like Bedrana, Kara 
Ҫarsafli Gelin /Bride in Black Chador (Süreyya Duru, 1975), Firatin Cinleri/Jinns of Euphrates (Korhan 
Yurtseven, 1977), Bereketli Topraklar Uzerinde /On Fertile Grounds (Erden Kıral, 1979). 
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1992b). Land reform had already been a primary agenda of the State since the 1940s28 as 
a way of centralizing the political and economic power by way of destroying the feudal 
system led by big land owners. However, in its application during the Democrat Party 
term (1950-1960) land reform created a ‘dependent feudalism’ as a result of assigning 
public lands to the landlords within the region in exchange for voting power, rather than 
redistributing the private lands of the land lords to the landless farmers. This systematic 
practice precluded socio-economic and cultural change within the region by vesting more 
power on the (pro-government) feudal authorities (Beşikçi, 1992). 
Within the Socialist discourse ‘Eastern Problem’ (Doğu Sorunu) was used to 
define the aforementioned socio-political situation of the region. The discourse on Doğu 
within Socialism was part of a larger ‘national question’ that had been a major topic 
within international Marxism during the anti-colonial national struggles29. Within the 
Socialist left, the development of Doğu was seen necessary for the development –and 
independence --of the Turkish nation (Zeynep, 2011). As it was reflected in the Socialist 
movement in Turkey, the larger discussion was centered on whether socio-economic 
development or national independence of the Kurds should be the primacy of the socialist 
movement in Turkey. Differing responses to the issue of primacy led to the persistent 
                                               
28 While small in scope, in 1945, 1950, and 1955, the State distributed land to landless people in the rural 
areas. However, later on the distributed lands were sold by the owners to the landlords. (Yıldız, 1983)  
29 In the late 1960s and 1970s national question is framed within the internationalist Marxist problematic 
of anti-colonial/anti-imperialist struggle, and socialist development. Following the debates on imperialism, 
underdevelopment, and the third world, the socialist Left prioritized socialist or ‘non-capitalist 
development’ as a way  to break free from imperialist expansion. For the socialist left, Turkey was an 
underdeveloped nation due to its tie with the imperialist order (Belge 1993). 
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separation of Turkish and Kurdish socialists. The ‘Eastern Problem’ as a particular 
discourse was Turkish Socialism’s response to the issue of primacy; the ‘problem’ was 
defined through socio-economic development. According to the Socialist Left, feudalism 
as the main reason for the backwardness of Doğu should be eradicated as part of the 
‘socialist revolution.’ Although in its radical forms the 1960s’ Socialist Left discussed the 
possibility of self-determination for the Kurds (Belge 1993, Yegen 2005), the modernist 
premises of the still strong Kemalist ideology perceiving the East within the problematic 
of [Turkish] national modernization dominated the Socialist agenda during the 1960s and 
1970s. However, while on the discursive level Kemalism and Socialism shared a 
modernist and developmentalist ideology, to a great extent they differed on practical 
level. Unlike Kemalism, within its official incarnation, Socialism recognized the 
existence of Kurds. According to socialist theory, the Eastern Problem would disappear if 
the problem of underdevelopment would be solved. While the developmentalist ideology 
is problematic in itself, the problem in the socialist discourse and the socialist 
representation is not directly developmentalism, but how the problem of 
underdevelopment is framed and against whom development is offered. The 
underdevelopment indeed was a main problem of Doğu for the region had been subjected 
to emergency rules and systematically left underdeveloped. 
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THE ‘SKILLS OF SALAKO30’: SOCIALISM COMES TO DOĞU 
“I am a land lord and you are money rich; when the money and power come 
together….it will be beneficial for the nation” tells Rashid Agha, the owner of the village, 
to Abuzer Bey, the local tradesman, in the film Salako/The Fool One (Atıf Yılmaz 1974). 
While the conversation out of its larger context sounds just like a business deal between 
the two wealthy local men, this one is of a special kind. The occasion that brings them 
together on that particular day is Abuzer’s intention to marry the Agha’s daughter. Both 
Abuzer and the Agha get very excited by the idea that with the union of two families they 
would be ‘unbeatable’. However, during the conversation we also learn that what unites 
them is not only the prospect of familial union but also the anxiety towards the recent 
events taking place in the village. We only learn a hint of the source of this anxiety when 
Abuzer complains to the Agha in that same intimate conversation: “[t]hey manipulate 
[the villagers]. They brought a trouble upon us called the Left. May Allah convince you, I 
am not able to use my left hand anymore. I would not even use my left foot if I could.” 
We don’t hear much about nor see the troublemakers who are manipulating the villagers 
but we know that they are “a bunch of educated men” who “does not recognize neither 
religion nor faith” and they recently visited the coffee houses in the village and that their 
visit is somehow related to Abuzer and Agha’s decision to bring forces together to 
become ‘unbeatable.’  
                                               
30 The title of the soundtrack of the film.  
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While we expect that there would be a clash between the ‘manipulated’ villagers 
and the Agha-Tradesman duo, the films takes us to an unlikely direction through an 
unlikely character: Salako-- the fool one-- or Salo as he is briefly called by his fellow 
villagers. Throughout the film we don’t get to know his real name, if he has one. Salo is 
the orphan servant of Agha. While the villagers make fun of him, for Agha he is the ideal 
subject “without any knowledge of (R)ight or (L)eft.” He is Agha’s punch bag and 
everybody in the village pities him. However, as if he did not have enough trouble in 
Agha’s hands already, Salako falls in love with Emine, Agha’s daughter. After learning 
that Agha is marrying Emine off to Abuzer, Salo decides to hang himself but he even 
fails to kill himself. When the villagers learn Salo’s melancholia, they convince him to 
kidnap Emine. However, kidnapping Emine means more than the act itself: it is the act of 
transgression of feudal order through interrupting the ‘deal’ between the two powers. Yet, 
the fact that instead of directly challenging the order, the villagers chose Salo –the most 
unlikely character -- to do the job through an unlikely scenario is not only the comic 
factor but also a clue about how reasonable it is to imagine change in that social order.  
Salo is convinced by the villagers to kidnap Emine, and even though she does not 
feel anything for him except for pity, agrees to go with Salo as the only way to escape 
from the marriage with the old Abuzer and reach the notorious Bandit Hamido, her true 
lover. Only Salo would be ‘brave’ enough to dare to kidnap the Agha’s daughter. So the 
plan works. However, when Emine reaches Hamido and tells him the story, he dismisses 
her as he does not want to mess with Rashid Agha and Abuzer: “Without their support” 
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he “would die out of hunger.” Hamido locks Emine in a room until Rashid Agha and 
Abuzer come to pick her up. However, Salo, out of pure chance, and thanks to his 
clumsiness and through a series of misadventure manages to save Emine and runs away 
with her. After a while up in the mountain, they encounter Hamido, who is on duty 
robbing the villagers coming from the bank in the town. In a shoot out Emine kills 
Hamido, but the villagers seeing the pistol in Salo’s hand assume it was Salo who killed  
Hamido. They spread the word in the village that Salo killed Hamido. The conversation 
between the villagers, Rashid Agha and Abuzer back in the village is important to 
understand the effect of the event:  
Villager: Congratulations Agha you trained a matchless hero… 
Rashid Agha: hero? 
Villager: did not you hear, it was your Salo who killed Hamido!   
Villager: He saved our honor, pride and money…  
Rashid Agha (surprised): Salo?  
Villager: First we heard a roaring lion up on the hill….we thought it was the clap 
of thunder…we were wrong… and then the sound of pistol….” 
Rashid Agha: Salo? 
Villagers all together: Sure, Salo! 
Villager: and we saw something rolling down from the hill… we saw it was 
Hamido… he was laying on the ground, lifeless, he fell in front of our feet… Salo 
was standing on top of the hill, smiling gently! 
Rashid Agha (exhausted): Salo? 
Villagers all together: Sure, Salo. 
Villager: his grandeur.. his force…then his fiancée approached him. 
Abuzer: who the heck is his fiancée? 
Villager (sarcastically): It was Emine, Abuzer efendi, your fiancée! 
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Villager: and then we saw the sky turned into money, we thought it was a money 
rain! 
Rashid Agha: what happened to Hamido’s men? 
Villager: they all died too!... and then a smell covered the air! 
Abuzer: what smell? 
Villager: the smell of shit, Mister Abuzer, don’t you get it? under their pants! 
Villagers: (laughing and chanting): Long live Salako! 
Salo, unaware that he became a hero, goes down to the village to get some food. 
When the villagers see Salo they receive him with fear mixed with admiration; but Salo 
does not understand their attitude. The villagers prepare two mules packed with food and 
clothes and send him back to the mountains. In his way back to the cave where he and 
Emine were hiding, he overhears Emine’s voice from the top of the cave through a small 
hole talking to one of Hamido’s men who is still out looking for them. She tells him she 
still loves Hamido, but the man tries to rape her as Hamido is dead already. Another man 
of Hamido comes to the cave and hits his friend with a rock to stop him. Salo accidentally 
falls from the top of the cave on the other man and pacifies him. Hamido’s other men 
come into the sounds in the cave and in the dark beat each other thinking they are beating 
Salo. They all leave the cave thinking they are all beaten by Salo. In the meantime, 
Emine sees them running away from the cave and assumes Salo beat all of them to save 
her. When Salo comes out of the cave he dismisses Emine’s attention after learning the 
real story and he leaves her. After he leaves, Rashid Agha and his men capture Emine and 
he orders his men to capture Salako. While running away from them Salako falters and 
accidentally falls on a colossal greyder which without any effort –even against Salo’s will 
who tries to stop it-- starts running. The greyder on its own wards off Agha’s gunned 
96 
 
men; then drives Salo towards Emine, Abuzer and Agha and captures them in its holder. 
The greyder drives them to Agha’s house and stops after destroying the gate. In the next 
scene, we see Salo with a stick in his hand beating Rashid Agha and Abuzer’s feet. Both 
agha and Abuzer offer to give everything but Salo would not accept, “especially Emine”. 
At the end of the film, Emine kidnaps Salo with a rifle and they make love in a ditch. 
This would have been an ideal happy ending but another ending comes 
afterwards. By the ditch, the narrator, turns the happy ending into –another--failed 
attempt at destroying the feudal order: 
Who is simpleton, Salo or us? We tied our hopes to a fool guy, he turned out to be 
smarter than us. This stupid villagers, instead of fighting for their rights, they 
always depend on somebody who is the least likely. Legend of Hamido, legend of 
Salako… Is it going to go like this? Salako reached to his wish , we will get back 
to the needled barrel. Whatever! 
While the film does not deal with the arrival of the Socialist Left beyond the 
aforementioned conversation, we know that it was a factor behind the villagers’ desire to 
back up Salo against Rashid Agha and Abuzer. The ‘historical necessity’ of the withering 
away of feudalism in favor of a better social order, miraculously drove the trajectory of 
Salo. Throughout the film, it’s as if Salo’s actions are led, against his will, by an invisible 
outside force. He only accidentally saves Emine and eliminates Hamido’s men. The same 
historical necessity mobilizes the greyder upon Rashid Agha and Abuzer. However, 
although aptly installed within the narrative, the ‘historical necessity’ is left without a 
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proper agency. Salo represents both the necessity and the near impossibility of social 
change. As narrator ruefully admits at the end of the film, Salo turns into a – bigger than 
himself-- legend rather than a proper historical agent initiating social change. The proper 
historical agent comes to the screen in the director’s second comedy at the end of the 
decade: Feyzo, in Kibar Feyzo/Feyzo, the Civilized One (1978). I will get back to Kibar 
Feyzo later in the chapter after a necessary detour to the maraba films of which Kibar 
Feyzo is also one of the most sophisticated example. 
MARABA, THE REVOLUTIONARY AGENT OF DOĞU 
The Doğu has been mostly represented in desperate situations: with its people 
oppressed by the landlords, undernourished, always sickly and illiterate. Although a 
truthful representation of the situation in the region, it uncomfortably borders on fatalism. 
The socio-economic and political structure of the ‘dependent feudalism’ may admittedly 
be near-impossible to change, yet the fatalistic representation disqualifies any possible 
organic agency that would initiate a social change regardless of its consequences. In the 
1960s films, the social chance was introduced from outside through modernizing agents. 
Reflecting the military-bureaucratic consensus through the military coup in 1960, these 
were military officers, engineers, and teachers enrolled within the region. However, the 
second military coup in 1971 dismantles the optimism towards the military and any 
outside factor. Maraba, the agri-proletariat, became the agent of social change – and of 
historical progress-- in the 1970s films made by the Socialist directors. Endişe/The Angst 
(1974) by Şerif Gören is the film that introduced maraba for the first time as a fully 
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developed character in cinema. Although the idea had been grappled by Yılmaz Güney 
both in Hudutlarin Kanunu/Law of the Borders (1966) and Umut/The Hope (1970), 
neither Hıdır nor Cabbar could become ‘maraba,’ the revolutionary agent.  
Endise tells the story of Cevher, who, in order to pay his blood money, goes to 
work at the cotton fields in the Southern city of Adana. There is an influx of workers to 
the cotton fields every summer due to much higher pay for the work. However, the cotton 
picking takes place during the hottest period of the summer and both adult and child 
mortality rate  raises exponentially due to malaria during the picking season. Only the 
most despondent work force-- who can risk their life-- goes to work on the cotton fields. 
Hence the density of Kurdish workers ending up in the cotton fields. The film opens with 
the black and white  photos taken by assistant director Ali Özgentürk during his field 
research in the cotton fields prior to the shooting of the film. The close-up pictures of the 
fly-ridden faces of children who are left alone on the camping area while the adults work 
at the field works to create an overbearing sense of destitute even before the narrative 
begins with the medium shot of a crying baby boy. Next, we see a number of trucks 
carrying the piled-up maraba to the cotton fields. We see Cevher talking to his brother-in-
law about the blood money he has to collect by the end of the season. However, in the 
middle of the picking season the workers decide to go on a strike due to the disagreement 
between the workers and the patrons on the payments, a way below the national cotton 
ground price according to which it is calculated. The workers receive the information on 
cotton prices and other economic and political events from the radio which stays on 
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throughout the film. While the strike continues without compromise, it puts Cevher’s 
plan to save money to pay his blood debt, and hence his life, in danger. He even agrees to 
marry his daughter to the landlord in exchange for a good amount of money but it does 
not happen as the daughter runs away with somebody else. At the end of the season, 
Cevher fails to collect and pay the money and his blood enemies kills him in the cotton 
fields.  
Endise, while holds on to a class-based perspective through the antagonism 
between the landlord, patrons and the workers, points to another antagonism, that is 
between the workers and Cevher 31. The film end up being the critique of Cevher as 
maraba, or his failure of being one. He is portrayed as lacking class consciousness and 
sense of solidarity with the other workers due to his attachment to the feudal order 
through blood feud. His impending feudal predicament is recognized as the main reason 
for Cevher’s opportunistic attitude throughout the strike: his willingness to break the 
strike, while puts him in bad terms with the workers, makes him a sympathetic worker in 
                                               
31 Yılmaz Güney was the original director of Endişe, however, Güney’s assistant Şerif Gören completed 
the film after Güney was imprisoned with charges of murdering the district prosecutor. The film is initially 
planned as a documentary account of cotton workers who migrate to the cotton fields in Adana every year 
for the entire summer and work under extreme conditions. The scenario is based on the three-month 
ethnographic research done by the assistant director Ali Özgentürk upon Yilmaz Guney’s request. By 
realistically representing the working conditions of the cotton workers, Güney aims to contribute to the 
intensifying workers’ struggle of the period (Güney 2005). However, under Goren’s direction the film’s 
focus changes from the workers’ collective struggle to personal struggle of the main character Cevher. 
Despite this dramatic shift in the narrative, the documentary style remains as an important aspect of the 
film. In order to sustain the documentary atmosphere, Goren successfully integrates worker’s mundane 
activities --- fasting, praying, eating, playing, etc ---  to the narrative structure though a steady-cam 
wandering amongst the workers’ tents. Endişe received the ‘best actor’, ‘the best original scenario’, and 
‘the fest film’ awards in that year’s highly controversial Antalya Film Festival, where a group of unsatisfied 
audience stoned the jury for their decision. (Yedinci Sanat 1975)  
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the eyes of the patrons. He cannot join the other marabas’ celebrations during the strike. 
Moreover, he is openly favored by the patrons with promotions as long as he continues to 
work. The film’s message is in parallel with the socialist discourse of the period, 
explicating how feudal structure and the traditional loyalties ingrained in that structure 
run counter to a socialist revolution: a successful revolution passes through the abolition 
of feudalism and the failure is not less than death. 
The narrative of Kara Carsafli Gelin/Bride With Black Chador (Süreyya Duru 
1975) also builds upon a blood feud. The landlord of the village orders a villager to kill a 
fellow villager in exchange for economic support for his family. After the villager 
completes the mission he asks the landlord why he killed the guy. The landlord tells him 
not to question his orders. We later learn that the landlord wanted to possess the victim’s 
land that the victim was not willing to give up to the landlord. Blood provokes blood and 
the victim’s family is supposed to reciprocate in equal measure. However, instead, the 
victim’s family asks for the daughter of the murderer in exchange for the life of the 
victim to prevent the blood feud and the family of the murderer accepts. Years later, we 
see the older sons of the victim, Müslüm—who carries a rifle throughout the film -- 
propagating land reform in the village. Yet the landlord opposes him and threatens the 
villagers if they follow his lead. When Müslüm is supported by the idealist engineer in 
helping the villagers to defend their rights, the village landlord asks the help of the big 
landlord of the region. The ‘big boss’ apparently has close ties with the government and 
uses this connection in local affairs. The big landlord together with a Minister of the 
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Parliament visits the village to both scare and sweet talk to the villagers. However, led by 
Müslüm, the villagers tell them they only want land reform. Müslüm is found too 
dangerous for the villagers and the landlord of the village orders another villager to kill 
Müslüm, again, in exchange for support for his family. The villager kills Müslüm during 
his brother Vakkas’ wedding. The villagers force Vakkas to take revenge to save his 
honor but he believes that there is somebody else behind the shooting, in the same way 
that he believed there was somebody behind the death of his father. Vakkas finds an 
ingenious trick to learn who is behind the shooting. During Müslüm’s funeral, Vakkas 
kindly asks the murderer to go into the grave and measure it to make sure Müslüm fits 
into it. Assuming that nobody saw him shooting Müslüm, the murderer hops into the 
grave unsuspectingly. Vakkas points his pistol to him and asks him who made him kill 
Müslüm. The murderer gives the name of the landlord. At the end Vakkas kills the 
landlord to avenge both deaths. 
In Fıratın Cinleri/Jinns of the Euphrates (Korhan Yurtsever 1977), the landlord of 
the village, Vakkas Agha, seizes the land of Genco on the premise that the river 
Euphrates eroded most of Genco’s land and the remaining part merged with his land. 
However, Genco finds the explanation unfair and refuses to give up on his land. Vakkas 
Agha orders his men to beat Genco for his irreverence. In a flashback, we learn Vakkas 
Agha wanted to stop Genco’s wedding for he wanted to have the bride, Yağda. But he 
could not insists as Yağda’s uncle, the notorious Bandit Kasım, the only person Vakkas is 
afraid of, backs up Genco. While Genco gets beaten up badly, his defiance is spread in 
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the village. Genco’s mother tells him to go to the court, assuming that “the law would 
treat Genco and Vakkas equally” but the elder of the village tries to convince them that 
Vakkas Agha is the representative of God on the earth and he should be treated 
respectfully: the way of the government would solve any problem.  
Agha also intervenes when Genco wants to bring a doctor for Yağda.32 Genco’s 
friend Zülfü insists they bring a doctor but neither the elder nor Vakkas fancies the idea. 
Vakkas tells Genco they have Sheiks and hodjas who can heal Yağda with the force of 
their breath. According to the elder Yağda is under the influence of Jinns and the only 
solution is a jinn-expellers. Agha promises he would bring the best jinn-expeller. Not 
convinced but having no other option, Genco agrees to stay in the village.33 However, the 
jinn-expeller cannot heal her because “she is under the influence of water jinns who are 
the worst and the strongest kind.” Yagda goes completely insane during the jinn-
expelling ritual. Zülfü summons the fellow villagers:  
If doctor was here, he would have healed our sister. But the bastard landlord did 
not want it. So far we lived like dogs. Who sweats all the time, if not us? We did 
the sowing and harvesting, look what we have, nothing! Will it continue like this? 
                                               
32 Yağda has difficulty during the delivery of her second child. We see the midwife and two more women 
helping Yağda to deliver the baby. In a series of shots we see the process: first they hang Yağda from her 
hands and shake her up and down, then they lay her on the floor and press down a flat wooden piece with 
their feet; then bounce her to the ground. The delivery happens but the mother cannot stop the bleeding. 
Midwife recommends her to put dung to her wound to stop the bleeding. However, Yağda gets rabid 
decease from the dung.  
33 In a conversation between Agha and his butler we learn Agha’s real concern:  “Genco is giving ideas to 
the villagers […] So if Genco brings the government into everything, he becomes an example for the 
villagers, and our credit in front of the village devalues. And whoever feels damaged by the feudal tradition 
starts asking for rights and justice.”  
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No, brothers, it’s enough. Let’s wake up! Let’s do not let the landlord to seize the 
bearing of our sweat.  
While Zülfü and the villagers march towards Vakkas Agha with hammers and 
shovels, Genco reaches to the Agha and kills him.  
KIBAR FEYZO34 AND SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN DOĞU 
The film starts in the courtroom. Feyzo is summoned by the judge for defense and 
he tells how he ended up in the court: “My name is Feyzo, they call me ‘Feyzo, the 
civilized one,’ in the village. This life did not leave us any heart or soul. However we 
know who is to blame. Poverty is the main reason, your honor, we realized this too late.” 
After this brief introduction the film goes back to the beginning as Feyzo narrates the 
story. After the military service Feyzo comes back to his village to marry his long time 
beloved Gülo. However, as Gülo’s father raises the dowry Feyzo pays its half with bond 
under the land lord, Maho Agha’s guarantee. During the wedding ceremony Maho Agha 
expels him from the village for his ‘irreverence’ because according to Agha, Feyzo 
disrupted the dress code by wearing a hat that ‘could only be worn by Aghas.’ Feyzo 
goes to Istanbul to work and earn the money he owns to his father-in-law. While in the 
city he sees the labor market, which he thinks “worse than the animal market in the 
                                               
34 The direct translation of the title would be Feyzo, The Polite One. Throughout the film we are not told 
how he acquired the name but it’s made clear that his exposure to the ‘civilized’ life in the cities he is 
exiled and his desire to bring it in his village is the reason for the name. However, what inspires Feyzo is 
not the city life itself which is also criticized by him, but the political vibrancy of the workers against the 
oppression and inequality ingrained in the urban life. In the translation, I chose ‘civilized’ instead of polite 
to give this sense of acculturation and enlightenment. 
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village.” After six months he leans Maho Agha forgives him and he can go back to the 
village. When he goes back, his father-in-law asks for the first installment of his debt. In 
order to complete the amount, he decides to construct a makeshift public restroom that he 
saw in the city. When Agha learns about it he comes to see the restroom. Even though 
Feyzo tells Maho Agha that ‘it’s free for him to use it,’ Maho Agha gets offended by the 
idea that a maraba would take shit after him. He one more time expels Feyzo from the 
village. Second time in Istanbul, he works as a construction worker and he hears about 
labor unions. Even though he does not know what it means he learns “if you are from 
labor union you get more money and you become stronger.” After a while Maho Agha 
calls him back to the village to pay his debt. Being unable to pay the second installment 
Feyzo sells his mother’s cow. When his mother learns it she puts him on the plough 
instead of the cow to process the field. The government representative visiting the village 
sees Feyzo under the plough and asks Maho Agha for explanation. The conversation 
between Feyzo, Maho Agha and the representative summarizes the main stake of the 
film: 
Feyzo: Welcome, my Agha 
Agha: Feyzo, what is this, you put yourself there as if you are a cow? 
Feyzo: Yes. Haci Huso (the father-in-law) took the cow, Maho Agha. 
Representative: Why did he take it? 
Feyzo: As an installment of the dowry, Sir. 
Rep: [to Maho Agha] Did not you tell me you are paying the dowries for the 
villagers? [to Feyzo] Do you have land? 
Feyzo: how can maraba have land, sir? We are farming Maho Agha’s land 
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Rep: How much money do you make annually? 
Feyzo: What money? our Agha just feeds us 
Rep: Is it really enough? 
Feyzo: May god protect the Agha. If we are able to eat a piece of bread, it’s 
thanks to the the Agha. 
Maho Agha blames his butler for not telling him what really goes on in the village 
and in front of the representative promises Feyzo land and two cows in addition to the 
money for the dowry. After the representative leaves, though, Maho Agha beats Feyzo 
and expels him from the village for the third time. The third time in the city he witnesses 
a workers’ strike. Feyzo narrates what he saw to the Judge: “There are city Aghas in the 
city. But here, if marabas don’t get what they deserve, they gather hand to hand for their 
rights.” and he reads the banners he sees during the strike: “Strike,” “Bread,” “Freedom,” 
“Workers Brothers, Bosses Treators,” “Fascism…” “What the heck is Fascism?” Feyzo 
asks the Judge if he knows what “Fasho” means and he continues without waiting the 
answer: “I swear to God, our Agha is Fasho!” 
Feyzo starts working as painter to erase graffiti on the walls written by the 
revolutionaries. He also learns them by heart: “End to the order of Aghas!,” “No passage 
to Fascism!,” “Revolutionary Youth: General Strike is our right. We will get it no matter 
what!,” “Fascist cells must be destroyed!” Feyzo also learns the lesson of his life: while 
on the street he sees a wedding ceremony and he wants to talk to the groom:  
Feyzo: How much did you pay, bro? 
Groom: For what? 
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Feyzo: For the woman? 
Groom: What are you talking about, man; who says you can buy women? 
Bride’s Father: Leave us alone, mister! 
Feyzo: I am asking him how much he paid for the bride. 
Father: I am the father of the bride. My daughter is not for sale. They met and got 
married. 
Feyzo: Did not you ask for dowry for your daughter?  
Father: What dowry, son, there is no such a tradition any more. 
Feyzo: (to the groom) tell me the truth for god’s sake, you got the bride for free? 
Groom: (laughing) yes it’s for free. 
After he comes back to the village he spreads the words to the villagers and gather 
them at the village center to protest dowry. Their banners read “Girls should get the 
husband, Pay the money to the cow,” “Women are our right, until we get them we will 
fight,” “We are women we are mother, we are against to be sold.” Even though Maho 
Agha suppresses the protest violently, the villagers overcome their fear of the Agha. 
Feyzo’s mother even threatens Maho: “Beat as long as you can, won’t that stick end up in 
our hands one day?” This time Agha does not let Feyzo leave the village, because every 
time he leaves the village, ‘he creates a bigger problem” for him. On the other hand, 
while content that he would not leave his family, Feyzo tries to find a way to go to the 
city to earn money to pay the next installment. He does all the tricks to get himself 
expelled; he even writes graffiti on the wall in the village. Maho Agha sees him writing 
“Fasho Agha.” When Agha asks its meaning, Feyzo explains: “It means like bastard and 
faggot, my Agha.” But Agha still does not expel him fearing the consequences.  
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While in the village Feyzo learns that the cotton workers in Adana earns a lot of 
money. He talks to the other marabas and they all go to talk to Maho Agha. But Maho 
Agha does not give them permission to leave the village. He blames Feyzo to have spread 
these “evil ideas” among the marabas. However, other marabas also oppose Maho Agha’s 
decision. Recalling the general strike in the city, Feyzo gathers the marabas around him 
and convinces them to come with him to the cotton fields. The entire village packs their 
stuff and set out to go to cotton fields but Maho Agha stops the caravans and threatens 
the villagers. At the end, Feyzo shoots Maho Agha dead. Back in the courtroom, we learn 
that, Maho Agha’s death was not the end of oppression at all. A new landlord bought the 
village and he is even worse than Maho Agha. The film ends with Feyzo’s question to the 
Judge: I don’t know where this ends up, your honor. You are the state, and you are aware. 
You make the decision, your highness, Who is to blame? 
While the death of Maho Agha allows Feyzo to talk to the state directly for the 
first time as a proper ‘subject’, the direct encounter is problematized by its terms. It 
expresses the desire to talk to the Power, whose understanding was sought for the 
problems of the region, the encounter is also structured in a position of inequality and 
guilt. Feyzo gets to speak to the state while, except for calling Feyzo’s name at the 
beginning, the State remains silent throughout the film. However, Feyzo speaks as a 
criminal. Indeed, this was one of the Socialist critiques of the state that it categorically 
conceived of the “easterners” as criminals. The films ends without the verdict. As a 
matter of fact, the verdict of the judge is not considered important, as we already know 
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that Feyzo will be incarcerated for his violent deed. Moreover, he already reveals the 
important verdict in his last address to the Judge when he tells him that another Agha 
bought the village and he is even worse than Maho Agha. As his ‘revolution’ ended up 
bringing about a more oppressive order, Feyzo learns that the problem cannot solely be 
solved where it is lived. 
In all these films, the ‘revolutionary’ agency of maraba both saves the narrative from an 
otherwise orientalizing logic and complicates the realist premises of the films. Maraba is 
represented as a classed body whose actions are solely motivated by economic destitute. 
In order to emphasize the socio-economic factor, the narrative excludes what, during that 
period, haunts the Socialists as well as liberals and what was labeled as “Kürtçülük,” 
‘Kurdism.’ Kurdism was used to define Kurdish population sympathetic to Barzani 
movement in northern Iraq and who strived for independent Kurdistan. Maraba, while 
given revolutionary agency vis-à-vis the feudal order, should also be read as a response to 
the danger of Kurdism. Maraba as Socialist national fantasy works to nationalize the very 
revolutionary agency35.  
SÜRÜ/THE HERD AND HAZAL: DOĞU’S ENCOUNTER WITH NATIONAL MODERNITY  
Sürü (1977) and Hazal (1979) mark an important shift within the cinematic 
representation of Doğu in the 1970s socialist cinema. While the other films discussed so 
far have dealt with Doğu as outside national modernity, and informed by the desire for 
                                               
35 The discourse of Kurdism is a good example of how anti-imperialist ideology can reproduce nationalism. 
Kurdism was seen as foreign-inspired ideology that was designed to disintegrate the national unity as in the 
case of Ismail Cem’s reflections of the ‘general scan at the beginning of the decade. (see Cem 1970) 
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modernization, Sürü and Hazal deal with the region’s physical encounter with national 
modernization through various modern technologies. Both films also differ from the 
others in terms of their main characters. Maraba is no longer a main character in these 
films. Sürü was written and supervised by Yılmaz Güney while he was in prison after 
allegedly murdering the district prosecutor during the filming of Endişe in 1974. During 
this period – the late 1970s-- Güney’s politics as well as cinematic focus on the region 
shifted from the workers’ struggle to the Kurdish question (Sengül 2012). After films 
such as Umut (1970), Ağıt (1971), and Endişe (1974), in which socialist politics informed 
the narrative -- even though the messages always carried references to ethnicity—Sürü 
does not revolve around a strictly socialist problematic. This shift is also seen in Güney’s 
choice of subject matter for the film.  
The film deals with the disintegration of an animal-breeding, nomadic Kurdish 
tribe in the face of the arrival of modern agriculture into the region, which has eradicated 
the pasturelands. The Veysikan tribe, headed by Hamo Agha, is already dysfunctional 
after losing its men to a blood feud with the Halilhan tribe, which ended when the latter 
agreed to marry a female member to Hamo’s son Şivan in exchange for the life of another 
tribe member. At the very beginning of the film, the worried face of Hamo watches the 
tractors enter the scene. As a yearly routine, Hamo has a deal with a businessman from 
Ankara to sell a portion of the herd. Already troubled by the tractors, Hamo’s train 
journey to Ankara with the herd completes the process of disintegration. In order to rent 
the compartments of the train, Hamo has to bribe the officers and the machinists, who, 
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finding the bribe too little, cause the death of a number of animals by driving the train 
haphazardly. The officer does not even clean up the compartments that had residues of 
DDT from the earlier trip, which killed more animals throughout the journey. The 
railway, through its corrupt bureaucracy, and with its claustrophobic compartments, 
works as a metaphor for the terms of the region’s integration into the national modernity 
(and national market). When Hamo and his sons arrive in Ankara, the businessman tells 
them to feed the herd in the animal bazaar for a couple of days before he buys them. At 
the end of the film Hamo is shown alone in a crowded urban milieu screaming the names 
of his sons he lost in the city. Yet, the film is not totally devoid of socialist politics. It is 
only in the city of Ankara that Güney brings up the necessity of socialist revolution 
within the urban proletariat through Şivan’s childhood friend who is a construction 
worker in the city. Back where the films open, in the East, Güney does not refer to 
socialist revolution as solution of the problems of the nomadic Kurdish tribe. Güney 
seems to exclude Doğu from the geography of socialist revolution, by instead 
problematizing the process of modernization as incorporation –more specifically 
exploitation-- into the national market. 
Hazal by Ali Özgentürk, a former assistant to Güney, takes place in a border 
village in the East. The film depicts the response of the feudal elite to the construction of 
roads connecting the village to the rest of the national territory. Although they initially 
resist the road construction, the film provides a rare portrayal of feudal elites as rational 
agents of a politic-economic system, without ridiculing them or showing them as evil. 
111 
 
During a meeting to discuss the possible repercussions of the construction, the landlord 
warns the village committee against the dangers of roads: “When the road comes, the 
state comes too. The state records your name, gives you an ID, gets to know about you, 
and intervenes in everything you do.” Unlike the majority of “revolutionary” films 
depicting the feudal order at its apex, Hazal, depicts the disintegration of the feudal 
system during the process of modernization. After the meeting, the committee decides to 
oppose the construction and punish the villagers willing to cooperate with the engineers. 
The tension arises when an idealist villager convinces the other villagers to work with the 
engineers. Although the landlord manages to kill the idealist villager, he cannot stop the 
arrival of the excavators into the village. The visual representation of this process is 
remarkable: as the machines progress towards the village, carving the ground for the 
road, the villagers run away and gather around the corpse of the idealist villager. The 
tremendous heft of the machines contrasts with the human forms, which seem like ants 
from a bird’s eye view. While Hazal has a more balanced representation of everyday life 
in the village, due, perhaps, to the director’s earlier documentary works on the region and 
his collaborations with Güney, the narrative is still structured around the feudal-modern 
tension. It is also notable that, although made at the very end of the 1970s, socialism does 
not factor into the narrative; rather, the modernists desire remains intact. To some extent, 
the film takes ‘the agency’ that was granted to maraba away, from within the region to 
the outside technocrat modernizers of the state.  
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 THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DOĞU IN POST-1980 TURKISH CINEMA 
The 1980s marks the end of Doğu as a cinematic space in Turkish cinema. This is 
not the literal disappearance of the region from the cinema. Rather, the disappearance of 
‘Doğu’ as formulized within Socialist discourse and portrayed in cinema of the 1970s: 
the marabas exploited by the landlords, the scorching summer time of harvesting on the 
fields, evil landlords, backwardness, and blood feud claiming the lives of the people, etc.. 
The film Hakkari’de bir Mevsim/A Season in Hakkari (Erden Kıral 1983), is about a 
primary school teacher who in the middle of winter ends up in the Pirkanis village of the 
city of Hakkari 36. The teacher does not even remember how he came to the village: he 
may be “lost, a survivor or a fugitive.” Unlike the state representatives who came to the 
region in the earlier films, he is not there to represent the state, he is sent here by the state 
as punishment. Not only does he have not any control over the village, he is not able to 
communicate neither with the people nor with his own students who is speaking “another 
language.” The teacher stays in the village for a semester and when he finally starts 
communicating with the people and the students, an inspector from the Ministry comes 
and tells him that his term in the village is over. The film gives a critique of the state 
policies not through the ‘poverty’ of the region but the through the teacher who sees in 
the village another world which is foreign to him. The teacher, rather than being the 
                                               
36 The city of Hakkari was a primary direction of exile for socialist teachers. It’s the farthest city from the 
national capital. The idea of sending the teachers to Hakkari was to pacify them as a teacher and dissenter. 
The teacher would struggle with language barrier, lack of infrastructure, and sense of isolation both 
physically and intellectually as the city becomes unreachable during the long winter season due to the 
snow.  
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modernizer -- like the one in Hudutlarin Kanunu --tries to learn from the villagers 
survival skills to simply stay alive. While his amnesia lets him to see the region from a 
fresh perspective, unmediated by modernist ideology, it also refers to a violent traumatic 
moment as the cause of the amnesia.  
Derman/Remedy (Şerif Gören 1983) is about a nurse who is appointed to work in 
Doğu. She has to stop by a village on the way as the roads are blocked by the snow. 
While in the village she helps the villagers with their heath. But when she decides to take 
a pregnant woman to the hospital despite the warnings of the villagers, she barely 
survives the snow. In the meantime, she is called by the neighboring village . Even 
though the villagers she stays with warns her not to go, she decides to go anyways since 
‘it’s her job to help everybody.’ But when she goes to the neighboring village the village 
chief does not allow her to return. She is saved by the bandit Şeyhmus who is feared and 
respected by everybody. Şeyhmus is a fugitive. After killing somebody he took shelter in 
the mountains. Since then he helps people in need. Şeyhmus falls in love with the nurse. 
But the nurse wants him to surrender and he surrenders.  
Züğürt Ağa is the story on a landlord who has long lost his power to rule his land 
and his subjects. Except for  wrestling, the landlord does not have any venue to show his 
might! He always wins the matches. However, the wrestling are set up by the villagers. 
The opponents are bought to lose to the Aga, so that after every victory he offers feast to 
the villagers. His party loses elections to the party of the Sheikh who gave the villagers 
land title in the heaven. Unlike the films of the 1970s where the narrative is centered on 
114 
 
the antagonism between the feudal ruling class (Agha, Sheikh) and the peasant, in Züğürt 
Agha both the Agha and the peasant are losers. A larger force destroys the feudal 
dynamics but the result is not what the Socialist were prophesying. After an unproductive 
harvesting season and as a result of the villagers’ decision to sell his share of crop, the 
landlord has to sell the village. The potential buyer is the head of “his party.” After Agha 
sells the village and moves to the city, he learns that the value of the village area has 
drastically increased due to the highway project passing through the village.  
In Yer Demir, Gök Bakır/Iron Earth, Copper Sky (Zülfü Livaneli 1987) The 
inhabitants of a mountain village are scared by the village chief that the landlord, Adil 
Efendi (Mister Just), is coming to the village accompanied by 20 gendarmerie and if they 
don’t pay their debts, he will raze down the village. While Taşbaş and a few others tell 
the other villagers to resist, the villagers, instead, find a safer solution. They start 
believing that Taşbaş, their fellow villager is a Saint who can save them from the might 
of the land lord. The rumors spread very quickly and even the village chief has to go with 
the flow. Tasbas strictly refuses the idea at first but he has to accept to it as  his refusal 
also is seen by the villagers as a sign of his being a genuine saint: “only a genuine one 
would refuse he is not saint” While the ‘invention’ works to scare the village chief off 
from messing with Tasbas and the villagers, when the head of the gendarmerie hears the 
story he goes to the village and arrest Tasbas as the sign of “dark age” mentality.  
Throughout the film, Adil Efendi does not appear, even whether he really is 
coming or not is not certain. At the end of the film, while Taşbaş is arrested by the 
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gendarmerie, he speaks to the villager that he is cursing the village chief and nobody 
should talk to him until his death. Katırcılar/Mule Riders (Şerif Gören 1987) is about a 
female journalist visiting a town on the Iranian border to write a story on smuggling. In 
the town, she meets three mule riders who smuggle food across the border. The mule 
riders get caught by the gendarmerie and they are sent to the court in the village. On the 
road, the journalist accompanies the gendarmerie and the mule riders and we learn the 
stories of all on the road. The mule riders are the only ones who know the directions in 
the snow and they had to lead the crew to the court. The mule riders manage to escape 
after saving the lives of the gendarmes and the journalist after the avalanche.  
The first thing to notice in the films of 1980s is the dramatic change of the season. 
Winter and snow capped mountains dominated the films on the region. In the only film 
that insisted staying in Doğu, Züğürt Agha/Penniless Agha (1985), the marabas force the 
Agha to sell the village. As the title suggests, the landlord is very different from that of  
1970s. Within the first half of the movie, the landlord had to move to the city where he 
ends up running a food vendor. With the disappearance of the land under the snow, 
marabas disappeared too, so did the evil landlords, and the malaria. Their disappearance 
only paralleled the disappearance of the Socialist movement after the coup. The snow 
was either a memory loss by the trauma of the coup or to ‘freeze’ the problems for better 
times. It signified the end of an era, revolution left its place to weariness. The 1980 coup 
made impossible the re-emergence of Left leaning parties due to due to mass 
incarcerations and the new constitution severely limiting basic rights and freedoms. The 
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military rule lasted until 1983 when the center-Right Motherland Party won the general 
elections. The Kurdish movement, as a result of extreme state-violence, evolved into a 
Marxist-Leninist guerilla movement under the name Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 
which started its armed resistance in Turkey in 1984. Due to both the military coup and 
the emergence of the Kurdish armed struggle by PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) making 
films within and on Doğu became virtually impossible.  
CONCLUSION 
The films of Doğu captured an important moment in the history of politics of 
dissent in Turkey. Turkish Socialists and the Kurdish opposition, underground since late 
1930 united their powers for a decade. While the Turkish Socialists took the ‘Eastern 
problem’ as a major component of their politics and for the first time opened the region to 
critical knowledge production, the Socialist revival in the East, thanks to the socialist 
movements in Turkey and in Iraq provided a model for a Socialist revolution for the 
Turkish Socialism. A new subject position, maraba, became the main protagonist of the 
majority of the films on Doğu. Maraba represents the revolutionary consciousness of the 
rural working class in the region and through his agency the villagers formed a block 
against the feudal ruling class. Even though in none of the afore mentioned films the 
upraising led to a systemic change, the flexibility of the system is shown through the 
encounters between marabas and the ruling elite. However, the failure of the marabas in 
the films is not just due to the strengths of the feudal ruling elites. As it emerged in the 
Socialist discourse, what produced maraba was the ‘hopelessness,’ which haunted the 
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very agency that is given to him. Even though maraba stood in for the Kurdish peasant in 
the 1960s and 1970s, its representation in cinema stripped them of their ethnic ‘excess,’ 
by overemphasizing their socio-economic bases. The actions of the de-ethnicized figure 
of maraba are driven only by his economic destitute.37  
The socialist films were able to deal with social problems during a time when, as 
writer Vedat Türkali aptly described, ‘the price of a line of writing was one’s head’ 
(Türkali 1993, 87). The directors, screenwriters, producers were subjected to systematic 
incarceration, torture, and exile. The screenwriters had to use different names on their 
scripts to pass the censorship38. The films were trashed and the theaters where these films 
were exhibited were burned down by ultra-nationalists mobilized by the conservative 
governments. In the meanwhile, the 1977 statute on cinematic materials made any hint of 
criticism an act of terrorism (Türkali 1993). The articles in the 1977 statute were all 
interpretative, according to which every film can be deemed subversive (Özgüç et. al. 
2000). The systematic violence the filmmakers faced during 1970s should be an 
indication of the radical character of their films. Despite all state violence, the socialist 
cinema produced influential films.  
                                               
37 The ethnic content of the mobilities within the region in the 1960s and 1970s were framed as separatist 
‘Kurdism’ against which the state was invited to fight through socio-economic development programs 
(Cem, 1970). However, this does not cancel out that the Socialist films of the 1970s also pushed the limits 
of the representation of the region in Turkish cinema 
38 Nazim Hikmet, Vedat Turkali, and Yasar Kemal were well-known examples of the socialist writers, who 
had to use different names to write for films. As discussed in the previous chapter, in Turkey censorship in 
cinema functioned at three levels: on the script (pre-production), the film, and the exhibition (post-
production). In order for a film to be shot, its script had to pass the censorship. This mechanism made the 
name on the script of prime importance for the censor committee. 
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While the East was made visible through these films, it gained this visibility 
through the gaze of socialist modernization: Doğu was the spatial form through which the 
East came to be seen within the decade’s films. 1980 is a turning point in the 
representation of the region. Although the post-coup constitution prepared by the military 
rendered any engagement with the region as crime, the films of the decade, while being 
more cautious in terms of their political message, are also less certain in terms of 
perceiving the region. The revolutionary certainty of the Socialist directors during the 
1970s that feudalism is the prime problem of the region and what was needed was a 
socio-economic development left its place to the weariness of the main characters ended 
up in the region. The weariness can be attributed to the trauma of the coup and the 
disappearance of Socialist movement, but this also led the directors see the region outside 
the Socialist framework: poverty and feudalism. The characters in the aforementioned 
films observe the region and the people inside and see a different life that is different but 
not necessarily worse than theirs: The teacher in HBM is an exile in a place he does not 
know anything about, the journalist in Katircilar is abused by the public officials during 
his time in the town. In Derman, the midwife is rescued by the villagers just before 
freezing in the snow storm.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE LONG 1990s: WAR, DOĞU AND THE 
POLITICS OF SPACE IN NEW TURKISH CINEMA 
INTRODUCTION: THE LONG 1990S 
The war has marked the condition, possibility and the language of cinema on 
Doğu39 during the 1990s. The armed conflict that started in 1984 and turned into a civil 
war in the early 1990s left by the end of the decade approximately four thousand villages 
and hamlets evacuated (Jongerden 2007, Secor 2007, Ungör 2011, Mater 2005, Ronayne 
2005) forcing about three million inhabitants to leave their homes in the region. The 
establishment of the emergency rule zone in the region through the State of Emergency 
put in effect in 1987 – following the marital law since 1979-- not only turned the region 
into a dead zone, but it also defined the life of the inhabitants in their new places. The 
evacuated villages flooded with water of the dams constructed as part of the state’s 
regional development program, military towers and barracks and ghostly houses 
populated the cinematic space of what I will call, regarding the time of the films, “the 
long 1990s.” I use the ‘long 1990s’ to refer to the period during which the war defined 
the cultural production on the region. In this chapter, I discuss how the war affected the 
representation of Doğu in the cinema of the 1990s: what kind of a space did Doğu 
                                               
39 Though the discursive function of ‘Doğu’ continue to determine the mode of official engagement, in 
1990s, ‘southeast’ (güneydoğu), abbreviation for the ‘Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi’ (Southeastern Anatolia 
Region), came to be used to refer to the main space of state involvement. There are two reasons for the shift 
in naming: firstly due to the Southeastern Regional Development (GAP) plan which was the quintessential 
part of the post-coup military governments’ spatial policy in the region in the 1980s, which defined the 
southeast as the primary reference for the official and the scholarly address. Secondly, southeast has been 
the epicenter of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Army. 
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become in the films of the decade? The spatial reading will combine on the one hand the 
textual analysis of the films dealing with the war, on the other how the war and the state 
of emergency affected the politics of cinematic production. I am interested in the 
transformation of the cinematic space of Doğu from a socialist spatiality to the space of 
war. 
The cinematic production in the 1990s was shaped by multiple factors both inside 
and outside of cinema. Within cinema, the 1990s witnessed the revival of the cinematic 
production after being almost stagnant throughout the post-coup 1980s. Defined as “New 
Turkish Cinema” (Dönmez-Colin 2008, Suner 2011), this ‘new wave’ is identified by its 
engagement in the issues of identity, belonging and memory as main concerns behind the 
productions. The films on the region were a part of this cinematic language new Turkish 
cinema appropriated.40 This was made possible –and necessitated by --the political 
conjuncture in the 1990s. While the State of Emergency rule limited the scope of cultural 
production in/on the region,41 the first Gulf War and the diplomatic traffic between 
Kurdish, Turkish and the American representatives on the future of the post-war Iraq, the 
new coalition government in Turkey that brought together the left and the right first time 
after the 1980 coup, the recognition ( by the president and the prime minister) of 
“Kurdish reality” in the early 1991 led to the production of films about “Kurds.” Mem û 
                                               
40 As a gesture against subtle nationalism within the literature, many scholars address the possible 
‘nationalist’ connotation of “Turkish,” in “Turkish cinema” and promote using “Cinema of Turkey”, 
instead of Turkish cinema. See  Arslan 2011, Suner 2001, Donmez-Colin 2008. 
41 Decree-Law no 430: 12/15/1990. On the Continuation of State of Emergency and the necessary 
Precautions that should be taken by the State of Emergency Governorate. 
http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/10042.html (date of access: 7/24/12) 
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Zin/Mem and Zin (Ümit Elçi 1991) and Siyabend û Xece /Siyabend and Xece (Şahin Gök 
1992), both based on Kurdish epics, were the early demonstrations of the short-lived 
change of political atmosphere. Yet the successive failures of the governments’ reform 
plans and of the unilateral cease-fires declared by the PKK led to the intensification of 
the armed conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK towards the middle of the 
decade. What was equally alarming during the decade was the possibility of total state of 
war including the urban centers receiving Kurdish migrants from the depopulated war 
zone, heralded by the public lynchings against the newcomers (Kılıç 1992, Belge 1995).  
Cinema, while an important medium through which the region has become visible 
during the 1990s, was not the only one. Television, due to its ease of access and its 
importance as governmental propaganda machine became the most important, and 
affective, distributor of structure of vision on the war throughout the decade. A special 
weekly program ‘Sights From Anatolia’ was dedicated to the war efforts of the Turkish 
Army and to the issue of ‘PKK terror’ The public channel, TRT2 (Turkish Radio 
Television), started broadcasting in 1987,dedicated most of its air time to the educational 
programs on Southeast Anatolia Regional Development Project (GAP) propagating the 
state efforts in the region. Yet, while the medium of television ---especially the public 
television-- was representing the state perspective on the issue, cinema was able to 
critically reflect on the process. The reason behind the ‘ideological’ difference between 
the (public) television and cinema is the institutional structure of the former. Whereas 
television, until the early 1990s when private channels started broadcasting, was directly 
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run by the successive governments and considered as the key institution for political and 
ideological propaganda, cinema enjoyed, at least, institutional autonomy. Although the 
1990s witnessed the emergence of private channels, a government institution, The Radio 
and Television Supreme Council, strictly regulated the televisual content.42 Despite the 
fact that private televisions broke the taboos of public broadcasting to an important extent 
the Supreme Council is effective in securing the ‘state perspective’ on several issues of 
public concern.  
The war informed the cinematic language in two ways: the urban migration and 
the concomitant anxiety over the new population and the raising ethnic conflict in the 
western cities necessitated the film directors reflect of the ‘urban’ side of the Kurdish 
question, which was in a way a turning point after the dominance of the village as the 
main space of the representation of Doğu. Secondly, while the main space of cinematic 
representation changed, the films, in a dialectical movement, constantly oscillated 
between the western city and the southeast to connect the two spatio-temporalities 
insulated by the mainstream media. I will discuss the ways in which Turkish cinema 
engaged in the representation of the war and its effects through two sites. While the 
region has become the site of the armed conflict, its effects far exceeded the region due to 
the depopulation of the region and the migration to the cities within and outside the 
region, to fight the PKK and disconnect the Turkish Kurds from the Kurds in the post-
                                               
42 The Suprime Council was set up with the Article 3984 in 1994 and replaced The Radio and Television 
High Council that had been in effect since 1983. In addition to the duties of High Council, the Supreme 
Council assert jurisdiction over the new private channels.  
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Gulf War Iraq (Belge 1995). The beginning of the 1990s witnessed several economic-
turned-ethnic violence between the migrant Kurdish population and the inhabitants and in 
several cases the migrant population were expelled by the inhabitants after violent 
encounters (Kılıç 1992, Belge 1995). The first trope is based on a particular spatial 
configuration: ‘empty village under water’ as the product of the forced migration from 
the region throughout the state of emergency period. In this part, I will analyze 
Eşkiya/The Bandit (Yavuz Turgul 1996), Işıklar Sönmesin/Let There Be Light (Reis Ҫelik 
1996), Güneşe Yolculuk/Journey to the Sun (Yeşim Ustaoğlu 1999), and Büyük Adam, 
Küçük Aşk/Old Man, Little Love (Handan Ipekçi 2000). I will suggest that the dialectical 
spatial orders of these films create a rupture in the official discourse taking migration and 
the spatial strategies of the army as distinct and unrelated phenomena. The second one is 
the trope of ‘going back to doğu.’ They are motivated by the desire to ‘claim’ the region 
into the nation-space. In Büyü/Spell (Orhan Oğuz 2004) and Deli Yürek: Bumerang 
Cehennemi/Crazy at Heart: The Hell of Bumerang (Osman Sınav 2001) the main 
protagonist(s) go back to the ‘southeast’ to solve a mystery of national importance. 
Vizontele (Yılmaz Erdoğan & Omer Faruk Sorak 2001) is about the arrival of Television 
to a remote town of Doğu in 1974 during the Cyprus Incursion. While the narrative time 
of the film is the mid-1970s, I will claim the allegorical connection of the two wars is 
strategic to understand the message of the film. Though the ‘new wave’ cinema has a 
critical stance on the Kurdish question and the new stage it reached with the beginning of 
the armed conflict, the intensity with which the films engage in the issue greatly varies 
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from one film to another. While the films like Eskiya and Vizontele are big budget films 
and aimed at national audience and conveyed their engagement through commercially 
successful formulas thus avoiding overtly political messages, other films directly engaged 
in a political critique without market concern. It’s not surprising, however, that the only 
film in this chapter having an openly nationalist tone Deli Yürek: Bumerang Cehennemi 
is the film adaptation of a highly successful nationalist TV serial that had been on for 
several years. The difference in the ideological tone of Deli Yürek and the other films I 
discuss in this chapter betrays the difference in the 1990s between the two media. The 
television serials exploited the militarization of everyday life throughout the decade by 
reproducing several masculine fantasies of potency against the casualties inflicted by the 
war on the young male bodies, whereas, cinematic productions engaged in the human 
costs of the war. 
On the other hand the difference between the big budget films and the political 
films’ engagement in the war particularly and in the ‘political’ in general, addresses the 
popular cinema-art cinema debate that shaped the decade’s film criticism. As briefly 
mentioned earlier, the 1990s witnessed the revival of Turkish cinema in a ‘new’ identity, 
while political commentary was one axis of the film production the other one was 
regaining the national audience from the big budget Hollywood films that had dominated 
the box office for a long time. Both Eskiya and Vizontele were advertised as big 
productions using the latest technology redefining the average cost of film production in 
Turkish cinema. Both films attracted record audience even beating the Hollywood film in 
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the box office returns. Yet the films also used more subtle political commentary risking 
being missed by the film critics complaining about the films commercially driven 
marketing strategies. For the political ‘art’ films with more direct engagement in the 
region and the war, the 1990s was a new era in another sense. As a result of the rapid 
forced migration to Istanbul, the center of cinematic production, Kurds became part of 
both urban life and cultural production in the western metropoles. In 1991, Mesopotamia 
Cultural Center (Navenda Ҫanda Mezapotamya) is founded by the Kurdish artists to 
promote Kurdish culture. The Center provided technical and institutional support for the 
Kurdish artists throughout the 1990s. While the Center’s prime importance lies in 
production of first Kurdish films in Turkey thus contributing to a Kurdish cinema, the 
filmmakers worked as assistants to the films of ‘new Turkish cinema.’ Güneşe Yolculuk 
by Yeşim Ustaoğlu was supported by the Center and one of the directors of Kurdish 
cinema Kazim Öz, member of the Center, worked as assistant director in the film. The 
visibility of Kurdish artist within the national cultural production contributed to the 
ideology of cinematic production during the decade.  
For the State of Emergency which ended in July 2002 to an important extent 
defined my time-frame, I will end ‘the long 1990s’ within the first half of the first decade 
of 2000s. Although the war remained as the main concern in the more recent films made 
later in the decade, these films went back to the 1990s as their narrative time to reflect of 
the war. Yazı-Tura/Toss-Up (Uğur Yücel 2007) critically reflects on the life two ex-
commando who did their military service in the region in 1999. The film focuses on the 
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post-traumatic distress syndrome suffered by the main characters as a result of military 
operations they conducted in the region. After a military operation, one of the characters, 
Rıdvan, realizes that during the armed encounter he shot his ex-lover who had to move 
back to her village in the region and joined the PKK after her village was burned down 
by the army. After seeing her dead body, Rıdvan goes mad and starts running berserk, 
shooting in the air. He steps on a landmine that blows one of his legs. Cevher, his 
teammate, loses his hearing in one ear during the same explosion as he tries to rescue 
Ridvan. After the military service Ridvan, a disabled veteran, gets comatosed due to 
heavy drinking, while Cevher becomes cocaine addict and ends up in the prison after 
killing a man43. Güneşi Gördüm/I Saw the Sun (Mahsun Kırmızıgül 2009) tells the story 
of a Kurdish family who had to leave their village during the war in 1990s. Nefes: Vatan 
Sağolsun/The Breath: Long Live the Nation (Levent Semerci 2009) is a pro-Army 
account of the experience of the Turkish soldiers during their military service in the 
‘southeast’ in the early 1990s. On the other hand, during the second half of the decade, 
Kurdish directors started making films as part of the emergent Kurdish cinema – which 
will be the subject of the next chapter. 
                                               
43 The camera use in the film works successfully to create a particular spatial feeling. Through handheld 
camera, the cinematographer creates a nauseating spatial feeling during the armed encounter: The point of 
view does not allow to orient the soldiers within the space. The same moving, unfocused camera movement 
is used both when Ridvan is comatosed due to excessive alcohol consumption and during the earthquake in 
Istanbul to which Cevher loses his uncle. In both cases, like back in the region, both Ridvan and Cevher 
lose control over their senses. 
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FORCED MIGRATION AND THE NEW CINEMATIC SPACE 
Istanbul has been the city of arrival in Turkish cinema projecting several waves of 
migrants since 1960s social realism, in films like Gurbet Kuşları/Birds of Exile (Halit 
Refiğ 1964), Bitmeyen Yol/Neverending Road (Duygu Sağıroğlu 1966), etc. Gelin/The 
Bride and Düğün/The Wedding (Lütfi Ömer Akad 1973, 1974). It has been a ‘city made 
of gold’ that would be shared by the new comers or the city of escape from one’s blood 
enemies, where nobody can find the escapees. Istanbul was believed able to 
accommodate whoever comes. Yet the same the lure that attracted people would destroy 
them. While every migration is necessitated by particular events, here I will take the 
cinematic representation of ‘forced migration’ which involved proximate to three million 
people during the emergency period. Unlike the earlier migrations, the reason behind 
moving westward in forced migration is not primarily for a better life or a personal 
matter. It’s instigated by depopulating the region (Jongerden 2007). The narrative 
function of cinematic migration is also quite different as we shift to the forced migration: 
earlier waves and the arrivals in the western cities were framed as the dissolution of the 
migrants within the cosmopolitan Istanbul: Families coming to Istanbul to ‘make it’ there 
would be ‘crushed within the cogs of the machine’ called Istanbul; or those coming to 
Istanbul to ‘conquer’ it, as was the case in the 1980s ‘arabesque’ films on ‘easterner’ 
singers44. The identity of those who are forced to migrate to western cities is ambivalent. 
                                               
44 During late 1970s and 1980s, the ‘arabesque films’ became very popular. As a common narrative, an 
‘easterner’ comes to Istanbul and finds a job as construction worker. His musical talent is discovered by a 
music hall owner. His cassettes and LPs sells a lot and he becomes powerful and rich.     
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Mostly, during the emergency period, the population in the region had two options, either 
to become a village guard and fight against the PKK, or to move from the village. Those 
who had to leave were the ones who refused to cooperate with the State. They may be 
sympathizers of the Kurdish struggle and have to leave for their survival, or they are 
‘trapped between two fires’ and had to leave. Those who stay, they had to serve as ‘guard 
villages’ on the government payroll.  
The first cinematic treatment of the depopulated village and migration came in 
1996 with Eşkiya/ The Bandit, by a well-known director Yavuz Turgul. The film is about 
an old time bandit, Baran who lived in the prison for the last 35 years. The film opens on 
the day he is released from the prison.  Dressed in a khaki trench coat and kefiah, a 
familiar Kurdish attire, Baran comes out of the prison and goes to his village in the 
eastern city of Urfa only to see in its place a few demolished buildings half-soaked in the 
lake like water mass. Although he strolls around the hill, he cannot see a sign of the 
village except for these half-buried buildings. While pondering on the whatabouts of the 
village, he is approached by Ma Ceran, the madwoman of the village, who, as we would 
learn later on, is the only one in the village. What Ma Ceran tells Baran upon his query 
both supplements and subtly questions the literality of the information given at the very 
beginning of the film in the intertitle that Baran and several other bandits were captured 
by the army 35 years ago after a fierce armed encounter with the Turkish army. To 
familiar eyes, the reference to the 1960s bandits is not a coincidence and historically sets 
the politico-ethical world Baran was used to be a part of: the peasant class who had to 
129 
 
leave their homes up to the mountains to fight the oppressive landlords who are, if still 
powerful in the region, beneficiaries of the state support. Yet the armed encounter that 
happened 35 years ago cannot merely work as a background information and considering 
the then ongoing armed conflict in the region it should be related to the present as well. 
The very nomenclature of ‘eşkiya,’ which, in the nationalist media of the 1990s, gained 
the function of defining ‘the PKK,’ thereby politico-culturally de-qualifying the 
movement, had come to supplement a generic title of ‘terrorist’ which lacks the affective 
weight of the former. The expression ‘a bunch of eşkiya’ came to define the entire 
Kurdish movement since the 1980s. It is this double reference of ‘eşkiya’ that gives the 
historic reference to Baran, indeed a Kurdish name meaning ‘rain.’ Eşkiya Baran, though, 
represented as honorable old timer, works, within the overall narrative economy of the 
film, to save the very nomenclature of Eşkiya from the ‘official’ chain of signification. 
Ma Ceran responds Baran’s query about the village in the following way: 
Ma Ceran: Water brought the end to everything. They told us water is 
coming we should leave. Everybody left their place. Only I am still here. I told 
them not to go but they did not listen to me. After you went into prison, the 
system corrupted, Eşkiya. The bad ones reigned. Those who are repressed remain 
repressed.  
[…] 
Baran: it’s all over here. Everything is flooded under water. Soon, this will 
come to our graveyards. Come with me Ma Ceran. You will be food for the 
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animals. 
Ma Ceran: The animals are ours, son. The real evil is somewhere else. I 
am the madwoman, I cannot go anywhere. 
The dialogue between Baran and Ma Ceran helps us to see the subtle 
intertextuality that connects the history with the present, yet the epic tone of the 
encounter and the enigmatic style of speech pushes the same intertextuality to the back of 
the narrative. It is, however, possible to retrieve it through reference to the spatio-
temporal matrix of the conversation. While it is easier to know that the water is from the 
dams constructed on the two main rivers in the region, Tigris and Euphrates, we need to 
dig into the historical context of the film to understand why people moved out of their 
places and who are the ones reigned in the region and who are the ones repressed: Why 
the emptied-flooded village? 
What seems to elide the recent critical reflections on the film is this initial 
embeddedness of the story in an empty-flooded village and the spatial demarcation of our 
animals and the ‘evil’ that is there. However, Baran’s disappointment with the vanished 
village disappears in the critical reflections on the film. Instead Baran’s journey to 
Istanbul becomes the main concern. In the film, what drives Baran to Istanbul is the 
shocking bits of news from an old friend from whom Baran learned who was responsible 
for his imprisonment. Not only did he learns that his best friend, Berfo, betrayed him, he 
also ‘bought’ Baran’s beloved Keje from her family and moved to Istanbul. The second 
part of the film follows Baran in Istanbul where he goes to find Berfo who became a 
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mighty mafia businessman. Asuman Suner (2011) missing the enigmatic conversation 
between Ma Ceran and Baran, back in the village, claims that in the film Doğu and Baran 
represent the authentic harmonious anti-image of the corrupt, cosmopolitan, neo-liberal 
Istanbul. Although it is true that Istanbul is portrayed as a corrupt(ing) place, what was 
implied happened in the village surely marks it anything but harmonious; the 
conversation back in the village is nothing less than a sign of rupture.  
The dramatic shift in the focus of the narrative – from spatial problematic to the 
journey of Baran seems to support Suner’s narrative. Moreover, the second part of the 
film does not give away any answers to the questions left open in the first part regarding 
what happened in the village in the first place. However, within the overall narrative of 
the film, the second part only makes sense in relation to the open-ended first part: the 
Berfo character represents the anxiety over the ‘migrant other’ in the western cities, an 
anxiety that occupied the national agenda since the early 1990s. I suggest that without the 
reference to the empty village as the structuring yet enigmatic part, the film loses its 
critical potential. Whether the director leaves the first part open intentionally or it was 
meant to be left behind, it gravitates the narrative back to the region. 
While Baran had to leave the village for Istanbul to search for Berfo, Eşkiya only 
implies forced migration from the village, although neither Berfo nor Baran’s migration 
is forced. Nonetheless, the narrative makes it clear that the migration has to do with the 
‘repression’ and only Ma Ceran was ‘crazy’ enough to stay and take care of the 
disappeared village. The film which explicitly referred to the forced migration, made in 
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the same year as Eşkiya, is Işıklar Sönmesin/Let There Be Light (Reis Ҫelik 1996). The 
film, the first cinematic representation of the war in Turkish cinema, is about a PKK 
guerilla45 and a Turkish army Captain, who end up alone on the mountains after their 
crew dies due to an avalanche during the army’s raid on the PKK guerillas trying to cross 
the border. While neither of them accepts the other’s position during the heated 
discussion-cum-accusations, they have to collaborate to survive the cold weather. After 
the guerilla manages to run away from the Captain, they end up in a rundown house in an 
empty village. Their fight gets disrupted by an old villager, the owner of the house, again 
the only one in the village with his granddaughter. The old man accuses both the captain 
and the guerilla in turning the village into a hell. While the four of them is inside, the 
house gets shot at by unidentified armed men. Hoping to keep the lights on in the village 
so that the inhabitants would come one day, the old man grabs a torch goes outside to fire 
the candles of other houses. As he steps out he gets shot and dies. At the very end of the 
film, the captain and the guerilla run away together from gunfire holding up the 
granddaughter by both arms and carry her outside the frame under crossfire.  
The issue of forced migration is fully taken up in Güneşe Yolculuk and Büyük Adam, 
Küçük Aşk. Both films show for the forced migrants, the experience does not end as they 
leave the region as the stigma follows them in the city they arrive, Istanbul. As Secor puts 
it in her analysis on the Kurdish migrants in Istanbul, “a city marked both by the 
                                               
45 The film does not take a stand on the identity of the former: He is called both ‘terrorist’ and ‘guerilla’ 
depending on whom addresses him. 
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intermingling of peoples and by the reinforcement of lines of inclusion and exclusion, of 
spatialized regimes of difference and control” (2007 p. 40) not only Kurds experience 
violence through spatial reordering of urban space, it’s also their place of birth that makes 
them the object of this spatialized violence. In the films I discuss in this section Istanbul 
is a space where the Kurdish characters experience violence due to the place of birth or 
due to their dark complexion that serves as indication of birthplace. Migrants are marked 
by their place of birth. ‘as long as check points become everyday ordering of urban 
space’ they experience the spatial logic of the nation-state.” The films speak to both the 
region and what it means to be from that region even when one is outside of it. 
Güneşe Yolculuk: Multiple spaces of Doğu 
Towards the end of the film, in order to bury his friend Berzan’s coffin, who got 
shot by the police during a public protest, Mehmet, the main character, sets out to a 
journey to Zorduç, a Kurdish village located near the Syrian border. When he arrives to 
where the village should be located, he sees a water mass in its place where only the 
banner of the village is recognizable. The overwhelming scene of partly visible minarets 
and the utility pole are the only spatial marks from what was once a Kurdish village.  
The film is about Mehmet and Berzan, both recently migrated to Istanbul. 
Mehmet comes from the town of Tire located in the westernmost part of Turkey to search 
for a job and Berzan comes to Istanbul from the village of Zorduc located in the southeast 
near Syrian border, to evade the fate of his father who got assassinated by the security 
forces before Berzan moved to Istanbul. This geographical information is given not only 
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to spatially orient the audience to the characters46 but to situate the characters ethnically, 
even racially, within the narrative: While they had different reasons for being in Istanbul 
and came from opposite directions, the dark complexion of Mehmet, an ethnic mark of 
being Kurdish, makes him ‘easterner’ hence Kurdish hence potential terrorist like most 
recent Kurdish migrants were being perceived in the 1990s. (Kılıç 1992). The couple 
meet after Berzan saves Mehmet from being beaten up by hooligans vandalizing in the 
streets as a way of celebrating the national soccer team’s recent victory. The next day 
Mehmet visits Berzan at the Eminonü square where the latter works as audio-cassette 
seller on a wheel-cart. The music Berzan plays, also works as the soundtrack of the film, 
is by a Kurdish singer. Although Mehmet does not understand the lyrics, he likes the 
music and Berzan gives him a copy of the album as a gift. 
One day during a road control, the police find a bag with a gun next to Mehmet’s 
seat and captures him. During the interrogation, the police finds the Kurdish album in 
Mehmet’s pocket. Combining his dark skin and the Kurdish cassette, the police officer 
reasons that even though in his ID he is from Tire, his parents must be Kurdish47. Dark 
                                               
46 The music, works to spatially orient the character: We hear “Amediyê Kêf Xweş e” [Being in 
Diyarbakir makes one’s spirit happy] by the Kurdish band Koma Amed.  
47 The analyses of the film claim that Mehmet was really Turkish but for some reason he had darker 
complexion. While this is supported by how Mehmet perceives and identifies himself in the film, I claim 
that Mehmet is also Kurdish whose family left  the southeast in the 1970s, and did raise Mehmet Turkish to 
avoid being subjected to discrimination. The films leaves this reading open, not through Mehmet’s self-
identification, but through the police officers during his interrogation. Not believing that Mehmet is 
Turkish, the officer asks him if he takes after his father or mother to which Mehmet answers ‘his father.’ 
According to the police officer, Metmet is Kurdish even though his name, unlike Berzan’s, does not carry 
any ethnic identity. The Kurdish identity of Mehmet makes more sense as the fact addresses another layer 
of the story. For the fear of discrimination, Mehmet’s family had to put a Turkish-sounding name for him 
and secreted their identity. On the other hand, even with the classical reading, Mehmet’s dark complexion 
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complexion and the audio-cassette were in this case seen enough to associate the bag with 
the gun to Mehmet. After several days of detention and injury, he finally gets released. 
However, Mehmet’s hardships start after the detention, namely after he is marked as 
Kurdish. His attempt to dye his hair blonde to look like Turkish does not undo the official 
mark as the police not only had marked his body as Kurdish, hence terrorist, but also the 
spaces he occupies. He gets fired from his job with the police order. The ramshackle 
building where he stays together with other migrant youngsters gets marked with red 
double-cross on the door. Familiar with the mark from before, his friends don’t want to 
have him anymore fearing it will put them in danger too. He goes to Berzan and with his 
help finds a job at an auto-gallery outside the city. Soon, his new place also gets double-
crossed. One day during a public protest in support of the hunger strikes by the political 
prisoners, Berzan gets shot dead by a police bullet. Mehmet’s journey to the sun starts at 
that moment. He steals a van from his work and takes Berzan’s coffin back to Zorduc 
where he wanted to go back one day. On the way, Mehmet meets people whose language 
he does not understand. He runs into a family sitting on the road side, in front of a 
moving truck filled with house stuff. They also had to evacuate their village. Mehmet’s 
attempt to communicate with the elder of the family fails as he learned from the daughter 
that he does not know Turkish. Mehmet’s reverse migration intersect their migration to 
the West. Mehmet stays in hotel in a city under curfew. In the morning, his short glimpse 
at the downtown square from his hotel window meets with a number of military tanks 
                                                                                                                                            
works to reveal the racist prototyping and how this is spatially oriented: dark complexion always takes one 
‘back’ to the east and marks one Kurdish and ‘terrorist.’ 
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filling the square. As he gets closer to the village, he sees more and more security towers. 
When he reaches Berzan’s village, the only the banner of the village salutes him. He 
releases the coffin into the water and watches as the coffin slowly submerges into the 
water.  
Discovering the Kurds: Personal Encounters in the City 
Büyük Adam Küçük Aşk/Old Man Little Love (Handan Ipekçi 1999) is about the 
intractable relationship between a five year old Kurdish girl, Hejar, and the old retired 
judge, man-of-principle, Mr. Rifat. Hejar is brought by his relative to Istanbul after her 
family is assassinated by the gendarmerie during a village raid back in the southeast. 
After their village is evacuated, the relatives come to Istanbul. Her relative takes her to a 
distant cousin, a lawyer, to take care of her. However, the night Hejar comes, the cousin’s 
apartment gets raided by the police and the cousin and her two activist friends get killed. 
Mr. Rifat, the next door neighbor, witnesses the raid from the peephole of his door. As a 
believer in democratic principles of the Republic, what he sees through the peephole 
shocks Mr. Rifat: even though the cousin informs the police they are surrendering, the 
squad shots her and the two friends without warning. Hejar manages to hide from the 
police and while they search the apartment she comes out and stand in front of Mr. 
Rifat’s apartment door. First hesitant to get involved in the event and then after 
convinced that the police would kill the girl, too, Mr. Rifat lets his housemaid take her in 
his apartment. As the unaccounted killing by the police was the first shock, his second 
shock comes when he realizes that the girl does not speak in Turkish. Additionally he 
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learns that his housemaid can communicate with the girl in Kurdish. Yet Mr. Rifat 
immediately forbids speaking in Kurdish at home, until he understands that the only way 
to communicate with Hejar is to learn Kurdish himself. 
Film’s story proceeds through four intersecting sites: the village, where Hejar lost 
her parents, the place she leaves behind, at least initially; the cousin’s apartment, raided 
by the police who killed the cousin and the friends; Mr. Rifat’s apartment, secure yet 
homogenizing; and the relatives’ overcrowded house in the slum neighborhood by the 
city’s garbage dump site. These four sites regulate the experiences, and maps the itinerary 
of Kurds in the 1990s bringing together where they had been and where they were. While 
Mr. Rıfat provides Hejar with a place to stay and food, as we later learn when the 
housemaid Kezban reveals her real ‘Kurdish’ name, living in the apartment requires 
assimilation in return for these benefits. After a while, though, being not able to 
communicate with Hejar, Mr. Rifat asks for Kezban’s help to learn basic Kurdish. Yet, 
his attempt does not suffice to keep Hejar in the apartment. Mr. Rıfat finds the relative 
and lets him take Hejar.  Hejar chooses the ramshackle house to the luxurious apartment. 
While the film provides the critique of the state’s spatial strategy during the 1990’s, and 
the stigmatism attached to the bodies in motion, and their less than favorable living 
conditions, at an allegorical level, the relationship between Hejar and Mr. Rifat refers to 
the possibility of Kurds being able to ‘leave’ what seems to be the ‘secure’ and ‘modern’ 
nation-space. Mr. Rifat’s apartment, with the sometime suffocating pedagogical 
incursions by him and Hejar’s ressitance against them, allegorizes the state’s policy 
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towards minorities48. At the end of the film, Mr. Rifat gives up on ‘educating’ Hejar and 
lets her choose where to go. 
GOING ‘BACK’ TO THE EAST: SPATIAL CLAIMS IN THE NAME OF THE STATE 
While the ‘return to the village’ program for the rehabilitation of the villages 
evacuated during the 1990s and for clearing the lands from the landmines for the people 
who had to migrate from the region can come back to their villages has yet to realize, in 
cinema, ‘going back’ to the region already started, ironically, not by the people who had 
to leave the region but by the figures in the name of the state. An ex-special force 
commander who fantasizes the good old days of the war in 1990s when the army was in 
control of the region in Deli Yürek: Bumerang Cehennemi/Crazy at Heart: The Hell of 
Bumerang (Osman Sınav 2001), and an archeology professor looking for the trace of a 
hidden inscription by a Turkish sultan ‘that would change the history of the region’ in 
Büyü/Spell (Orhan Oğuz 2004) embody the anxiety over the ownership of the region. 
Vizontele, on the other hand reflects on the state’s desire to ‘mediate’ the ‘god’s forsaken’ 
remote Kurdish village while recruiting its youth by hundreds for a vicious war. 
Crazy at Heart: Fantastical Encounters in the Southeast  
Deli Yürek starts with a voiceover on a map showing the east of Turkey with a 
recognizable Kurdistan region highlighted: ‘Here is Mesopotamia, the boomerang hell of 
global conspiracy. Even the God sent the prophets to this region for the world order, 
                                               
48 Mr. Rifat tries hard to be nice to Hejar yet whenever she does not do what he asks for--- in Turkish--- he 
gets infuriated and Hejar responds with equal measure. Rifat Bey’s altruism, is coupled with his suspicion 
and he always looks down upon Hejar. When he realizes that she has lice on her head, his first reaction is to 
call her “lousy Kurd!”, when she pees underneath on the carpet out of fear he calls her “dirty Kurd.”  
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because the place was used to be the heaven on earth.’ The voiceover is followed by 
voices in foreign languages, English, German, Arabic, Persian, Kurdish, Zaza, all 
explaining the importance of the region. As the voice proceeds, a black board marker 
writes in English the name of the states that is planned to be founded within the eastern 
Turkey, all written with their connection to outside powers of Armenia, Iran and Syria. A 
red marker at the end writes Kurdistan as the mega project of the global conspiracy.  
The film is about Yusuf Miroğlu who completed his military service in the 
‘southeast’ as a special force commander trained in guerilla warfare to fight PKK. After 
the first map sequence we see Yusuf and his fiancée in an SUV car going to the city of 
Diyarbakir to attend the wedding of Yusuf’s best friend, and teammate while in the army, 
Cemal. This is, however, not the first time Yusuf goes to the city. As shown in the map, 
Diyarbakir, or Amed in Kurdish, is considered to be the capital of Kurdistan and during 
the 1990s Yusuf was enrolled in several military operations, in one of which Cemal killed 
his future brother in law who was fighting on the side of the PKK. On their way to the 
city, his fiancée asks Yusuf how he and Cemal met in the military. We learn that Yusuf 
and Cemal were a part of sniper team. During their military service Yusuf and Cemal 
became like brothers.  
However, Cemal gets killed on the first day of the wedding ceremony. After the 
conversation the preceding night with Cemal during which Cemal says he is the only 
person who solved the mystery behind the assassination of the chief of Police in 
Diyarbakir, Yusuf is convinced that the two events are connected. He decides to stay in 
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Diyarbakir to find the murderer and is joined by the head of their special force back in the 
army, Bozo, who, as he learned from Cemal, still lives on the mountains as the savior of 
the region. While Yusuf aimed to find the murderer, as he delves in the case, he realizes 
that the death of Cemal was necessary for a series of events leading even to the 
foundation of Kurdistan by the U.S. as a satellite state on the eastern part of Turkey.  
While the desire to return to the military rule through reassuming special force 
capacities is already problematic, what becomes more alarming is what is entitling Yusuf 
and Bozo reassume their military might, which we learn during the two conversations 
Yusuf had with Cemal and then with Bozo. A night before his murder, Cemal tells Yusuf 
that the reason the chief of police is assassinated was his representing the ‘smiling face’ 
of the state: he, according to Cemal, ‘ initiated peace between the state and the people.’ 
As he is assassinated, ‘people lost their faith in the state that has been cold to them.’ We 
here a very similar tone in Yusuf’s conversation with Bozo:   
Yusuf: People do not smile here much. Why? Why is this land so rigid and 
ruthless? 
Bozo: Our fathers do not smile at their children. 
Yusuf: Just like the state. For years, people here have not seen the smiling face of 
the state. 
Bozo: Here is Mesopotamia. The place called Amed. Here, the fight is as old as 
the history. No matter how far they would be, mighty would extend their arms to 
this land. The first blood of the human being is spilled on this land: the blood of 
the brother. 
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Yusuf: Would not this change at all? Will brothers always kill each other? 
Bozo: It’s hard. Whoever tries to change it would face the world as enemy. We 
wanted to use Tigris and Euphrates to irrigate these lands but look what 
happened: thirty thousand people died. 
Yusuf: You mean this is the water politics of the secret services? 
Bozo: Only one of the reasons. Do you know who would benefit from the Kurdish 
state in Iraq? They will bring their military bases, distribute guns and do whatever 
they want to do. And then three out of five Kurdish children will die. But who 
cares. What is important for them is to share the rant of 100 billion dollar worth 
cocaine trade that passes through the region…  
Yusuf: There should be a way. 
Bozo: There is one way. The state should smile at its people and the people 
should trust the state. Then there would be no terror and neither Hizbullah nor 
Abdullah would cause any damage to the nation. 
Yusuf: So who is the enemy? Hizbullah? 
Bozo: Yesterday we fought Abdullah and when they got what they wanted they 
gave Abdullah to us. Now it’s Hizbullah’s turn.   
Although the alarming tone of the conversation seems to find the state as part of 
the problem, at least internally, the solution that is implied betrays the subconscious 
intention: any correlation between the state and the PKK is erased. While the state is a 
bad father, ‘terrorism,’ according to Yusuf and Bozo, is not a matter of internal politics 
and the state should not be held responsible for its existence. Furthermore, instead of 
entertaining the possibility of decreasing the power of the state, so that it may stop being 
‘a bad father’, Bozo and Yusuf’s alarm is triggered by the weakness of the state. The 
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desire to go back to 1990s when they were mighty vis-à-vis the enemy ‘pushes’ Yusuf 
and Bozo to assume the function of the now ‘defunct’ state but not without re-writing the 
history of the region in accordance with the state’s: ever ready imperialism to incite 
terrorism inside the national body. The film uses the rhetoric of defunct state only to 
justify the actions that is beyond the ability of the state.  
The above conversation ingeniously divests state of its ‘monopoly over legitimate 
violence,’ but only to justify the existence of extra-legal techniques of the private counter 
guerilla force to deal with this particular space, the boomerang hell, called Kurdistan. The 
state should act like a good father, the conversation betrays, while the national threat 
must be prevented by privatized forces with the extra-state, extra-legal capacities. Indeed, 
according to Bozo, the state had already not taken any part in the conspiracy except for 
the corrupt officers who acted as the hands of imperialism. Bozo’s explanations 
throughout the conversation, inspired by the far-right terminology, denies the state’s 
involvement in the emergence of Turkish Hizbullah to fight the PKK, the real 
contribution of the film is the fantasy work that runs through all explanations given by 
the main characters. The hyper-real representation of the map making use of the real 
event, the assassination of the chief of police, as the central focus of the film and 
blending it with fantastical characters works to blur both reality and fantasy and give 
credence even to the most absurd explanation. When the narrative space is explained as 
hyper-fantastic, the fantastical characters and connections seems realistic. The character 
in the film, Butcher Hasan, who was present on the wedding day, and his multiple and 
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shifting identities works well to blend fact and fiction. First appeared as the cook during 
the wedding, we later learned that Hasan is the chief Imam of the Hizbullah’s Diyarbakir 
branch and later on we further learned that his real name is David and he is the American 
secret service agent from Northern Dakota: He, as Bozo explains to Yusuf, can ‘speak 
Kurdish like his native language even with regional accents.’ Not only as the head of 
Hizbullah, in the film, Hasan also is the PKK supporter. Bozo admits that they ‘burried so 
many pro-PKK Imam with cross on their necks.’ Although lacking historical accuracy, 
Hasan’s multiple identities fantastically connects the PKK to the US as well as Iran. We 
see Hasan with the U.S. Ambassador during a secret meeting with the Kurdistan 
Democrat Party (KDP) representatives from Iraq. However, Hasan is not the only person 
with multiple identities: the chief of Police replacing the one assassinated is also a 
double-agent working for Hasan. The retiree Turkish colonel Şeref, a businessman, sides 
with the U.S. and is a key player in the conspiracy.  
Bringing together these agencies can only work in a fantasy where everything 
becomes possible. Yet, what this hyper-fantasy achieves is to allow Yusuf to single-
handedly finish off the conspiracy for the sake of the state. The narrative economy of the 
film necessitates, and even sanctions, the individualized military violence by Yusuf. 
What is fascinating is how the conspiracy legitimizes Yusuf’s unaccounted for violent 
mobility in the city of Diyarbakir: he punishes the culprits, blow off the buildings, kills 
the leaders and so forth. This mobility in a real space, though, is only achieved, in a 
fantasy work, through imagining the southeast as the ever changing, foggy, slippery, 
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treacherous spatiality that is both the reason of the failure of the state and source of 
legitimacy for the actions of Yusuf as the revived military might of the defunct state. The 
film reinstalls the result of the state as the justification for the existence of the extra-state. 
Going ‘Back in Space’: Traumatic Encounters with the Invisible Kind in Büyü  
As one of the earliest contemporary horror films in Turkish cinema, Büyü/Spell 
takes place in the Dengizhan village in the city of Mardin. An archeology team headed by 
a famous archeology professor and joined by ‘one of the best philologist in the world’ 
goes to the Dengizhan village to search for a 14
th
 century document by the Turkish sultan 
of the Artuklu Dynasty that would ‘change the history of the region.’ However, not 
known to the team, it happens that the village is cursed many years ago after a sorcerer 
came to the village and cast spell on the villagers to sacrifice their newborn daughters to 
the devil. While this initial “artifice of grave importance in the cursed space” narrative 
resembles the Indiana Jones kind of imperial mobility of a scientist claiming –and 
taming—the space in question to the geography of the empire, the professor in the 
Turkish variation is not equally apt to survive the curse. This is not without its specific 
reasons, though.  
First of all, while the modern-primitive axis that motivates the narrative in 
Indiana is also present in Büyü, it’s not the only one, the conflict runs deeper than that. 
While the language of the ceremony that the sorcerer performed to claim the last daughter 
in the village gives no sign as to her ‘origin,’ the conflict between her and the village is 
framed as between pre-Islamic cult and the Islamic belief as is seen in the frame where 
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the Quran hanged on the wall in the daughter’s room is hidden by the stepmother aligning 
with the sorcerer to eliminate the possible obstacle in the way of getting rid of the girl. 
Although this originary allegorical trope is later conflicted with the modern methodology 
of the archeology professor, it will contribute to the death of the professor and the entire 
team at the end of the film. On their way to the village the team take a break on a small 
road-side tea house run by an old man. When the old man learns that the team is going to 
the village, he immediately warns the team that the village is cursed and has been empty 
for a long time. We learn the entire story of the village from the old man. However, he 
fails to convince the professor as the latter does not believe in the story: ‘so many stories 
like this are told in this region and they are all legend without bases.’ The tension shifts 
from the devil vs. Muslims to pre-modern vs. modern/scientific method. The dichotomy 
may seem to entitle the team to do the excavation and register the cursed space –by 
giving it an identity—into the national history, but alas the film denies the team’s mastery 
over the space, hence the national desire remains unfulfilled. 
The main tension starts as the team continues its journey to the village after the 
tea break. This time they are supported by two mule riders, assigned by the old man, 
guiding them the village. Yet while the guides supposed to help them, there is a clear 
difference between the two as to the spatial and temporal orientation. One of the 
assistants complains that whenever he asks to the guides how long they are far from the 
village the answer is a vague ‘very soon.’ They ‘don’t have a conception of neither time 
nor space.’ Moreover, although the team has one of the best philologist in the world, 
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nobody can understand the language of the two men guiding them to the village. 
Intentionally made audible, the conversation between the two guides in Kurdish works 
only to confuse and scare the team. As the director wants us, the audience, to hear and 
possibly understand the conversation but denies the team from that information and 
leaves them vulnerable, we should read the entire trip to the region through the 
relationship between the team, the old man and the two mule riders.  
The curse starts to take effect as the group come closer to the village. During a 
break in a cave an earthquake scares the guides and the team has to proceed without 
them. The village appears right at the other end of the cave. Not only does the team not 
know the language of the guides, their maps and knowledge also proves insufficient to 
navigate through the village. Without any knowledge, the only information the professor 
retains of the region is the engaging exclamation that “the people of Doğu are strange, 
indeed.” In the narrative economy of the film, this lack of information about the region 
while going there to search for a 14
th
 century document creates an inconsistency, yet an 
intentional one. How come a famous archeology professor and ‘one of the best in the 
world’ philologist are so dumb-founded in the village and not even able to communicate 
with the guides, if this is not to address a trauma that denies any knowledge to them about 
the region. Has the mystery of the village and its self-motivated catastrophes against the 
team to do with the curse or it was the source of the trauma that left the team without 
knowledge? 
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The invisible beings haunting the team and the unknown language spoken by the 
people whom the professor identifies as ‘people from Doğu’ subtly connects the 
traumatic experience with the space to the curse. The trauma is also due to the realization 
that the team do not know anything about the space that they come to claim to the 
national historiography. In a conversation with the team, the professor reasons why the 
village is not inhabited by anybody for a long time: ‘may be for months or even for years, 
the soil has not seen a drop of rain. Its dry and hard. It’s obvious why people could not 
live on this land’. Yet the explanation falls to deaf ears as the team is frightened enough 
not to give credence to a scientific explanation and the disconnect cause the explanation 
hanging in the air. That one of the assistants finds a knife –the one we see at the 
beginning of the film carried by the father to kill his daughter-- right beneath the surface 
that the professor claims belongs to 14
th
 century also creates temporal inconsistency as to 
whether the traumatic event happened in the present or in the long past.  
With the other films of the period on the southeast, I claim that the space of the 
empty village, whether it is cursed or evacuated by the military is a way to engage in the 
discussion of war. By making the enemy invisible and the space unknown, Büyü alludes 
to the traumatic experience of war through the trope of the haunted space. While the team 
go to claim the village, their lack of knowledge and indifference made the team 
vulnerable to the space and its invisible (and unrecognized) inhabitants. 
VIZONTELE: MEDIA, NATION-SPACE AND VARIATIONS ON THE WAR 
Vizontele (2001) is written and co-directed by the actor-director Yılmaz Erdoğan 
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of Kurdish descent. While the film is not directly about the war in 1990s, it takes place 
during another war, the Cyprus incursion of 1974 and a possible allegorical reference to 
the current war in the 1990s more than simply implied. Vizontele is about the coming of 
Television to a ‘remote’ eastern town on the Iran and Iraq border. The effect of 
Television on the town is described by the mayor during the opening ceremony: 
The newspapers come here two day after their dates. When an event excites us, 
people in the big cities do not even remember it. Now Vizontele will change this. 
We will watch the same event at the same time with Istanbul. Vizontele will make 
far nearer and here will not be that far anymore. 
For the mayor, television would connect the town to the rest of the country, yet 
it’s function is not only this. The new technology is about being seen as much as it is 
about to see although it raises some concerns in some townspeople: ‘if they can also see 
us, what would we do during the news! Prime minister and the President will also show 
up, we will have to dressed up all the time.’ Yet for a ‘remote’ place that is outside the 
purview of the state, both seeing and being seen is deemed important as it means part of 
the nation. Yet the director does not celebrate the arrival of the TV set. While television 
would sync the town with the West, it’s probable catastrophic effects is heralded by the 
mayor’s wife who thinks of the television as the ‘devil’s invention’. While the wife 
opposes the technology from a religious standpoint, through this opposition the director 
comments on the nationalizing effect of the television both as technology and as the 
message: the technology, the receiver, is part of production of nation-space by 
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distributing the signals to the far reach corners of the national territory, the ‘message’, the 
programs, would work to introduce the town, and the region, into the visual economy of 
the nation. In order to deal with the possible effect of the television, the film constructs 
two temporalities in the town: one is the everyday and the other is the national 
temporality. While the former includes the bitter yet humorous functioning and 
interaction of people, the latter comes in through conscription and now the arrival of the 
officers from the public television. Television means the subsumption of the everyday by 
the national temporality. Through the mother, the film connects two contents of national 
temporality, conscription and Television: her son goes to the military service and 
Television replaces him in the house and she warns the mayor that it is not a good sign.  
The mother’s melancholy over her son who will do the military service 
dramatically effects the tone of the film. The conscription is an incursion by the national 
temporality from the beginning. Yet this incursion is felt only by the oldest son of the 
mayor who is drunken and the mother both not quite part of the everyday life of the town. 
The only political comment on the conscription comes from the drunken son and his 
friends during one of their drinking session: As the public bus full of new conscripts 
passes in front of them they express their worry: “the bus is taking the soldiers. My 
brother Rifat is also in it. They collected all the youngsters. Why did they collect so many 
this time?” the scene dissolves as the camera pans to the fire. 
However, while the travel of television to the ‘eastern’ town is  to include it into 
the space and time of the nation, the process involves public officers who are reluctant to 
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be far away from the state. However, the combination of the intended ideological 
function of the television with the insecure bureaucracy who is not willing to be a part of 
that function in a far away place for quite other ideological reasons results in the tension 
between the desire to include and reluctance to go. The public officials from Ankara, the 
national capital, who are in charge of installing the receiver and the TV set in the town 
are worried because, the job is the least desirable kind ‘public ’job given to the 
blacklisted officers who are deemed ideologically subversive. Doğu is a place of internal 
exile, or as one of the officers put it ‘the place that even the God does not stop by.’ 
Worried that the assignment is a sign of their exile, the public officers immediately leaves 
the town without installing the receiver and the TV set, only informing the mayor that 
they have to install the receiver the highest possible point so that it receives the signals. 
As there is no technician in the town, the mayor asks Crazy Emin to help working things 
out, assuming that since he can repair radio, he should be able to make the ‘radio with 
pictures’ work too. After trying the receiver in several hilltops in around the town and 
fail, Crazy Emin decides to climb the mountain Artos, where ‘nobody ever dared 
climbing.’ After so much difficulty, and having already received the TV signals from 
Iran, the team finally gets the Turkish signals at a higher point in the mountains. To 
celebrate the first day of the Turkish TV channel, the entire town gathers in the mayor’s 
house. They turn on the TV and start watching the evening news. The first news is about 
the Cyprus war. The speaker announces the four martyrs with their pictures. The picture 
of Rifat, the mayor’s son freezes the entire crowd in front of the television.  
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The death of the son and his picture as the first things seen on the television is a 
brilliant commentary on the spatial stakes concerning the ‘eastern’ town. While the 
television came to the town as sign of the production of nation-space through spatial 
modernization, it is realized through a death. While the excitement was to see and to be 
seen, what the townspeople saw in the representation was their own death. The coupling 
of the television and the death refers to two temporalities: first to the 1990s televisual 
news culture where the photos of the martyrs were used as a strategy of nationalizing the 
mourning second the time of the arrival of the first television set to the region. in the 
latter sense the television set metaphorically replaces the death body. the film defines the 
founding moment of representation ( being seen as well as standing in for) as the 
realization of the loss of what is represented, i.e. the death of the son. The picture of Rifat 
on the TV screen also summarizes for them the terms of being included into the nation-
space. At the end, the mother buries the TV set to not only avenge the death of her son 
but as his representation whose body never arrives the town.  
CONCLUSION 
During the long 1990s, when the southeast as the center of armed conflict became 
a space of emergency, we saw the migration as the main trope through which the region 
is represented. While the interest in ‘mobility’ was result of the forced migration of about 
three million people in a decade, the films on Doğu can be understood not by the 
‘mobility’ but by the dialectics of two spatiality the characters have come to occupy as a 
result: the empty-flooded village and the urban center of Istanbul. The political-art films 
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of the period such as Güneşe Yolculuk put forward their politics of space more openly by 
showing how their characters’ mobility turns into [national] spatial entrapment both in 
the village and the newly inhabitated urban space. However, in films like Eşkiya and 
Vizontele, the use of fast editing, high-end cameras – the latter was promoted as the first 
Turkish film using the micro cameras attached to battery operated flying equipment—
manipulated the reflection on the films towards technical and commercial sides of the 
films missing the subtle spatial commentaries they included within their narrative. 
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CHAPTER V – KURDISH CINEMA AND REMAPPING NATION-
SPACE 
The question of the father isn't how to 
become free in relation to him (an Oedipal 
question) but how to find a path there where 
he didn't find any. 
Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. 
Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari 
-- And [I have] a heart which I can throw 
just like a hand bomb to destroy all fucking 
borders.  
Gitmek: My Marlon and Brando 
(Hüseyin Karabey 2008) 
INTRODUCTION 
The debates on the existence of a ‘Kurdish cinema’ started in the late 1990s, 
especially after the international release of Bahman Ghobadi’s award winning Zamani 
Barayé Masti Asbha / A Time for Drunken Horses (2000), yet films on Kurds and their 
socio-economic situation first appeared in the 1920s. Armenian director Hamo 
Beknazarian’s Zarê (1926) (Alakom 2009) and Merian C. Cooper, Ernest Schoedsack, 
and Marguerite Harrison’s Grass: A Nation’s Battle for Life (1925) are cited among the 
first films within the genealogy of this new Cinema. While the films that have informed 
and inspired the discussion on Kurdish cinema have been made ‘outside’ of Turkey, the 
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political and aesthetic parameters of the object of debate, namely Kurdish cinema, and 
the desire and commitment to discuss the possibility of a Kurdish cinema is driven by the 
discussions emanating from Turkey. Within the historiography on Kurdish cinema, in 
addition to the abovementioned ‘first’ films made on Kurds by the foreign directors, 
Yılmaz Güney’s Seyyit Han, is considered the first ‘Kurdish film,’ made by a Kurdish 
director. Long considered to be a seminal Turkish social realist film, Seyyit Han has 
retrospectively been incorporated into the history of Kurdish cinema. Seyyit Han in this 
respect shares the status of another film: Yol/The Road (1981). The film was written and 
supervised by Yılmaz Güney while in prison and directed by his assistant Şerif Gören. 
Güney is considered the founding father of Kurdish cinema, even though neither Seyyit 
Han nor Yol satisfy what is considered by the scholars, critics and the directors as an 
essential criterion of what makes a Kurdish film, namely, film being in Kurdish language. 
Yet, both films signify a major break, both aesthetically and politically, from what was 
considered Turkish ‘national cinema’. Yol was followed by the first ‘Kurdish language’ 
film, dated 1992, Klamek Ji Bo Beko / A Song For Beko by Nizamettin Arıç, a Kurdish 
political refugee in Germany and born in the city of Urfa in Turkey. Kazım Öz’s Ax / The 
Earth (1999) and Fotograf/Photograph (2001) are also early examples of Kurdish 
Cinema from Turkey both dealing with the 1990s militarization and its effects on the 
Kurdish region.  
Following the earlier chapters, here, I offer a spatial reading of Kurdish cinema. 
In the first three chapters on Turkish cinema, I argued that the cinematic representation of 
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what constitutes eastern Turkey is productive of the spatiality called ‘Doğu’ as part of 
Turkish nation-space. In this chapter, I suggest that Kurdish cinema, dealing with the 
same region, deconstructs the discourse of ‘Doğu’ as cinematic space, offering instead a 
new spatiality. What I call a deconstructive turn in the representation of the region as 
Doğu has started with the films of Yılmaz Guney and cautiously – due to the rigid 
boundaries of the critical reflection on the issue-- continued in the 1990s. In Turkey, in 
the second part of the 1990s, the PKK’s 1993 cease-fire and the Turkish state’s 
recognition of the ‘Kurdish reality’ resulted for a while in a more favorable political 
culture, during which time several Turkish directors, sometimes assisted by the young 
Kurdish directors, made films critical of the state policies within the eastern region and 
about the precarious lives of the Kurdish population having to migrate to the western 
metropolises as a result of the armed conflict within the region.  An important part of 
what Asuman Suner calls “new Turkish cinema” (Suner, 2010), these films of the late 
1990s already engaged in problematizing the discourse of Doğu. While parallel to the 
politicization of cinematic language in Turkish cinema in the 1990s, Kurdish cinema has 
other parameters setting it apart from the new Turkish cinema, such as the use of Kurdish 
language as the primary language of the films, connection with the Kurdish political 
struggle, and dealing mainly with the lives of Kurdish population.  
THE ROAD TO ‘KURDISTAN’: THE SPACE OF KURDISH CINEMA 
Starting from Seyyit Han (1968), the film Yılmaz Güney considered his first film 
exhibiting his directorial style and Yol / The Road (1982), Kurdish directors from Turkey 
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made films that problematized Turkish nation-state, national identity and Turkish 
national cinema. As discussed in the chapter on social realism, ‘national cinema’ in the 
Turkish context aimed at producing a secular national culture within the national 
territory. Seyyit Han was different in terms of both its formal structure and its politics of 
representation. The film deconstructs the teleological temporality of popular films of the 
period. The film starts in the middle of the story of the main protagonist, Seyyit Han. He 
comes back to his village after a 7-year quest, yet no clue is given as to the reason for the 
quest. Piece by piece, we learn Seyyit Han’s story from the rumors spread in the village 
after his arrival. As the narrative unfolds, a voiceover narrates the first half of the story 
with flashbacks, and at the end of the film the beginning of the story told by the 
voiceover overlaps the visual ending.49 The censor board banned the film on the premise 
that the name of the lead female character, Keje, is not a Turkish name, and the banners 
shown during the wedding ceremony do not belong to Turkish culture. Güney 
intentionally put the name and the banner – both elements of Kurdish culture – to give a 
more ‘truthful’ account of the region, as the film was intended to be realist(Turanli 2005).  
His Yol/The Road (1982) was a turning point for cinema in Turkey in terms of its 
configuration of the narrative space. The film not only produced an uncompromising 
critique of the repressive state apparatuses within the eastern region, an impossible task 
due to the film censorship and the ideology of cinematic production, but also, for the first 
                                               
49 See the discussion of the film in the second chapter. 
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time the cartography of cinematic space diverged from the national cartography and 
‘Kurdistan’ entered the cinematic space.  
Yol’s narrative structure was also different from earlier and contemporary films in 
that it introduced a story with multiple protagonists in which all characters are assigned 
the same weight within the narrative. The film follows five prison inmates en route to 
their hometowns in the Kurdish region during a national holiday break. As they travel 
throughout the national landscape, the film shows the road signs of the cities they pass. 
We see the sign ‘Kurdistan’ as one of the characters, Ömer, passes through the city of 
Urfa, located at the border of Kurdistan, according to Kurdish maps. The sign is added by 
Güney during the editing process, but it was excised from the versions released in 
Turkey50. Güney’s cinemato-graphing redraws the map of the region within which the 
film takes place in accordance with Ömer’s cognitive attachment.51 This authorial 
‘supplement’ also refers to a discrepancy between the national cartography and how 
Güney maps the region within the cinematic space.  
The new cartography, however, does not work in favor of Ömer and the other 
characters in the film. It only explains the violence that the audience, through the 
characters, experiences during the rest of the film. After one of the characters, Mevlut, 
                                               
50 I have reached three different  copies of the film. One is the version released outside Turkey, the film has 
English subtitles and retains the Kurdistan sign. Another version, that I could not trace the distribution 
place, shows the city of ‘Urfa-Siverek’ instead of Kurdistan. In the DVD version released in Turkey, 
neither the Kurdistan sign nor Siverek appears. 
51 Marcus Power and Andrew Crampton discuss ‘cinemato-graphing of political space’ (p. 4) in their edited 
work “Cinema and Popular Geo-politics” Power and Crampton argue for the productive power of cinematic 
mapping. 
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gets off the bus in Urfa, the camera focuses on the face of Ömer who is still waiting for 
his stop. As he nears his destination, the excitement on his face becomes more acute. He 
finally gets off the bus in the middle of a vast landscape and kisses the ground. We see 
him from a wide-angle shot running in the green landscape, playing with a dog chasing 
him. However, his excitement and sense of ‘freedom’ does not last long. As he hears the 
sound of gunshots, his expression changes into fear. The nearer he gets to his village, the 
more frequently the gunshots explode. His village is surrounded by the gendarmerie 
chasing border smugglers.52 Ömer can only enter the village after the smugglers 
surrender to the gendarmerie. The operation against the smugglers continues the entire 
night. The next day, the Gendarmerie brings the dead bodies of the smugglers for 
identification. In fear of retaliation, Ömer cannot claim the body yet after his brother’s 
death, Ömer decides to join the smugglers and at the end, we see him riding his horse 
along with the other smugglers to the mountains outside the village.  
The film shared Palm d’Or at the Cannes Film Festival with Missing by Costa 
Gavras in 1982 and has been the subject of academic as well as non-academic debates in 
Turkey ever since its domestic release in the late-1990s, after a long term ban by the post 
1980 coup military government that confiscated the film together with Güney’s other 
films. Guney’s citizenship was also revoked after he fled the country during a furlough 
                                               
52 Whether the smugglers are real smugglers or they stand for Kurdish guerillas is only implied in the film. 
When Omer decides to join the ‘smugglers’ we understand that what he is going for is more than 
smuggling. In the perception of the army, on the other hand, the line separating the two easily disappears as 
both smugglers and guerillas -- “smugglers and separatists”-- are equal threat to the territorial integrity of 
the nation. 
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that the characters in his Yol were granted. Though Yol has been commented upon by 
critics, the part of the film where Güney inserted the road sign ‘Kurdistan’, has been 
missed – or skipped--within these comments. The lack of scholarly attention is partly due 
to the excision of the part in the ‘Turkish’ version yet a few comments referring to that 
part dismisses it as not being the original part of the film53 but added ‘later on’ by Güney. 
But, if a film is finalized during the editing, and the part is added during the editing 
process, the dichotomy between what constitutes original and addition becomes 
problematic. What makes one original and the other addition? As an argument, we can 
even say that, since the film was only supervised by Güney from the prison and directed 
by his assistant, the ‘addition’ is the only part that is directly put in by Güney; strictly 
speaking, originally Güney’s. Yet in discrediting the ‘addition,’ there is more than the 
film and its truth value. What makes the sign inferior to, and less original than, the rest of 
the film, if not the pre-conviction of the commenter on the originality of what he 
considers as the original: the national territory. We can make sense of this hierarchy of 
original/addition within the cartography of the film (the very position of the extra 
footage, the ‘excess’ film within ‘the reel’) only in connection with the national 
cartography (the truth value of its map and ‘Kurdistan as addition’): the belief in the 
national territory and the disbelief in what the sign refers to: Kurdistan. The ‘real’ 
cartography here determines the limit of the reel cartography. There is also the itinerary 
                                               
53 The political Identity of Yilmaz Guney is still a matter of debate within the historiography on Turkish 
cinema. The liberal writers, like Atilla Dorsay, had an uneasy relationship with his late pro-Kurdish stance, 
as he thinks it was an influence he gained while in prison (Dorsay, 2005) 
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of the film’s completion process. In order to complete the film, Güney fled Turkey and 
went to Switzerland where he was ‘present’ during the editing process yet absent in 
Turkey, the absence which made the completion of the films  possible. However, to play 
with this arbitrary original vs. addition debate, one can claim from the perspective of 
Jacques Derrida that the sign works as the “supplement” to national cartography as 
‘presence.’ In discussing Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writing on ‘writing’ as destruction of 
presence, while speech constituting the presence (1976, 142), Derrida uses Rousseau’s 
often used term supplement to deconstruct this and other dichotomies of absence and 
presence (original and addition) in his texts by recourse to its double meaning as a) 
addition to something already complete and b) as substituting a lack thereby completing 
what is already claimed as complete. Kurdistan as ‘sign’ within the cartography of the 
film and Kurdistan as geography, taken as ‘supplement,’ “exterior addition” (p. 145) may 
be taken as serving to give completion-- only in the sense of providing the complete 
picture of what constitutes ‘national territory’ as presence. For Güney’s absence from 
Turkey, one can only say it made the completion of the film possible. While the film was 
shown ‘outside’ of Turkey when Güney received the Cannes award in France, until the 
late 1990s the film was banned – absent --  in Turkey. Then, when it was shown in 
Turkey, the absence of the sign also further comments on the complicity of the geography 
of exhibition and its cartographic determinants, and the geography within the film. The 
comments on originality of the film suggests that the limit of the originality of the film as 
it could be shown in Turkey constitutes its overall authenticity. The film, however, 
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problematizes the arbitrary equivalency of the geography of exhibition (its authenticity 
depends on what it can be shown in a particular place), and the geography within the film 
(both the sign as place and as extra footage). Completion, either through the excision of 
the part, which is what happened during the public screenings in Turkey, or alternatively, 
completion by seeing the film through that part that is deemed as addition, as supplement. 
As for the narrative function of the sign, as supplement, it addresses both Turkish 
nation-space as the central problematic and the patriarchy that is still intact in that space 
the road sign refers to. The tension between the existence of ‘Kurdistan’ and its 
catastrophic effects on the characters inhabiting it is kept up throughout the film. Rather 
than a utopian space, Kurdistan is shown as ‘space of entrapment,’ not only of the state 
apparatuses but also of the apparatuses of feudalism. Yet the sign, cleverly works to 
separate simultaneously the region as ‘Kurdistan’ and reconnect it to Turkish nation-
space as product of state violence, the sign becomes a deconstructive point to address the 
entire nation-space as space of entrapment. Waiting the characters in the region, hence, is 
not any better than their prison life. Seyyit Ali’s wife, who started working in a brothel 
after he ends up in prison, is kept in the basement on her parents’ house until her husband 
takes her life to avenge the honor of the family, in accordance with the traditions. Mevlüt 
constantly complains about his fiancée’s female relatives who keep them under 
surveillance the entire time they are together. The brothel he goes to feel ‘free’ does not 
give him respite, as its prison-like structure only exacerbates his claustrophobia when the 
prostitute tells him to wait in the room with the same number as his prison cell. Mehmet 
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Salih finds his wife, Emine, in the house of her parents who, after the accident caused by 
him costing his brother-in-law’s life, declares him as blood enemy. The couple escapes 
the city by train. However, during their claustrophobic train ride, their son shoots them.  
The films in this chapter are dealing with the issues relating the mechanisms of 
construction and the maintenance of nation-space such as national borders, militarization 
of everyday life, and national pedagogy. Although Kurdish cinema refers to the films on 
Kurds in the diaspora, Iraq, Iran and Syria, and Turkey, my main focus here is what is 
referred to as ‘Kurdistan Bakur,’ which overlaps with the territory constituting Doğu. In 
order to discuss the films, I specify three sites through which the discourse of Doğu is 
deconstructed in Kurdish cinema: city, village, and the border. In the first site, I analyze 
films dealing with the production of urban space within the region since 1990s. I look at 
two films, Min Dȋt/I Saw (Miraz Bezar, 2004), on the life of two siblings in the city of 
Diyarbakir after their parents are assassinated by the secret paramilitary state force, 
JITEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence Anti-Terror Team) and Press (Sedat Yılmaz 2010), 
which also takes place in Diyarbakir, and deals with the pro-Kurdish daily, Özgür 
Gündem (Independent Agenda) that started publishing in 1990s. For the second site, I 
analyze the production of village space, and look at  two films. The first is Ax/The Earth 
(Kazım Öz 1999), which narrates the story of Zelo, the elder of a Kurdish village, who 
decides to stay in his village with his wife and dog after the village is evacuated for the 
security reasons by the gendarmerie. The second film, Iki Dil Bir Bavul/On the Way to 
School (Özgür Doğan and Orhan Eskiköy 2008), chronicles the life of a Turkish primary 
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school teacher assigned to a primary school in a Kurdish village, where almost no 
students know Turkish. The film depicts the absurd encounter of non-Turkish speaking 
Kurdish students with their non-Kurdish speaker teacher. For the third site, I examine 
production of border space. The main focus here is Turkey’s eastern and southern borders 
with reference to the films taking place on the Iran-Iraq border. Klamek Ji Bo Beko/A 
Song For Beko (Nizamettin Arıç 1992) is on Beko who, after the disappearance of his 
brother, sets out a journey across four parts of ‘Kurdistan’ to search for him. Dol/Valley 
(Hiner Saleem 2007) is about Azad, who is living in a village on the Turkish side of 
Turkey-Iraq border and has to cross the border into Kurdistan after shooting a military 
officer on the day of his wedding. While not directly related to the borders of Turkey, 
Bahman Ghobadi’s films taking place on the Iran-Iraq border are perfect examples of 
how Kurdish directors perceive and experience the borders. Ghobadi’s films deal with 
families and relatives whose lives are divided by the borders and have to cross the 
borders to survive economic and political hardships. Zamani Barayé Masti Asbha / A 
Time for Drunken Horses (2000) tells the story of five orphaned siblings taken care of by 
the oldest brother who has to do border smuggling across the heavily mined Iran-Iraq 
border. Niwemang/Half Moon (Bahman Ghobadi 2006) is about a Kurdish musician 
family who, after the fall of Saddam, want to cross to Iraq to perform on a concert to 
celebrate Saddam’s fall. Gomgashtei dar Aragh/Marooned in Iraq (2002) is about a man 
who wants to cross the border into Iraq to see his dying ex-wife.54 
                                               
54 In choosing the films, I attempted to select representative films while limiting the focus to those dealing 
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INTERNATIONAL KURDISH CINEMA CONFERENCE 
The themes and concerns of the chapter are informed by the International Kurdish 
Film Festival [Konferansa Sinemaya Kurdȋ ya Navnetewȋ] that took place in the city of 
Diyarbakir in 2009. The conference was the first – and so far the only one– of its kind. 
Although during the last decade several Kurdish film festivals have been organized in 
different capitals of the world such as London, Paris, New York, Melburn, Montreal, 
Berlin, the conference was the first occasion for the Kurdish directors, critics and a large 
audience to share an organized platform to discuss the concept of ‘Kurdish Cinema.’ It 
was also important that a Kurdish cinema conference could be organized in Turkey’ 
despite the repression of the discussion of Kurdish problem outside the state venues  due 
mainly to the support of the pro-Kurdish Diyarbakir Metropolitan municipality, which 
also hosted the event, and despite all the odds attached to the volatile political process 
between the government and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) that was 
banned by the Constitutional Court during the same month as the conference on the 
premise of its alleged connection with the PKK.  
                                                                                                                                            
with the spatiality ‘ Kurdistan Bakur’. While a general study on Kurdish cinema would likely include 
Hisham Zaman’s Vinterland (2007) about Renas, a Kurdish refugee in Norway who wants to get married to 
a woman from ‘Kurdistan’ (of Iraq), Yuksel Yavuz’s Kleine Freiheit / Little bit of Freedom (2003) about 
Baran, a Kurdish refugee in Germany, and Hüseyin Karabey’s Gitmek: My Marlon and Brando /To Go: My 
Marlon and Brando (2008), about a Turkish woman falling in love with a Kurdish man from Iraq and her 
attempt to reach her during the 2003 U.S. intervention, these are not included in the chapter. Also excluded 
is Kazım Öz’s Fotograf, which is about road friendship of two adolescents on their way to the eastern 
Turkey/Kurdistan), one going to attend Turkish Army, the other attending the PKK. Öz elegantly deals 
with the characters’ different attachments to that space while connecting the story to the larger issue of the 
militarization and nation-space. Since his earlier film Ax, included in the chapter, addresses a very similar 
process. I decided to use only one of them to avoid overlap. 
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The main concern of the conference was to define the emergent Kurdish cinema: 
whether or not it can be considered ‘national cinema,’ how to handle the political, 
technological, financial, and aesthetics hardships affecting the film productions; strength 
and weaknesses of the existing films, and the must-do’s of the Kurdish cinema.55 What 
was fascinating during the conference was the overcritical response of the audience 
towards the films shown throughout the conference.56 The directors, whose films had 
been premiered at international film festivals and praised by international audiences were 
obviously not expecting such an intense level of criticism. One of the films screened 
during the conference, Min Dȋt/Before Your Eyes (Miraz Bezar 2009) was dismissed on 
account of misrepresenting political ‘facts’, and the inability to capture the ‘revolutionary 
atmosphere’ during the 1990s that was the films starting point. Kilometre Zero (2005, 
Hiner Saleem) was dismissed due to its confused linguistic map of ‘Kurdistan’. The main 
                                               
55 From the selection of the directors, the films and the presenters, it was obvious that the organizers, and 
later confirmed by the participants, had a clear idea what is not to be included in Kurdish cinema. Kurdish 
directors Yılmaz Erdoğan, Mahsun Kırmızıgül, and Gani Rızgar Savata are not invited to the conference. 
Erdoğan, while a progressive artist and director and have a pro-Kurdish stance in terms of government’s 
Kurdish policies, has not been engaged in Kurdish issue in his two films Vizontele (2001), and Vizontele: 
Tuuba (2004) taking place in the Kurdish region. The films are made for the general public and received 
huge box office return. Kırmızıgül’s position is less favorable. A singer-actor turned director, his films, 
Beyaz Melek / White Angel (2004) and Güneşi Gördüm / I Saw the Sun (2009), both dealing with the 
Kurdish issue, are considered ‘self-orientalizing’ pieces reproducing the discourse of noble savage, while 
failing to address state violence in the region. Güneşi Gördüm confirms the ‘terrorist-innocent Kurd-State’ 
discursive triangle that has been fashioned by the state to solve the Kurdish problem. The films starts in a 
Kurdish village under the cross-fire by the Turkish army and the PKK. A Turkish army commander helps 
to the villagers to ‘evacuate’ the village and offer a family to go to his hometown to stay with his family 
until they find a job there. The ‘relationship’ stirred criticism against the film during a process that the 
Human rights records mention the number of the villages evacuated as many as 4000. (Human Rights 
Watch). In ‘The Kurdophlia of Official Discourse ’Müjde Arslan states that Kırmızıgül’s films aim to 
depoliticize Kurds by representing them as good ‘citizens’ trapped between two fires. (Arslan 2009). 
Savata’s films on the other hand are kitch replicas of Turkish melodramas, where the political process is 
reduced down to individual fatalism. 
56 The conference was subtitled “Six Films, Six Geographies.” Min Dȋt/I Saw (2009) by Miraz Bezar, 
Kilometre Zero / Zero Kilometer (2005) by Hinar Saleem, Vinterland/ (2007) by Hisham Zaman,…… 
166 
 
character, Ako, speaks in Kurmanci, a dialect spoken by the Kurdish population inside 
Turkey, is found an unrealistic portrayal of linguistic situation in Northern Iraq where 
Sorani is the predominant Kurdish dialect spoken among the Kurdish population.  
An important question that the encounter of the audience with the films and their 
directors brings about is the source of this discrepancy between the former’s response to 
the films being screened throughout the festival and the directors’ politico-aesthetic 
judgments behind the production of these films. The question points to a crucial issue of 
the make up of the modern Kurdish population. While the majority of the directors are 
diasporic/exilic living in Europe, the audience of the conference was composed of those 
who stayed in the regiom. The two live in two different spatio-temporalities. The city of 
Diyarbakir, the location of reception, is the political and cultural center of the Kurdish 
politics and has been the most politicized city in Turkish Kurdistan since the 1960s. 
During the war, the population of the city more than quadrupled due to the systematic 
destruction of the Kurdish villages as part of the war efforts. Traumas of war coupled 
with overpopulation, petit crime, a high prostitution level, and the resultant urban 
degeneration. These spatial registers affected the shape of the political culture within the 
city. On the other hand, all of the directors attending the conference were either from 
outside Turkey or left Turkey before the war spread to the urban centers in the region. 
Miraz Bezar and Yüksel Yavuz left Turkey in the early 1980s and currently live in 
Germany. Hiner Saleem and Hisam Zaman are from ‘Iraqi Kurdistan.’ Zaman lives in 
Norway and Saleem lives in France. None of the directors experienced the ongoing war 
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between the PKK and Turkish army in the region nor were they part of the political 
socialization process in Turkish Kurdistan since the 1980s. However, despite the 
disagreements between the overpoliticized Diyarbakirite audience and the diasporic 
Kurdish directors, what seemed to unite the two was the conviction that ‘Kurdistan’ is the 
main spatiality of Kurdish cinema. The disagreement over the assumed function of 
cinema within/for the national struggle, whether cinema would be an uninterrupted aid to 
national struggle or it has a semi-autonomous existence and different dynamics are 
involved in its production is an important point for the argument of this chapter.  
KURDISH CINEMA AND ‘KURDISTAN’ AS CINEMATIC SPACE 
The cinema has become an important cultural medium within Kurdish political 
struggle.57 Yet while an independent ‘Kurdistan’ has until recently been a primary aim of 
the Kurdish struggle, Kurdistan as cinematic space is more ambiguous than the political 
claims on Kurdistan as spatial matrix of political struggle. Even though ‘Kurdistan’ 
                                               
57 There are several reasons, both internal and external, why cinematic medium has gained a prime 
importance for the Kurdish struggle. The universal language of cinema, unlike literature which requires 
more substantial effort to ‘translate,’ makes it a necessary strategy for a political struggle for whom ‘being 
visible’ by the international public has been deemed of crucial importance for recognition. On the other 
hand, like literature, cinema has become a medium of cultural reproduction, during a time when Kurds’ 
cultural representation is still an issue within the mainstream media of the countries they live in. Another 
reason is for the Kurdish movements, cultural production has been a part of political struggle especially 
after the movement became ‘urbanized’ due to the massive urban migration. In terms of ‘cultural policy,’ 
Kurdish Question has been defined, by the national and international policy circles, more and more through 
the rhetoric of ‘cultural rights’ as part of the ethics of multiculturalism. Within Turkey’s EU membership 
process, cultural rights (taken as part of human rights) of the national minorities and proposed multicultural 
policymaking is a major area of contention between Turkey and the union. On the other hand, the 
multicultural policies have been introduced by the Turkish government with the expectation of de-
qualifying the political claims. Lastly, as an art form, cinematic production brings about different modes of 
political engagement that is complementary to the desire for national recognition. These factors make 
cinema as an important cultural medium as part of cultural reproduction and of a political strategy within 
the politics of multiculturalism.  
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appears as the index of cognitive map within Kurdish films, the films are more concerned 
with Kurdistan’s already fragmented state, and the realistic everyday life of Kurds than 
reclaiming Kurdistan within cinema through ‘revolutionary’ heroic figures ‘fighting’ for 
the political control of a particular territory that was ‘lost’ in the past. The opening 
remarks of Kemal Yıldızhan, the head of the Diyarbakır Cinema Club and the moderator 
of the first-day panels at the Kurdish Cinema conference explain the aims and 
motivations of Kurdish cinematic production well: 
While being politically fragmented has been a problem for the Kurds, one 
wonders if this multicultural existence as a result of the political fragmentation; 
Kurds living in the ‘four parts’ and those living in diaspora, this state of double-
spiritedness would allow Kurds to give the world a new cinematic language. In 
fact, the main premise of the conference is the possibility of a ‘new cinematic 
language.’ […] This language will be more universal and it will save us from the 
language of provincial ‘broken cinema’ that has been imposed upon us. (emphasis 
added) 
The films expose the violent mechanisms securing and reproducing the binary 
oppositions inside/outside, modern/primitive, developed/underdeveloped, legible/illegible 
that are productive of nation-space, while denying the same violence –and authority -- to 
its characters in their encounter with the apparatuses of nation-state. Moreover, the films 
do not counter unproblematically one nation-space to another, i. e. Turkey versus 
Kurdistan, rather, they imagine ‘Kurdistan’ as ‘alternative spatiality.’ Corresponding to a 
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territoriality divided by four nation-states, yet inhabited predominantly by Kurdish 
people, cinematically Kurdistan is offered as the negation of what produces nation-space 
as geopolitical entity. For the characters in the films Kurdistan means independence and 
freedom, not necessarily bound with national borders under a nation-state. As will be 
seen in the discussion, none of the films assign national-borders to ‘Kurdistan.’  
Borders of Kurdish Cinema 
National borders have been a major concern in the representation of ‘Doğu’ in 
Turkish cinema. From Toprağın Kanı/Blood of the Earth (Atıf Yılmaz 1965) and 
Hudutlarin Kanunu/Law of the Borders (Lütfi Ömer Akad 1966) in 1960s to Bedrana 
(Süreyya Duru 1974), Kara Carsaflı Gelin /The Bride in Black Chador (Süreyya Duru, 
1975), Hazal (1979) in the 1970s to Katırcilar/Mule Riders (Şerif Gören 1987) and 
Derman/Remedy (Şerif Gören and Zeki Ökten 1984) in the 1980s, border smuggling 
allegorized the anxiety on the nation-space. Kurdish films share with the Turkish cinema 
having the borders as a main chronotope of representing the region. However, while in 
Turkish cinema borders constitute narrative and the spatial limit, beyond which lies 
death, in Kurdish cinema borders cross in the middle.  
Klamek Ji Bo Beko, starts with a map of this kind. Before leaving Turkey to evade 
conscription and attend Kurdish Peshmerga, Beko’s brother Cemal, explains how he 
would reach Badhinan, his destination in ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’ on a map he quickly draws on 
the ground. However, instead of drawing a map of ‘Kurdistan,’ he starts the map with the 
borderline separating Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, and then locating Bahdinan in the 
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‘upper Iraqi Kurdistan’ without specifying any borders other than the existing ones. The 
important part of this representational strategy, drawing ‘Kurdistan’ through existing 
national borders yet without assigning a national border of its own, specifying its limits, 
works to let the director comment upon the violence embodied in the construction and the 
maintenance of the very national borders. The film takes place towards the end of the 
Iran-Iraq war and right before the Halabja Massacre in 1988 when Saddam Hussein’s 
army gassed a Kurdish village causing thousands of Kurds to die. Cemal tells Beko, he 
may either use Turkey-Iraq border, which is “heavily protected by both Iraqi and Turkish 
army” or he can reach Bahdinan “through Syrian Border. ” After Cemal leaves, the 
gendarmerie comes to the village to search for him. The commander collects everybody 
hands-up in an open area surrounded by tens of armed soldiers pointing the guns towards 
them. The commander asks for Cemal but nobody answers except for the mukhtar who 
explains him that people do not understand his language, for nobody speaks in Turkish in 
the village. Nonetheless, he warns the villagers: 
Now, open your ears and listen to me carefully. I see you refuse to help me. 
Villages like yours do not have a long life. Mukhtar, why are we giving you 
money for Village guardianship and the guns? You have to inform us every 
unusual situation and make sure everybody in the village is loyal to the Turkish 
state.[….] Even birds should not fly without our knowledge here. In case of the 
smallest nuisance, your village will sure be destroyed like other villages. We 
show no mercy to those who supports separatists and the PKK. 
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Unable to make anybody speak, the soldiers ransack the houses and take Beko as 
hostage until Cemal surrenders. However, Beko manages to escape the military jeep and 
goes to the Syrian border. He crosses the border through the river camouflaged under the 
bushes. He overhears the border soldiers talking about the military operations under the 
Turkish flag. On the other side of the border a fellow Kurd meets him and takes him to 
the refugee camp. There Beko introduces himself as coming from ‘Turkish Kurdistan’ 
and wanting to go Bahdinan to search for his brother. Another fellow Kurd warns him to 
the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq and the overmilitarized borders. Along with two 
Peshmerga he eventually crosses the Iraqi border through the mountains and reach 
another refugee camp in Iraq. While he was staying there until he hears from Cemal, the 
village gets attacked by an Iraqi helicopter. He survives the attack and saves a little girl, 
the only survivor in the village. After the attack, he crosses the Turkish border and at the 
end of the film we see him in Germany, where the films started. He learns that his brother 
Cemal has been arrested by the Turkish army and shot dead during an armed encounter 
with the PKK. 
While ‘Kurdistan’ informs the characters’ spatial orientation in the region, it does 
not have a physical marker to identify it except for the borders as its negation. 
Nevertheless, ‘Kurdistan’ survives as part of a rhyme that the kids memorize as part of 
their education they receive under a makeshift open tent and in front of a small 
blackboard: “Em Kurdin, Welate me Kurdistanê. Hesp, pirtuk, al, kûsȋ” / We are Kurd, 
Kurdistan is our nation. Horse, book, flag, tortoise. The second part of the rhyme sets up 
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a deterritorialized cartography through identification with ‘nomadic’ animals standing for 
‘Kurdistan.’ 
In Hiner Saleem’s Dol/Valley (2007) the main character, Azad (the free one) is 
also destined to cross the border after his armed encounter with an army officer on his 
wedding day. Unlike Beko, in Dol we see the sign of the ‘Kurdistan’ of Kurdistan 
Autonomous Region (KAR). Azad’s journey into Kurdistan intersects with three other 
Kurds, one from Iraqi Kurds (Jekaf), one from ‘Kurdistan of Iran’(Taman) and the other 
one from Diaspora in France (Ҫeto). On the border of Kurdistan, a civilian border officer 
greets them and let them in even though neither Azad nor Jekaf carries passports. The 
narrative brings together all Kurds from different parts in KAR. The autonomous region 
provides safety to the characters, but they still have to move back and forth across the 
borders to connect with their beloved ones.  
The film opens with Azad’s story on a barren hillside. As the camera pans to the 
left on the hillside, we see a Turkish flag and an inscription “Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene” 
painted on the rocks of the hill. In the next scene, we see a cow looking at the painting 
sadly, then in the next scene, we see the cow lying dead on the ground. As another mark 
on the space, this time on the air, the soldiers blow a huge white balloon on which states 
the same “Ne Mutlu” inscription. Both the ground and the air thus marked by national 
identity. While the flag is simply an identity marker that works to nationalize a territory, 
the inscription announces much more. It refers to the state of non-identification and uses 
a language of ‘curse’ to address those who do ‘not’ belong. Although the intended effect 
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of the proverb is not the sudden death of the onlooker like the cow, it subjects the 
onlooker to a precarious life, intensified by the barrack and the flag as the only 
representations of Turkishness. The matching of the inscription with the barrack works to 
point to how the former regulates the national life. What is important in the proverb is not 
that only Turks deserve to be blessed (the literal meaning of the text), but the state of 
being to which those who are not blessed would be subjected to. The very existence of 
the barrack works to deal with what lays outside the ‘blessed’ national identity. While it 
seems to be describing the Turks, the proverb actually regulates who is not Turk.58  
Yet, the victim of the border as violence is not only the Kurd. The security 
barrack is located across the hillside, where the recently-appointed commander talks to 
his wife: 
[…] Here? Here is like Hell. I feel like I am in the Bermuda Triangle. Here is 
Turkey, behind the mountain is Iran and on the other side is Iraq. There is not 
even a bar here. They are all backward people. Half of them are smugglers and 
the other half separatists. It’s been a week but it feels like a year. 
The paranoia-inducing solitude and alienation of the army crew within the ‘hell-
like’ nation-space, furthermore, turns into arbitrary violence as time passing activity for 
the soldiers. A soldier warns the commander about Azad that he should watch out of him. 
                                               
58 We see the proverb, the military presence, and space  as directly related in Fotograf (2001) by the 
director Kazım Öz. The film is about two guys riding bus together to the East. One of them goes to a 
military headquarter to surrender to do his military service and the other one to join the PKK. As the bus 
enters the region, we start seeing the hills with the same inscription. The inscription signifies the absence 
and presence of Turkishness at the same time. The curse, sanctioned by the army, regulates the national 
identity within the region. 
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“Sir, he [Azad] thinks himself Don Quixote, Al Capone, even Che Guevera. He is a 
smuggler, has connection with the separatists. You will hear his name a lot in here.” Soon 
after Azad and two other villagers are taken into the barrack and beaten up despite the 
will of another army officer who disagrees with violence as an effective strategy to deal 
with the ‘problem.’ Azad’s wedding ceremony, on the other hand, contrasts with the fear-
inducing claustrophobic military barrack. The ceremony takes place outside on the hills. 
The singer, played by the famous singer Ciwan Haco, sings his ‘Diyarbakir’ song. The 
colorful dresses of the people – in contrast with the unicolor military suit--- and the joyful 
music turns the barren land into a living place. However, the arrival of the commander 
who gets annoyed by the Kurdish music turns the wedding into chaos after which Azad 
shoots the commander and leaves the village. 
Jekaf and Taman’s stories add a gender dimension to narrative through a similar 
stories of displacement. When she was 15, the Iraqi army bombarded Jekaf’s. She had to 
go to Baghdad where she started to sing in Arabic in a cabaret until her Kurdish accent 
became an issue. Then she had to come to ‘Kurdistan.’ Taman was a Radio DJ in Iran 
until the radio station got bombarded by the Iranian Army. Kurds from Iraq brought her 
to a hospital in KAR. Similar to Azad, she had to part with her fiancée who still stays in a 
camp in Iran. At the end of the film Taman and her fiancé are seen during their wedding 
ceremonies but the festivities get interrupted by the falling bombs on the camp. Azad 
goes back to his village to get his fiancée but both he and his fiancée get shot by the 
commander. 
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Dividing the narrative space, the borders have an atypical characteristic in these 
films. The borders that are crossed do not necessarily overlap with the geopolitical 
borders. Moreover the cross border mobility works to problematize inside and outside of 
the border crossed and what constitutes transnationality, defined within the literature as 
border-evading mobilities of bodies and signals. Certain cross-border mobilities in the 
films, such as character Ömer in Yol, stay within the same geo-political unit yet he 
experience the mobility as trans-national. In other films, like Klamek Ji Bo Beko, 
although Beko crosses more than one geo-political border, he does not experience cross-
nationality through the Kurdish families he meets beyond the borders. The same holds for 
the characters of Bahman Ghobadi’s films. In Zamani Barayé Masti Asbha, the border 
separates relatives, not nations. Hence, the borders of Kurdish cinema function according 
to the political cognition of the characters not the international state-system. In this way a 
cross-border mobility can be both transnational and intra-national depending on from 
what/whose perspective the mobility is narrated. The trajectory of the characters draws a 
new map across national borders which embody the violent cartographies of the nation-
states.  
Claiming the space-time of the city: Min Dȋt and Press 
Both Min Dȋt and Press take the city of Diyarbakır as space of their narrative. The 
city has been the center of Kurdish politics in Turkey since the 1960s and the site of 
hegemonic contestation between pro-Kurdish parties and the Turkish governments. 
However, the importance of the city goes back to the 1920s when the city became a nerve 
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center of the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 and the alleged home to the Sheikh Said’s 
grave after he and his comrades were executed in the downtown Dağkapı area of the city. 
In the 1960s, the Worker’s Party of Turkey gained one MP seat from the city. In the 
1970s, pro-Kurdish Mehdi Zana, a tailor by profession, was elected the mayor of the city. 
In 1990s, the city turned into a site of urban warfare. In 2008, before the local elections, 
the Turkish Prime minister, in his address to the public in Diyarbakır, referring to the 
city, stated that they would “conquer the stronghold” of the pro-Kurdish DTP only to be 
reciprocated by the Mayor of the city claiming to “hold on to” the city. 
In both Press and Min Dȋt, the stories unfold within an urban space contained by 
tanks (panzer), police cars and secret service vehicles (white Renault automobiles as 
quintessential indexical sign of urban containment). Press tells the story of the pro-
Kurdish daily Özgür Gündem (Independent Agenda) in mid-1990s. Like other Kurdish 
cities in the region, the city was under the State of Emergency Rule (OHAL).59 In the 
Diyarbakir office of Özgür Gündem, four reporters and one editor work. They have to 
send the news and visuals to the Istanbul office for publication and distribution. 
However, the office is under 24-hour surveillance. Early in the film we see one of the 
reporters on the street forced into a police vehicle blind-folded and taken to outside the 
city and threatened by the JITEM officer to quit his job. Not only are the life of the 
reporters under threat, their mobility in the city is constricted too. They cannot print the 
                                               
59 In order to create the chronotope, the director uses CGI of tanks and the other vehicles. When the 
characters are seen outside, tanks usually obstruct their view and the sound of the military planes marks the 
soundscape of the film. 
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pictures for the news because the printhouses are also threatened by the security forces. 
They cannot mail the materials to the Istanbul office because the Post Office opens every 
piece of mail before sending it to its destination. The army also controls the incoming 
mails and the newspapers. When the office receives the newspapers, distribution is made 
clandestinely through informal channels by Fırat, the office boy, or given to corner stores 
as long as they manage to stay open.  
The response by the crew of Özgür Gündem to the highly militarized urban space 
and violence is different in kind. To begin with, the protagonists’ affective attachment to 
the city is different. The film opens in one of the room inside the office where the 
reporters work. An audiocassette player hooked to an analogue desktop clock is the first 
thing seen in the film. The clock at a certain time activates an electric circuit that turns on 
the audiocassette player. The machine plays the song ‘Diyarbekir’ from a pirated copy of 
an audiocassette of the famous Kurdish singer Ciwan Haco. The lyrics of the song starts 
with the following line: “Min navê xwe kola li burcên Diyarbekir”/I inscribed my name 
on the towers of Diyarbekir. The desire to appropriate the city is made obvious from the 
first scene of the film. The sound of the music would contrast with the deadly soundscape 
created by the military vehicles throughout the film. When the editor pointed out the 
censorship at the post office, the Fırat suggests they use intercity buses, which are much 
harder to control. Also, when the crew learns that the military is not letting the 
newspapers in the region, it decides to ‘depend on the people’ to transport and distribute 
the newspapers. The children ‘appointed’ by Fırat start clandestinely distributing the 
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newspapers to the readers. They finally have to turn one of the rooms in the office into 
darkroom for printing the photos when the printing shop stopped printing their pictures. 
These tactics used by the reporters of Özgür Gündem resembles what James Scott 
calls “weapons of the weak:” unorganized (in the sense of the not being “revolutionary” 
practice), based on the informal networks and avoiding direct or symbolic confrontation 
with authority (Scott, xvi). What these tactics by the crew in response to the spatial 
entrapment by the state of emergency rules tries to achieve is to create lines of escapes 
that the military power cannot control. The ‘informal networks,’ ‘depending on the 
people’ are the important components of that tactic. However, these tactics originate not 
only as the only way to survive the military presence, although it is an important 
component: Faysal, one of the reporters, who carries a gun for self-defense, is highly 
criticized by the others. Yet the same day he leaves his gun in the office, he gets shot by a 
secret service agent. The film denies military means to its characters for a particular 
reason. The crew counters not only ‘the power,’ but also the means of power through 
which the urban space is subjugated. As stated by the editor, it is only the negation of 
violence as method, life can be justified as productive, even though eventually it causes 
the death of the individuals. In the end, the film makes its statement clear. Alişan, another 
reporter taking up Faysal’s unfinished story about the existence of a secret paramilitary 
force founded by the state, goes to interview an influential political figure in the city of 
Hakkari. This time he carries a gun for protection. In a conversation with one of the men 
of the political figure, who called Alişan after the political figure gets shot following the 
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initial interview the man asks him to take his ‘handsome’ picture ‘like in the films’ while 
he points his gun towards the lens of Alişan’s camera. Alişan carries the camera in one 
hand and the gun in his other hand inside his pocket. Although Alişan realizes that it is a 
set up and he will be shot, he decides to press the shutter, instead of the trigger.  
The protagonist of Min Dȋt follows a similar ‘non-violent’ path as Alişan. The 
film begins in 1990s yet covers approximately a decade in the city. The film is about two 
siblings, Gulistan and Fırat, and the dramatic turn in their lives after their parents, --
journalists for a pro-Kurdish journal -- are assassinated by a JITEM officer.60 The 1990s, 
or ‘Doksanlar,’ (nineties) as it is referred to within the temporality of Kurdish struggle, 
witnessed the increased violence within the city as a response to the rising popularity and 
hegemony of PKK vis-à-vis the state. After the parents’ assassination, Firat and Gulistan 
are left without any means to make their living. After their neighbor, their only social and 
economic support is forced to leave the city, the siblings start selling their household 
goods, and when everything is gone their landlord kicked them out. To survive in the 
city, they start selling napkins and lighters on the streets. Soon, Firat begins to pickpocket 
as part of an adolescent gang, while Gulistan accompanies a woman, Dilan, who, 
                                               
60 In the Kurdish cinema conference, the film is dismissed by the audience as unrealistic. I argue that while 
historical references are abundant, the film does not aim at realism as much as it offers a new reality 
through a temporal montage. Past and the present intermingles in an assemblage of forms of violence 
productive of the urban experience during the war. The history of urban violence becomes life story of the 
main characters. The film shows the children as the bearer of urban experience in Diyarbakir. The parents 
are assassinated in 1990s, the city the kids are strolling in is the product of post-war urban reconstruction in 
the early 2000s: the city walls and the new downtown area are rehabilitated. The film re-registers the 
1990s’ JITEM, prostitution, child labor, robbery to the space-time of new urban reality. 
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unknown to Gulistan, is a prostitute. Dilan uses Gulistan as a cover to not to attract 
attention single women on the street. Gulistan provides Dilan with mobility and 
invisibility in the militarized and masculine public space.  
The only thing Gulistan managed to keep from her parents is an audiocassette that 
her mother recorded of her own voice reading the story of a wolf in a village. The story 
works as the central narrative – and the message-- of the film. The story is about a wolf 
that repeatedly comes to a village and each time captures a lamb from the village flock. 
Although the villagers are tired and frustrated by the wolf, they are unable to do anything. 
But one day, the elder of the village approaches to the wolf from behind and puts a ring 
on its neck. Surprised, the villagers ask why he did not kill the wolf instead, and the elder 
responds that in this way the wolf no longer will be able to hurt any living being for 
whenever it attempts to approach its ring will announce its coming so that the preys 
would run away on time. The plan works and every time the wolf approaches the flock 
the shepherd hears the ring and protects the animals. In the end the wolf dies of hunger. 
The director uses the story to give the resolution to the narrative of the film: The violent 
‘wolf,’ threatening a social space and exposing the violence, instead of reproducing it to 
deal with the wolf. While the narrative may seem simple, it creates a phantasmatic 
structure for the otherwise realist representation of the film as it comes back at the end of 
the film. 
The way the urban space is represented in Min Dȋt, through the axes of identity 
and violence is brilliant. The films clearly differentiates the public and private use of 
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Kurdish language. Kurdish language is used in interpersonal communications among the 
characters. Throughout the film Gulistan speaks in Turkish only a few times: when 
negotiating prices for the household goods with a client who tries to fool her, when she 
sells napkins to people on the street. Firat also uses Turkish a few times; first time to the 
pharmacist who refuses to give him medicine for his sibling and when he rides the vendor 
and use the megaphone to advertise the stuff he is selling. In Dilan’s case the separation 
is clearer. Dilan is a Kurdish name, she does not use her real name when she works: 
Dilan becomes Turkish Dilara. She only speaks Turkish with her customers, who are 
mostly security officers. On the one hand, spatializing the use of Kurdish, namely, 
limiting its use to interpersonal communications while addressing the ‘public’ in Turkish, 
works to problematize the public space that is controlled by the state apparatuses; on the 
other hand, limiting Turkish language to the moments of frustration and humiliation 
registers the affective – political dimension of the language. The spatial and affective-
political coordinates of the language successfully work to define the Turkish language as 
a form of both spatial and political violence. Another spatial reference is though a song 
Gulistan, Firat and the other street kids sing one night around the fire. Like Ciwan Haco’s 
‘Diyarbekir’ in Press, the song ‘Ka welatê min Kurdistan?’ (Where is my country, 
Kurdistan?) works as means to appropriate the space. However, the song is interrupted by 
the police vehicle, which not seeing the kids, dumps a dead body into a pit near where the 
kids sit.  
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The tension escalates when, at the end of the film, Gulistan sees the JITEM 
officer, who killed her parents, talking to Dilan for a possible date. The officer takes them 
to his house. While the officer and Dilara are in the other room, Gulistan manages to steal 
the officer’s pistol and one of his pictures. However, instead of killing him, she rushes 
out to find Firat. Along with Fırat and other street kids Dilan puts into effect the 
‘fantasmatic’ solution to deal with the officer. She prepares flyers with the picture of the 
officer with a note explaining the real identity of the officer who is known publicly as 
decent public officer. She distributes the flyers within the officer’s neighborhood, while 
Fırat, climbed to the mosque’s minaret and screams through a megaphone to warn people 
to the real job of the officer “He is not who you think he is. He is a killer.” 
Village as Nation-space: Iki Dil Bir Bavul and Ax 
Turkish cinema has had an ambivalent attachment to the village. Finding there the 
authentic roots of the national identity and the pedagogical desire to modernize and 
include it into the modern national identity always went in hand in the representations of 
Anatolian villages. Yet the identity of the village is left unquestioned, while the cinematic 
critique is formed along the lines of the problematic of modernity taken as a temporal 
process. In the first chapter, I argued that the spatial expansion of the representation in 
the Turkish cinema towards the Anatolian village in the 1950s is informed by the desire 
to find/found a secular national culture, hence the cinematic representation of the villages 
should be read as part of the production of nation-space. While the pedagogical desire is 
still alive, the claim for ‘authenticity’ is replaced by a more direct assimilationist function 
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of the education in the Kurdish region. In addition to the national-pedagogical desire, 
since 1980s, the villages have assumed another importance for the nation-state. In the 
fight with the PKK, the Kurdish villages have been deemed crucial sites by the state as 
they provide the militias and the accommodation for the PKK. The village guard system61 
introduced in the mid-1980s was one of the official responses to the double function of 
the Kurdish villages, the other being depopulating the villages in the region. Both Iki Dil 
Bir Bavul and Ax take place in the village and problematize both education and 
evacuation as twin-processes of the production of nation-space. 
Ax takes place in a Kurdish village that is evacuated by the Turkish gendarmerie. 
Zelo, the main character, his wife and his dog are the only ones staying in the village 
after the evacuation. Yet Zelo’s wife dies soon after and the soldiers kill his dog. The film 
opens from within the grave Zelo digs for his wife. On his way back from the graveyard 
he sees the village guards who ask him if he has anybody to bury him when he dies. Back 
in the village, we see boot prints of the soldiers on the ground and the boot of soldiers 
soon after comes into the frame still searching for Zelo in his house. Although they don’t 
find anybody, they set the house on fire. Throughout the film we see the soldiers only 
through their boots. Neither the soldiers are given proper body to inhabit the space, as 
everything but the boots are kept outside the frame, nor is their presence amount to more 
                                               
61 Village guards are appointed by the state among the local population who are not sympathetic to PKK. 
They are militia units  to keep the PKK away from the region. As they are not accountable for their actions 
within their jurisdictions, they have become very powerful. They are a main agents responsible for human 
rights violations in the Kurdish region. Their number reached 65.000 by the end of the 1990s. (Bruinessen 
2007) 
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than boot prints and the smoke that the burnt house produces. On the contrary, the films 
re-registers the village to the owners through Zelo’s memories seen in flashbacks. During 
his walk among the still smoking houses he hears the sound of drums. Men gathered and 
having conversation, kids are playing with the animals, a woman on the mule is 
approaching his way. People are speaking in Kurdish. However, everything disappears 
suddenly. In another remembering sequence the camera from Zelo’s point of view enters 
a room full of men playing music. Zelo salutes everybody and they welcome him in 
Kurdish. Yet they also suddenly disappear and only the broken instruments on the floor 
stays in the frame. In the last flashback sequence, Zelo remembers the day the villagers 
leave the village: they carry their houses on top of the mules, their animals follow them. 
Zelo’s grandson begs him to go with them otherwise they would kill him too. Zelo’s 
village is not totally destroyed though. The village school is the only building that is left 
untouched by the army and it’s still erect structure contrasts with the perished village. In 
a sequence we see Zelo walking inside the school garden. He comes face to face with the 
bust of Mustafa Kemal also seen in the frame is the Turkish flag on the background as the 
only discernible marks of ‘identity’ in the village. That there is nobody to ‘benefit’ from 
the school, yet still keeping it within the village-no-more, works to problematize the 
school with the bust and the flag as nationalizing ‘spatial marks’ on an otherwise generic 
post-apocalyptic village.  
The village school also works as the main setting in Iki Dil Bir Bavul/ On the Way 
to School The film documents the first year of a young Turkish teacher, Emre, in a 
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primary school in an eastern Kurdish village as his first place of enrolment. As a 
national/modern fantasy, an idealist ‘Western’ teacher, going to the rural Anatolia to 
enlighten the people there is a common genre in the Turkish literature since 1930s; from 
Yakup Kadri’s ‘Yaban’ (Savage) to the 1940s and 50s ‘village realism’ to the post-1960 
social realist films on the eastern Turkey such as Toprağın Kanı/Blood of the Soil (Atıf 
Yılmaz 1965) and Hudutlarin Kanunu/Law of the Borders (L. Ö. Akad 1966). On the 
Way to School has Emre at the center of its narrative. He is from a western city, Denizli 
and although caught surprised that he is assigned to a remote village that he cannot even 
find on the map (Ҫiçek 2011), he tries to keep intact the Republican mission of educating 
the people.  
Directors Doğan and Eskikoy follow the teacher from the day he comes to the 
village and throughout the film they document his interaction with the students and the 
parents. The village is out of running water and electricity is cut regularly where it exists 
at all and the school has only one classroom. When the Imam and the head of the village 
visit him at the school building, Emre shares with them his disappointment on seeing the 
state of the village after coming from a ‘city’ where there are tall buildings and whatever 
one imagines is abundant. With the help of the village head Emre manages to find the 
kids who are supposed to be students. His initial difficulty in finding his way in the 
village is, people do not speak in Turkish among themselves. In the case of the 
prospective students, the problem is even more tragic: the kids do not even have the basic 
knowledge of Turkish to understand him, nor does he know Kurdish to communicate 
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with the students. The situation get worse when on the first day of the classes, the Emre 
announces his first rule: “No Kurdish in the classroom!” and he continues: “Why? 
Because our lectures are in Turkish. Now if you speak in Kurdish, I won’t understand 
what you say. Throughout the eight year primary education, everything is in Turkish.” 
Alas, the students do not understand what he says. Although later on he manages the 
students to comply with the rule, it leads to monologs and repetitious sessions. Most of 
the students don’t speak, don’t understand and they occasionally ‘repeat after’ the 
teacher. The films juxtapose the state of the village, his position in the village and his 
desire to teach Turkish when nothing is Turkish in the village. His precarious life in the 
village contrasts with his authority in the classroom. Yet his authority fails, as it is not 
communicated. 
The directors brilliantly relate the pedagogical process to the spatial production by 
way of a series of juxtapositions. Within the village, the language of communication is 
Kurdish. Outside the school is the only place communication continues. The classroom 
with the mini Turkish flags, the blackboard, the posters to teach Turkish is 
overwhelming. Due to the lack of classrooms all available students are dumped into the 
same classroom. Add to this is the fact that it is a silent space for the kids. The teacher 
punishes the students who speak in Kurdish. When they speak in Kurdish, they stand on 
one foot in front of the blackboard. It is a total space of domination, if one does not count 
the lack of communication. Within the school garden, we see the same bust of Mustafa 
Kemal and the Turkish flag we saw in Ax. Every morning in front of the school building, 
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the students recite “The Oath.” It starts with “I am Turk. I am right. I am diligent” and 
ends with “May my existence be gift to the existence of the Turks. Blessed is the one how 
calls oneself a Turk. ”On Children’s Day, the students plant trees and play competitive 
games unlike their usual collective games. On that day, the teacher wants to communicate 
the importance of the day to the students. He himself answers the questions he asks 
students after a short silent pause not filled by the students: 
[A]pril 23
rd
. What happened on that day? The Parliament is founded! Which 
nation is celebrating this holiday? Turkish nation! Where are we living? …In 
Turkey! Appreciate that! 
While the violence ingrained in the pedagogical process is seen throughout the 
film, the directors do not attempt to personalize the violence. Emre is seen as a 
committed, idealist teacher who wants to make change in the village, which he believes 
would be done through education. The verité style allows the directors show his 
precarious state in the village. As he is unable to communicate with his students and the 
parents, he becomes more alienated. The teacher’s relationship with the villagers and the 
students is mediated by the state. Emre tries to embody the state discourse yet his 
‘unmediated’ physical interaction haunts his pedagogical duty. In the school garden, we 
see him asking a student why he is not playing with his classmates. As he does not get 
any response, he continues: “You have no idea what I am talking about, right? I don’t 
understand you, either. What are we going to do?”  
188 
 
Ironically, the villagers know the absurdity and impossibility of the task yet they 
respect and try to help the teacher. For them, though, the purpose of the education is bit 
different. A mother supports the education claiming that a ‘foreign language’ may benefit 
the kids in the long run. The most absurd part is when Emre has the parents come to 
meeting to discuss the situation of the students. He complains to the parents that, “They 
[the students] don’t know Turkish”. And he continues: “That’s OK. But if you stimulate 
them to speak in Turkish, that would be great. They don’t understand my language.” 
Ironically, after Emre finishes his sentence, a father asks him to wait so that he can 
translate what he just said into Kurdish for the mothers. 
While the teacher ‘marks’ the space as Turkish through pedagogical techniques, 
he is not able to reproduce national identity due to his lack of understanding – both 
linguistically and historically—and inability to penetrate the everyday life of the 
inhabitants. At the end of the second semester, the kids are given their school report. 
Emre’s relatives pick him up from the school and the summer time starts for the kids. At 
the very end we see the kids swimming in a small pond, talking and screaming, unlike in 
the classroom. 
CONCLUSION 
The ‘creative’ tension between the struggle for territorial rights and the 
deterritorialized state of the Kurdish population, as wishfully stated by Yıldızhan, and 
reflected in the cinematic productions puts Kurdish cinema in a constructive tension with 
the current taxonomies in cinema studies. While ‘national’ struggle and its influence on 
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some of the Kurdish directors may put Kurdish cinema in the field of ‘national cinema,’ 
now debated categorization in the discipline due to the decoupling effects of ‘global 
capitalism’ (Sarkar 2006) and the transnational flows making obsolete the national 
borders as containers of territorial identities (Hjort and McKenzie 2000; Willemen and 
Vitali 2006; Iordanova, Martin-Jones and Vidal 2010), Kurdish cinema’s deconstructive 
engagement in the idea and the function of nation-state and national identity, and its 
‘fragmented’ transnationality, puts it apart from other ‘national’ cinemas. However, as 
discussed earlier, its transnationality, the exilic/diasporic state of its directors and the 
characters, do not prevent a different cartography that these trajectories draw: the 
transnationality and the intranationality of the characters’ trajectories would be decided 
according to from whose perspective the mobility is perceived. For a ‘transnational 
cinema’ perspective, which takes transnational mobilities as evading ‘national’ borders, 
the transnational mobility of the characters who do not cross national borders, like Ömer 
in Yol, and the intranational mobilities across national borders, like of Beko and Azad, 
would be an anomaly. The characters’ uneasy relationship with the national borders – 
their physical-legal existence yet cognitive infunctionality-- may help thinking on nations 
and borders beyond how they are classified within geopolitical thinking.  
In terms of funding sources and circulation venues  films are transnational. The 
directors not only struggle to secure funding from the governments of their host 
countries, they struggle to reach to their audiences, which makes international films 
festivals as main venue for their screenings. While they are experiencing the difficulties 
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of having no state-institutional base for international representation ---the films are 
invited to major international film festivals as part of the quota of their countries of 
citizenship, with which the directors have at best ambiguous relationship---it also 
provides them the freedom from a nationalizing state censorship. On the other hand, the 
spatial analysis of Kurdish cinema, while recognizing the fragmentedness, avoids reifying 
the transnationality and mobility. The mobilities of the directors and the protagonists 
unquestionably shape the cinematic production, yet what defines Kurdish cinema is its 
attachment to the spatiality, no matter how deterritorialized it has been and imagined. 
Transnationality is important as long as it shapes how the spatiality, Kurdistan, is 
imagined.  
Rather than mourning for the lack of a nation-state, the directors creatively deal 
with the causes and the effects of living without having a state of their own. The films 
create a non-violent cartography where even an ‘anti-colonial’ violence is not permitted. 
Gulistan, Zelo, Azad, Alişan are the figures that a ‘revolutionary’ political aesthetics 
would not accommodate. They not only avoid the contact with the apparatuses of state, 
when they come into contact, they refuse to retaliate in equal style. Unquestionably, the 
political and cultural struggle influenced/ inspired this cinematic production, yet its non-
violent aesthetic and its language is to an important extend determined by the 
deterritorialized states of the directors, who are able to turn the ‘lack’ into a new language 
of cinema and a non-state cartography. Namely, in the Kurdish context, the function of 
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the cinematic production is not to imagine a state for the space, but find a space where the 
state cannot find a way to. This is the premise, and the possibility of, a Kurdish cinema. 
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CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSION 
As the Kurdish question that evolved into an existential ‘national’ problem of 
both the Turkish state and the intelligentsia for more than a century, manifesting itself in 
different guises such as the problem of modernization, development, political violence, 
human rights, multiculturalism etc., the cinematic representation about Kurds has been a 
central topic within the cinematic in Turkey. The term ‘Kurdish question,’ unlike the 
rival ‘Eastern Problem,’ in itself does refer to the spatial claims that inform the Kurdish 
struggle, although the spatial claims indeed have been revised and negotiated throughout 
the history of the armed conflict, from an ‘independent Kurdistan’ up until the end of 
1990s and later on ‘democratic autonomy’ within a confederate system. Following this 
central spatial problematic, I argued that the analysis of the cinematic production 
regarding Kurds should start from the recognition of the centrality of ‘space’ within the 
Kurdish question. Following this argument, I proposed that any scholarly analysis in 
general of the cinematic representation of people inhabiting contested territories should 
put their space at the center of critical reflection for the very spatial claims over that 
particular spatiality forms the limits of cultural as well as political representation.  
Throughout the previous chapters, where I discussed four periods during which 
the cinematic representation is formed by a specific problematization, I claimed that 
while Kurdish question informed the cinematic representation, the politics of 
representation has been determined by the politics of space, namely the way the East had 
been appropriated by the political power and the filmmakers. Although Doğu as a 
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discursive space formed first and foremost within the state’s address of the East and 
worked to assimilate the region into the space of the nation, cinematic representation 
should be taken as a turning point in the representation of Doğu. Formed at the 
conjuncture of post-1960 politico-cultural regulations and reforms and followed the first 
critical academic studies on the region, cinematic Doğu both acknowledged, as the limit 
of representation, and subverted the contours of the discourse of Doğu. Yet, as I tried to 
show in the individual chapters, the national ‘spatial anxiety’ determined the politics of 
representation: the ghostly mobile bodies of the smugglers, the pre-modern the feudal 
lords, and the armed bandits haunted the cinematic space of Doğu.  
In every period one character becomes dominant in the films I discussed, yet I 
tried to show that the existence and the narrative function of these characters are due to 
the changing perception of the space these characters inhabit: the narrative structure of 
the film adaptations of Yaşar Kemal’s stories in the late 1950s, where an orphan villager 
trespasses the feudal hierarchy, by claiming the hand of the daughter of the feudal 
nobility, and outmaneuvering the feudal authority by fulfilling its one ‘impossible’ wish, 
juxtaposes the embryo of modern national subject with the ‘pre-modern’ feudal system 
still intact in rural Anatolia. The ‘smuggler’ in social realism of the 1960s reflects the 
border anxiety caused by the revival of the Kurdish movement both inside and outside the 
national borders. Maraba took the central space in cinematic representation in the 1970s 
as part of Socialist movement’s investment in the region and due to the short alliance 
between Turkish and Kurdish socialism. ‘Maraba,’ the revolutionary agency of socio-
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economic development, was the product of the socialist gaze that prioritized socialist 
revolution to realize national modernization. The representation of the ‘bandit’ of the 
1980s through the mid 1990s was mediated by the armed conflict. The free-floating and 
border-evading mobility of the bandit was the sign of spatial anxiety caused by the armed 
conflict. The contemporary migrant character is obviously the product of the war that 
caused the massive depopulation of the region scattering around millions of people 
around the western metropoles. It is only within the narrative economy of Kurdish films 
that Kurdish characters emerge as proper subjects. It is also within these films that the 
audience is reminded that the space that the characters inhabit is not Doğu, but Bakur 
(North).  
Neither the few foundational novels of the early republican period where the 
eastern characters were portrayed in a derogatory way in stories of the victory of military 
might and the modern mind over the illiterate and ‘savage’ ‘mountain people,’ nor the 
fatalistic films portraying the deadly helplessness of the eastern people were nearly as 
popular as the films influenced by the revolutionary tradition. Yet the critical tradition in 
cinematic production informed by the socialist theory and anti-colonial politics, while not 
in the same way as the official discourse, took modern-feudal axis as the main structuring 
template for cinematic representation of Doğu. This perception determined class 
antagonism as the politico-ethical commitment behind cinematic production. The tension, 
thus emerged between the class antagonism and national liberation as possible 
trajectories of cultural politics, was the local reflection in Turkey of what, until 1990s, 
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occupied western Marxism as ‘national question’ (Ahmad 1992, Blaut 1987, Löwy 
1998). The disconnect between the conception of Doğu through the terms of class 
antagonism and national modernization thus prioritizing the independence of Turkey vis-
à-vis imperialism and identifying Turkish state as oppressive vis-à-vis the Kurds deeply 
inflected the politics of cinematic representation on Doğu. Although the Doğu as 
cinematic space and the Doğu of the state discourse differed on several grounds, the latter 
working against the basic contours of the former, the East stayed as Doğu in Turkish 
cinema.  
There are many questions and concerns raised in this project that need further 
discussion. I could only briefly mention the foundational role Yılmaz Güney played in 
both the formation of socialist cinema in Turkey and the Kurdish cinema. An academic 
work on the cinema of Yılmaz Güney has yet to exist. Another important concern is the 
issue of the censorship and cinema.  The existence of censorship is like a ghost haunting 
every single film. The analysis of censorship, another scholarly untouched subject in 
Turkish cinema, deserves serious study. My last chapter on Kurdish cinema was a later 
addition to this project’s formulation, yet the increasing number of Kurdish films and 
films festivals and conferences necessitated a reflection on this emerging cinema. The 
analysis of Kurdish cinema also showed me the validity of my methodology of ‘spatial 
reading’ of Turkish Cinema and the representation of Kurds therein. As I reflected on the 
individual films, I noticed the epistemic shift in the conception of the cinematic space of 
Kurdish films. The disappearance of ‘Doğu’ and the emergence of Kurdistan as cinematic 
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space in Kurdish cinema helped me better understand the subtleties of Doğu as location 
on the one hand and as discursive-cinematic space on the other. The changing ‘spatial’ 
parameters of Kurdish politics and their effects on Kurdish cinema is another issue I 
would like to address, but this one requires a longitudinal commitment. The question of 
how the Kurdish filmmakers will negotiate the aesthetic and political gap created by their 
transnational (diasporic) existence with an audience who, against all odds, still live closer 
to ‘home,’ and are still part of the Kurdish struggle, is also an important concern to 
address.  
Finally, my project is an initial attempt to start a conversation with the literature 
on national/transnational cinema debate. Discussing the production of national cinema in 
relation to spatial shifts within and without the field of cinematic production aims to 
contribute to the larger (trans)national cinema debate. Recently, the focus in cinema 
studies has shifted to ‘transnational mobilities’ that are claimed to make discussion of 
‘the national,’ as the scope of cinematic analysis, irrelevant. Taking the cinematic 
production as productive of space (part of the production of nation-space), rather than 
being bounded by ‘national territory’ would be the methodological contribution of this 
dissertation. This methodology problematizes the dichotomy of national vs. transnational 
(i.e. stasis vs mobility) by taking both of them as spatialities. My study discusses how 
national cinema and nation-space are intimately connected. Transnational cinema, exilic 
cinema, diasporic cinema, while shifted the focus away from national cinema, by 
emphasizing ‘mobilities’ nation-space framed by national borders has not lost its valence 
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as, in the films of transnational mobilities, traumatic lines of separation. We see in the 
films of the transnational (diasporic/exilic) directors, the borders are not as outmoded 
‘criscrossed’ constructs that belong to the past but they still define the lives of many in 
the ‘post-national moment.’ The chapter on Kurdish cinema aims to look at the symbiosis 
between nationality and transnationality, outside of dichotomous logic.  
Towards the end of the writing process, I was asked to help start a Cinema-
Television department in a new public university in the city of Mardin located in ‘the 
East.’ I take this as an opportunity to be a part of a process in which I have been only 
academically involved. The prospect of being able to educate the next generation of 
filmmakers and scholars who can be more spatially perceptive towards ‘the region’ is a 
wonderful reward for me as a scholar. The tension between Doğu (the east) and Bakur 
(north) is still expanding. Whatever comes out of it, I will be part of the process. 
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APPENDIX A: THE LIST OF THE FILMS IN THE EAST 
1950s 
Mezarımı Taştan Oyun/Dig My Grave in Stone (Atıf Yılmaz 1951) 
Ezo Gelin/Ezo: the Bride (Orhan Elmas 1955) 
Dağları Bekleyen Kız/The Girl Who Waits For the Mountains (Atıf Yılmaz 1955) 
Dertli Gelin Şirvan/Sirvan: The Rueful Bride (Muharrem Gurses 1955) 
Eceline Susamışlar/Those who Tempt Fate (Çetin Karamanbey 1959) 
Kaderim Böyle İmiş/I Was Born Ill Fated (Nejat Saydam 1959) 
1960s 
Mor Sevda/Purple Love (Huseyin Peyda 1961) 
Erkek Ali/Ali, the Man (Atıf Yılmaz 1964) 
Kara Yılan/Black Snake (Ümit Utku 1963) 
Hudutların Kanunu / The Law of the Borders (Lütfi Ömer Akad 1966) 
Ölüm Tarlası/ The Field of Death (Atıf Yılmaz 1966 ) 
Toprağın Kanı/The Blood of the Soil (Atıf Yılmaz 1965) 
Can Pazarı/The Market of Dead (Ertem Göreç 1968) 
Seyyit Han (Yılmaz Güney 1968) 
Ezo Gelin/Ezo: The Bride (Orhan Elmas 1968) 
Aç Kurtlar/Hungry Wolves (Yılmaz Güney 1969) 
1970s 
Eşkıya Oğlu/The Son of the Bandit (Mumtaz Alpaslan 1970) 
Acı/Pain (Yılmaz Güney 1971) 
Cemo (Atıf Yılmaz 1972) 
Dönüş / The Return (Türkan Şoray 1972) 
Ağrı Dağının Gazabı/The Wrath of Mount Ararat (Zeki Ökten 1973) 
Ezo Gelin/Ezo: The Bride (Feyzi Tuna 1973) 
Hudutların Kartalı/The Eagle of the Borders (Nuri Ergun 1973) 
Kızgın Toprak/Heated Earth (Feyzi Tuna 1973 
Sultan Gelin / Halit Refiğ / 1973 [The Bride, Sultan] 
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Şirvan ile Nazlı/Şirvan and Nazlı (Yavuz Figenli 1973) 
Bedrana (Sureyya Duru 1974) 
Ölüm Tarlası/The Field of Death (Yücel Uçanoğlu 1974) 
Salako/The Fool One (Atıf Yılmaz 1974) 
Kuma/Concubine (Atıf Yılmaz 1974) 
Kara Çarşaflı Gelin/The Bride in Chador (Süreyya Duru / 1975) 
Köprü/The Bridge (Şerif Gören 1975) 
Fıratın Cinleri/The Jinns of Euphrates (Korhan Yurtsever 1977) 
Onu KötüVurdular / They Shot Him Dead (Hüseyin Peyda 1977) 
Derviş Bey (Şerif Gören 1978) 
Kibar Feyzo/Feyzo: the Civilized One (Atıf Yılmaz 1978) 
Sürü/The Herd (Zeki Ökten 1978) 
Adak/Obilation (Atıf Yılmaz 1979) 
Hazal (Ali Ozgenturk 1979) 
İsyan/Distress (Orhan Aksoy 1979) 
Nazey (Osman F. Seden 1979) 
1980s 
Havar/Cry (Hüseyin Peyda 1980) 
Yılanı Öldürseler/When They Kill the Snakes (Turkan Şoray 1981) 
Yol/The Road (Şerif Gören 1982)  
Hakkaride Bir Mevsim/A Season in Hakkari (Erden Kıral 1982) 
Derman/Remedy (Şerif Gören 1983) 
Ayna/The Mirror (Erden Kral 1984) 
Kan/Blood (Şerif Gören 1985) 
Kurşun Ata Ata Biter/The Sea of Bullet (Ümit Elçi 1985)  
Züğürt Ağa/Penniless Agha (Nesli Çölgeçen 1985) 
Dilan (Erden Kıral 1986) 
Paşo (Samim Meriç 1986) 
Mayın/Land Mine (Fikret Uçak 1987) 
Katırcılar/ The Mule Riders (Şerif Gören 1987) 
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Gömlek/Shirt (Bilge Olgaç 1988) 
1990s 
Berdel (Atıf Yılmaz 1990) 
Ah Gardaşım / Oh My Friend (Kadir İnanır 1991) 
Mem Ile Zin/Mem and Zin (Ümit Elçi 1991) 
Siyabend ile Heco / Siyabend and Xece (Şahin Gök 1991) 
Kurşun Adres Sormaz/Bullet Asks No Address (Bilge Olgaç 1992) 
Drejan (Şahin Gök 1996) 
Propaganda (Sinan Çetin 1999) 
Sınır/Border (Gürsel Ateş and Gani Rüzgar Şavata 1999) 
2000s 
Maruf (Serdar Akar 2001) 
Vizontele (Yılmaz Erdoğan and Omer Faruk Sorak 2001) 
Vizontele: Tuuba (Yılmaz Erdoğan 2004)  
Yazı-Tura/Toss-Up (Uğur Yücel 2004) 
Büyü/Spell (Orhan Oğuz 2004) 
Beyaz Melek/White Angel (Mahsun Kırmızıgül 2007)  
Güneşi Gördüm/I Saw the Sun(Mahsun Kırmızıgül 2009) 
Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun / The Breath: Long Live the Nation (Levent Semerci 2009) 
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